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Attention Shifting to Social and Non-Social Cues in 
High-Functioning Individuals with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders by Joanne Neely 
ABSTRACT 
Impairments in attention shifting and inhibitory mechanisms have been implicated as 
possible deficits underlying the behavioural symptomatology of autism. These hypotheses 
were explored in the first experimental chapter using variations of Posner's covert 
attention task. No pervasive deficits were found on the attention shifting tasks in either 
the voluntary or automatic modes. Furthermore, the inhibitory mechanism `inhibition of 
return' appeared to be intact. To extend this investigation of visual attentional abilities in 
autism, two visual search tasks were employed. The pattern of results did not indicate 
attentional dysfunction. The remaining experiments sought to resolve criticisms such as 
lack of ecological validity and social significance aimed at contemporary attention 
research by examining `social orienting' in autism. Modifications of Posner's cueing 
paradigm were again used whereby the directional cues were a photographed face with 
the gaze direction or head orientation manipulated. The pattern of results indicated that 
individuals with autism oriented attention in a reflexive manner to the direction of eye 
gaze, however they were less efficient at moving attention at will contingent upon these 
cues. They had no difficulty moving attention contingent upon the head direction of 
another. An interference paradigm was used to investigate the relative importance of eye 
gaze versus head orientation in the analysis of social attention among individuals with 
autism. While the results do not resolve this dispute, they provide further evidence that 
individuals with autism have difficulty in using information from the eyes. The final 
experimental chapter studies accuracy at perceiving frontal eye gaze using a forced choice 
detection task. No impairments were found. Overall, the results suggest that individuals 
with autism are not globally impaired in orienting to all social cues, however using 
information derived from the eyes is problematic and this impairment may be 
contributing to their difficulties during social interactions. 
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CHAPTER Il 
Autism: An overview 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the first published account of autism (Kanner, 1943) over fifty years ago, much 
effort has been expended into trying to understand why or how autism occurs. However, 
further empirical work is still required to find the root cause of this puzzling disorder. In 
generating a better understanding of autism, Morton and Frith (1994) have suggested that 
three levels of explanation are particularly useful in the study of autism; the behavioural, 
the biological and the cognitive and it is on the basis of this framework that this chapter 
progresses. The chapter begins with a review of autism at the behavioural level, as 
currently a diagnosis is made on the co-occurrence of certain behavioural features. The 
general consensus is that in all children with autism there is some (perhaps very subtle) 
brain damage or dysfunction (Steffenburg & Gillberg, 1986; Steffenburg, 1991). The 
evidence for an organic basis to autism is considered in the next section. While this 
research has aided our understanding of the biological nature of autism, evidence relating 
the site of brain abnormality involved in the symptomatology of autism remains 
inconclusive. However, psychological research into the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
the specific pattern of behaviours seen in autism has aided our understanding of what 
functions are impaired in the autistic mind. Ultimately the brain and the mind are 
inseparable, therefore the challenge for research into autism lies in relating a somewhat 
disparate set of symptoms to corresponding deficits in brain systems. 
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1.2 AUTISM AT THE BEHAVIOURAL LEVEL 
Autism is a behavioural syndrome and is defined on the basis of impairments in three key 
domains. These include: 
1. social relationships and social development; 
2. communication and language and 
3. interests and activities that are restrictive and repetitive rather than flexible and 
imaginative. 
This set of three key behaviours has become known as Wing's Triad of 
impairments (Wing, 1976) and is the basis for the diagnosis of autism today (Rutter & 
Schopler, 1987). These three impairments in behaviour must occur together and must be 
present by 36 months of age before a diagnosis can be made (World Health Organisations 
System for classifying medical disorders, ICD-10,1990; American Psychiatric Association 
DSM-IV, 1994). A reliable diagnosis of autism is rarely made before the age of 3 or 4 as 
the types of behaviours which are impaired do not emerge reliably in typically developing 
children until this age. Armed with the hope that early diagnosis would enable prompt 
intervention and thus more effective remediation has led to the search for early indicators 
of autism. Based on current theories of the behavioural and cognitive characteristics of 
autism, Baron-Cohen et al., (1996) have developed a screening instrument called the 
Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (CHAT) and has had some success in pinpointing 
children as young as 18 months. 
1.2.1 Social Behaviour 
Kanner (1943) concluded that there is no single social impairment in autism but rather a 
range of problems is found, some of which can improve during development into 
adulthood. Children with autism are often unresponsive to people, apparently treating them 
as objects. They typically avoid eye contact or use eye contact inappropriately and often do 
17 
not respond when called by name. They show a lack of behaviour appropriate to cultural 
norms and seem to be unaware of the feelings of others. However, while some children 
with autism avoid social contact, not all are 'in a world of their own'. Some do 
spontaneously approach people but often only to carry out some repetitive, idiosyncratic 
preoccupation such as touching another person's clothes or hair. They may ask a limited set 
of questions which are frequently inappropriate to the situation and are rarely about 
people's feelings or thoughts. The observed variability in social impairments has led to the 
opinion that there is a spectrum of disorders in autism (Wing, 1988). 
1.2.2 Language and Communication 
Typically developing children use many different types of communicative behaviour prior 
to developing language. These include pointing, showing and giving objects to other 
people in order to communicate their interest in the object (Scaife & Bruner, 1975; 
Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Corkum & Moore, 1995). Children with autism rarely show 
this type of pointing ('protodeclarative' pointing) or showing (Loveland & Landry, 1986: 
Landry & Loveland, 1988: Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer & Sherman, 1986: Sigman, Mundy, 
Ungerer & Sherman, 1986). Typically developing children also use gestures to accompany 
speech and to express emotions, enhancing these with appropriate eye contact and facial 
expression. The facial expressions of children with autism often do not match their 
intonation and many do not develop any useful speech at all. In those children who do 
develop speech a variety of unusual features may be seen, including echolalia and a 
difficulty with the use of pronouns. Children with autism frequently use 'you' when they 
mean 'I' or they may call themselves by their first name. 
1.2.3 Repetitive, Obsessional Behaviour 
The behaviour of children with autism is distinguished by the absence of flexible and 
creative pretend play (Wulff, 1985). The repetitive quality in the interests of children with 
3 
autism makes their play seem rigid and rehearsed rather than spontaneous and imaginative. 
They can also become fascinated by a special interest that dominates their time and 
conversation which can sometimes be on bizarre topics such as counting lampposts, 
collecting bottle tops and remembering bus timetables. Many individuals with autism show 
motor stereotypies such as rocking, toe walking, hand flapping, or flicking their fingers 
rapidly in front of their eyes (Donnellan, Anderson & Mesaros, 1984). Kanner (1943) also 
noted their `desire for the preservation of sameness', which can range from the compulsive 
execution of elaborate routines, to the arrangement of objects which `must not be altered'. 
1.2.4 Asperger's syndrome 
At around the same time as Kanner published his paper describing a group of children with 
autism, Hans Asperger, a Viennese paediatrician, unaware of Kanner's earlier report, 
published a dissertation on the topic of autistic psychopathy in childhood. Both authors 
described a similar pattern of symptoms and used the same term. The main area of 
disagreement between the two descriptions was in the area of language ability with 
Asperger's case study patients showing no specific difficulties or delay. Unfortunately, 
Hans Asperger's description was largely ignored in Europe and the United States for the 
next thirty years until Wing's (1981) important literature review and case series. Lorna 
Wing was concerned that some children had the classic autistic features when very young, 
but developed fluent speech and a desire to socialise with others. They did not fit the 
profile for a diagnosis of classic autism according to criteria based on Kanner's work, 
however they still had significant problems with more advanced social skills and 
conversation. They more accurately resembled the original description by Hans Asperger. 
At present the prevailing view is that Asperger's syndrome is a variant of autism and a 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder and the condition has now been included in DSM-IV 
and ICD-10. 
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While it has been recognised that there are clear differences between children with 
Asperger's syndrome and autism, as originally defined by Leo Kanner, on measures of 
social interaction, language and long-term development (Szatmari, Archer, Fisman, 
Streiner & Wilson, 1995), one area of contention surrounds the possible differences 
between Asperger's syndrome and High-Functioning Autism. It is well recognised that 
some children have the classic features of autism in early childhood, but later develop the 
ability to talk using complex sentences and develop some basic social skills (Wing, 1981). 
Also, these children usually have an intellectual capacity within the normal range. This 
group would be described as having high-functioning autism. The continuity of Asperger's 
syndrome with autism remains the topic of debate (Klin, Volkmar, Sparrow, Cicchetti & 
Rourke, 1995; Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995). The lack, 
until very recently, of official guidelines for diagnosis has contributed to difficulties in 
interpreting available research. In addition, a clinical diagnosis of high-functioning autism 
as opposed to Asperger's syndrome is often made on the basis of access to services. 
However at present the results suggest there seems to be no meaningful differences 
between them. There are more similarities than differences. ' 
1.3 AUTISM AT THE BIOLOGICAL LEVEL 
During the 1960s, one popular held belief was that autism was a consequence of poor 
parenting, abuse or neglect (Bettelheim, 1967). Such a view is often referred to as the 
psychogenic theory of autism, which has now been discredited due to lack of supporting 
evidence. In contrast, the biological theory of autism continues to receive support 
from 
various sources. There are a number of indications that lead to the conclusion that some 
' In the experimental chapters reported in this thesis the participants are described as being diagnosed as 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and the prevalence of Asperger's syndrome and high-functioning autism is 
identified. However, elsewhere in the thesis the term `autism' is used for brevity. 
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biological abnormality is at the root of autism. These include the fact that autism is often 
accompanied by mental handicap (Smalley, Asarnow & Spence, 1988). About three- 
quarters of all individuals with autism have an associated mental handicap (IQ below 70) 
and when individuals further down the IQ scale are investigated, the incidence of autism 
increases (Smalley et al., 1988). Also, there is a high incidence of certain medical 
conditions such as epilepsy in individuals with autism (Olsson, Steffenburg & Gillberg, 
1988; Volkmar & Nelson, 1990). 
Secondly, there is increasing evidence of a hereditary component in autism (Rutter 
et al., 1990). The fact that autism is more than twice as common in males as in females is 
indicative of a genetic influence (Lotter, 1966; Lord & Schopler, 1987). Family history 
case reports are also supportive of a genetic role in autism (Gillberg, 1989,1991; Gillberg, 
Gillberg & Steffenburg, 1992). Indeed, siblings who are not themselves autistic show a 
much increased incidence of more general psychological difficulties such as language 
disorders and social impairments (August, Stewart & Tsai, 1981; Bolton & Rutter, 1990). 
Monozygotic (identical) twins also have a far higher concordance for autism than dizygotic 
(fraternal) twins (Folstein & Rutter, 1977). However, the concordance is not perfect which 
suggests that there may be a genetic predisposition for autism, which only manifests itself 
if certain pre, peri, or postnatal conditions are met (Goodman, 1990). 
Autism also occurs in a number of medical conditions which have a known genetic 
component, such as Fragile X syndrome, phenylketonuria and tuberous sclerosis (Gillberg 
& Forsell, 1984; Blomquist et al., 1985; Gillberg, Gillberg & Ahlsen, 1994; Gillberg & 
Wahlstrom, 1985). Finally, the results of studies using a range of neuropsychological tests 
and brain imaging techniques and post-mortem studies have revealed abnormalities in 
different regions of the brain although no specific abnormality has been found to underlie 
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all cases of autism. Candidate brain areas involved in autism are reviewed in more detail in 
section 1.4.2 (p12-13) and section 1.4.4 (p22-23). 
1.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF AUTISM 
Decades of research following Kanner's (1943) original description of autism have 
generated a number of psychological theories regarding the nature of the primary deficit 
underlying the disorder. Contenders have included impairments in mental state processing 
('theory of mind') (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), a weak drive for `central 
coherence' (Frith, 1989: Happe, 1994) and impairments in `executive function' (Ozonoff, 
Pennington & Rogers, 1991), among others. A brief review of these three main 
psychological theories of autism will highlight current controversies and some of their 
inadequacies and point to possible links with an attention shifting impairment hypothesis 
of autism (Courchesne, Lincoln, Kilman & Galambos, 1985; Dawson & Lewy, 1989), 
which will be reviewed in Chapter 2. 
1.4.1 Mindblindness 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) have argued that the triad of behavioural 
impairments in autism are the result of a deficit in the fundamental human ability to 
'mind-read'. They suggest that autism results from damage to an innate theory of mind 
(ToM) module, which underlies the "mind reading" abilities of normal subjects. This 
module contains an implicit theory of the structure and functioning of the human mind, 
which is accessed whenever a normal subject ascribes a mental state to another or seeks a 
mentalistic explanation of their behaviour. Typically developing children, from around the 
age of 4 years, understand that people have beliefs and desires about the world and it is 
these beliefs which determine a person's behaviour. The `theory of mind' explanation of 
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autism suggests that individuals with autism lack this ability to think about thoughts and so 
are impaired in social, communication and imaginative skills. 
This ability to impute mental states to the self and others is commonly tested by 
asking the child to predict the behaviour of others who hold a false belief about the world. 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) showed that 80% of autistic subjects failed to attribute a false 
belief to a character in an acted out story (the now-classic Sally-Ann task, a simple version 
of a false belief task devised by Wimmer & Perrier (1983)). In contrast, 80% of mentally 
handicapped and normal 4-year-old subjects were able to predict the character's behaviour 
on the basis of the inferred false belief 
Critics of these studies have suggested that individuals with autism fail false belief 
tasks because of pragmatic difficulties (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991) or lack of motivation to 
deceive (DeGelder, 1987). However, people with autism have been shown to fail a wide 
range of false belief tasks such as the `smarties task' (Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 
1989). Moreover, these findings have now been replicated in a number of studies, using 
real people instead of toys, slight changes in the wording - using `think' rather than `look' 
and using a control group of language-impaired children to rule out a language processing 
deficit (Leslie & Frith, 1988), suggesting that pragmatic difficulties are not contributing to 
their failure on these tasks. Furthermore, motivation to deceive was assessed by Sodian and 
Frith (1992) in a study which showed that children with autism were able to use sabotage 
to prevent another person from obtaining a goal, however they could not use deception for 
this purpose. 
Although several authors would accept that autistic individuals fail on false belief 
tasks due to an inability to mentalize, they do not accept that this is the core psychological 
impairment in autism. The fact that 20% pass a false belief task and still be socially 
handicapped poses a problem for the theory. Indeed, Bowler (1992) found that in groups of 
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subjects selected for normal verbal IQ the success rate on ToM tasks is much higher. In 
this study the performance of a sample of fifteen high-functioning adults with autism was 
compared to that of normal controls and schizophrenic adults on false belief tasks at two 
levels of difficulty. The results showed that the individuals with autism were no worse on 
these tasks than either of the comparison groups, with autistic subjects passing second- 
order false belief tasks (the ability to think about another person's thoughts about a third 
person's thoughts about an objective event). Bowler suggests that the handicap experienced 
by individuals with autism with real life social situations stems from a deficit in applying 
existing knowledge and not from a difficulty with mentalizing. He suggests that the good 
task performance of the subjects in his study is based on different mechanisms than normal 
mentalizing: " although people with Asperger's syndrome can compute correct solutions to 
problems requiring a theory of mind, they do so by routes that are slow and cumbersome, 
disrupting the timing of their responses and making them appear odd in everyday social 
interactions" (Bowler, 1992). 
This account is similar to one proposed by Frith, Morton and Leslie (1991) who 
suggest that the success of the individuals with autism should be seen not as proof of TOM 
ability but rather as evidence of some other strategy they have developed for solving the 
tasks. To test these possibilities Happe (1994) posed a more naturalistic challenge to 
subjects in the form of 'strange stories'. The stories revealed impairments in social 
understanding in even the most able individuals with autism who had passed all the tasks 
in the first and second order ToM battery. This may be because these `strange stories' are 
only understood using an advanced theory of mind level (e. g. double bluff). Another 
possibility may be the more naturalistic format of the stories and the fact that the questions 
posed do not draw attention to the salient features of the task. 
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Further argument against the primacy of an inability to mentalize being the 
underlying psychological impairment in autism has arisen because of evidence that 
children with autism show earlier social-cognitive deficits, such as lack of imitation 
(Rogers & Pennington, 1991) and joint attention behaviours (Sigman, Mundy, Sherman & 
Ungerer, 1986; Baron-Cohen, 1989b; Loveland & Landry, 1986). During normal human 
development, joint attention is a critical milestone along the road to complex social and 
language abilities and normally appears by 12 to 15 months of age (Trevarthen & Hubley, 
1978; Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). 
Joint attention is often described as the triadic relationship between self, other and 
object and is thought to be a precursor to the development of a `theory of mind' (Baron- 
Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987). Baron-Cohen (1995) now proposes that `theory of mind' 
shortcomings in autism may be secondary to an earlier emerging impairment in the ability 
to build `triadic representations'. Baron-Cohen suggests that the brain contains specialised 
modules dedicated to social perception and action. One such module deemed to be intact 
in individuals with autism is an `eye direction detector', used to identify the direction of 
gaze and any direct eye contact. This in turn feeds information to a `shared attention 
mechanism' which is necessary to understand whether the self and another agent are both 
attending to the same object or event, a mechanism which is suggested to be deficient in 
children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1994; 1995). 
An alternative position to the progression of joint attention behaviours requiring 
triadic relationships is the opinion that joint attention is linked with developments in 
attention (Leekam, Lopez & Moore, 2000). Research with typically developing infants 
shows that the visual orienting mechanisms undergo substantial development in the first 
year of life, shifting from subcortical visual processing to processing in cortical visual 
pathways (Bronson, 1982; Atkinson, 1984; Johnson, 1990). For example newborns much 
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more readily orient towards stimuli in the temporal, as opposed to the nasal visual field 
(Lewis, Maurer & Milewski, 1979). Also at around one month of age infants show 
`obligatory attention' (Johnson, Posner & Rothbart, 1991; Hood, 1995). That is to say they 
have great difficulty in disengaging their gaze away from a stimulus in order to make a 
saccade to another location. Progress in the endogenous or voluntary control over shifts of 
attention and saccades proceeds around 4 to 6 months (Johnson, 1995). Based on the 
results from a series of experiments with preschool children with autism, Leekam et al. 
(2000) suggest that children with autism do not have difficulty making exogenous or 
stimulus driven shifts of attention; however there may be a developmental delay in their 
endogenous control. 
Voluntary control of attention and development of theory of mind 
In normal development, social knowledge and many higher cognitive, affective and 
communicative functions arise from early infant-mother interactions (Trevarthen & 
Hubley, 1978; Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). The control and ability to shift attention 
efficiently is of fundamental importance during any normal joint interchange because the 
focus of information (gestures, sounds, objects, expressions etc) is changing frequently, 
rapidly and often unpredictably. Scaife and Bruner (1975) showed that typically 
developing infants as young as two months would readjust their gaze contingent on a 
change of focus of attention of an adult, however it is not until towards the end of the first 
year that infants normally achieve the skill of coordinating their attention between a social 
partner and objects of mutual interest (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1980; Corkum & Moore, 
1995). At around this time, looking where others point is also observed in most babies 
(Butterworth & Grover, 1990; Deak, Flom, Pick & Silberglitt, 1997). To achieve this 
major developmental milestone, an infant needs to do more than simply focus his or her 
attention on a single captivating character of an object or person. He/she must follow the 
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rapid and unpredictable ebb and flow of human social activity, such as words, gestures, 
facial expressions and actions. These activities provide signals to the infant to shift 
attention in order to follow the varying sources of social, emotional and circumstantial 
information. The ability to smoothly, effectively and rapidly shift attention enables the 
infant to combine, as a single entity in memory the various and separate components of a 
social situation. Clearly any damage or delay to this voluntary attentional regulatory 
system could produce severe developmental abnormality, perhaps resulting in the 
particular socio-cognitive functioning typical of autism. 
1.4.2 Biological basis for mind-reading ability 
Several attempts have been made to outline the brain regions involved in theory of mind. 
The frontal lobes have long been considered to play a special role in human behaviour, 
with damage to this region affecting not only high level cognitive functions but also social 
behaviour (Ackerly & Benton, 1947; Brazzelli, Colombo, Della Sala & Spinnler, 1994; 
Prigatano, 1991). While these reports are suggestive of this area being important in making 
mental state attributions, only a small number of studies have investigated this directly. 
Two studies have found frontal lesions to be associated with impairments on theory of 
mind type tasks (Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998; Channon & Crawford, 2000). Stone 
et al. (1998) have reported that patients with inferior medial damage but not left 
dorsolateral pathology were impaired on theory of mind tasks. Channon and Crawford 
(2000) report findings that left frontal lesions are associated with deficits on theory of 
mind type tasks. More recently, Stuss, Gallup and Alexander (2001) have reported a 
dissociation of performance on tasks requiring a theory of mind within the frontal lobes. 
These authors studied patients with well-defined focal and limited brain lesions in frontal 
and non-frontal regions to assess which regions were necessary for mental state attribution. 
Two tasks were employed: a transfer inference task and a deception task. The results 
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showed that bi-frontal lesions, which predominantly involved medial regions, impaired 
performance on the deception task. There was less specificity of lesion location within the 
frontal lobes for the transfer inference task, although there was some suggestion for a 
greater role for the right frontal region. 
Functional imaging data also suggests a role for the frontal lobes in theory of mind. 
Fletcher et al. (1995) studied story comprehension using PET (positron emission 
tomography) brain imaging in healthy typically developing participants and reported left 
medial frontal gyrus activation on stories that involved the attribution of mental states to 
the main characters, but not on stories which involved only physical states. Goel, Grafman, 
Sadato and Hallett (1995) compared healthy volunteers on several tasks involving object 
knowledge and reported left medial frontal and left temporal activation only in the theory 
of mind type condition. Baron-Cohen et al. (1994) reported increased right orbitofrontal 
activation in a SPECT (single photon emission computed tomography) study during a task 
in which subjects had to decide which aurally presented words ' described the mind or 
things the mind can do'. He has suggested a neural circuit including the amygdala, superior 
temporal sulcus and orbitofrontal cortex as regions necessary for mental state attribution. 
Recent support for this view comes from a single case study of a patient with early or 
congenital amygdala damage who was found to be severely impaired in his ability to 
represent mental states (Fine, Lumsden & Blair, 2001) 
An alternative view of the neural circuitry for theory of mind processing has been 
proposed by Frith and Frith (1999). They argue that this circuitry comprises the superior 
temporal sulcus, the inferior frontal regions and the medial prefrontal cortex. Convergent 
with this proposal, activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and the region of the 
temporoparietal junction has been observed in neuroimaging studies during mental state 
processing (Castelli, Happe, Frith & Frith, 2000; Gallagher et at., 2000). Thus, although 
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frontal areas have been implicated in several studies, the precise neural circuitry remains 
to be established. 
1.4.3 Central Coherence Theory 
Although the `Mindblindness theory' has helped us to understand the nature of the autistic 
child's handicap in communication, socialisation and imagination, there are other features 
of autism in addition to the classic triad of impairments. Parental reports on the 
development of children with autism (Hart 1989; McDonnell, 1993) supported by clinical 
observations (Kanner, 1943) have highlighted a number of aspects of autism not well 
explained by a lack of mentalizing. These include a restricted repertoire of interests, a 
preoccupation with parts of objects (diagnostic criteria in DSM-IV, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987), an obsessive desire for sameness (Kanner, 1943), islets of ability 
(Kanner, 1943), excellent rote memory (Kanner, 1943) and idiot savant abilities (1 in 10 
autistic children, Rimland, 1978). In addition, a number of experimental studies have 
reported surprising advantages and disadvantages shown by individuals with autism on a 
wide range of cognitive tasks (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967: Frith & Hermelin, 1969; 
Weeks & Hobson, 1987; Langdell, 1978). Influenced by the notion of one primary deficit 
being the underlying cause of both the assets and deficits seen in autism led Frith (1989) to 
propose that autism is characterised by a particular cognitive style whereby the normal 
tendency to draw diverse information together to construct higher-level meaning in context 
is lacking. Contrary to normal information processing where extracting `global' meaning is 
paramount, individuals with autism focus on `local' details without integrating them into a 
coherent whole. 
Evidence for local processing ability in autism 
Individuals with autism show an unusually 'spiky' profile across Wechsler Intelligence 
Scales (Wechsler, 1981) subtests, showing for example, superior performance on the block 
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design task relative to other subtests, and often relative to other people of the same age. 
This fact has generally been explained as due to superior spatial skills (Lockyer & Rutter, 
1970; Prior, 1979), however the designs in these tasks are notable for their strong gestalt 
qualities. The reason typically developing people appear to have difficulty with this task is 
the effortful process involved in inhibiting the overall picture and breaking it up into 
constituent parts. Central coherence theory (Frith, 1989) implies that the advantage shown 
by subjects with autism on tasks like the block design is due to their inability to integrate 
perceptual information. Individuals with autism are said to experience a fragmented 
perceptual input, which is characterised by local, rather than global processing. They seem 
to focus on the insignificant details of the environment without integrating them into the 
wider context. 
Additional evidence in support of this theory comes from Happe (1996), who 
reports that children with autism do not succumb to visual illusions. Both two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional illusions were employed in this study. Results from the three- 
dimensional condition suggest that the success of the autistic subjects on this task was due 
to their inability to integrate the induced lines from the inducing context. When the 
induced lines were disembedded from the inducing context (as in the three-dimensional 
condition), the group differences disappeared. This finding is similar to Shah and Frith's 
(1993) study with the block design task, where pre-segmenting the designs brought the 
control performance to the level of the autistic group's success, but did not improve 
performance among the subjects with autism. 
Further evidence that subjects with autism have a tendency to process local rather 
than global information is seen in their superior performance with the spotting `embedded 
figures' task (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983). This test involves 
spotting a hidden figure (triangle or house shape) among a larger meaningful drawing. 
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Subjects with autism show a faster and more accurate performance on this task compared 
to matched control groups. Gottschaldt (1926) attributes the difficulty of finding embedded 
figures in normal subjects to the overwhelming `predominance of the whole'. 
Global processing deficits 
Focusing on detail or a lack of central coherence would be expected to produce 
disadvantages on tasks that require interpretation of stimuli in terms of overall context and 
there is some evidence to support this prediction. Individuals with autism show a failure to 
process incoming stimuli in context during reading which results in a superior rote 
memory for sentences but little knowledge or understanding of the meaning of the material 
(Frith & Snowling, 1983). Similarly, Happe (1997) has reported that individuals with 
autism show an inability to use context to disambiguate linguistic material in a 
homograph-reading task. Moreover in the 'strange stories' task (Happe, 1994a) subjects 
with autism often gave context-inappropriate answers suggesting they were focusing on the 
utterances in isolation, prompted by a specific question and not relating it to the context of 
the story. 
Central coherence and attention 
There is a growing body of evidence reporting superior local processing skills among 
individuals with autism and some reports of a bias in adopting a local processing strategy 
during tasks requiring global processing. It is possible that an attentional impairment could 
account for the tendency of individuals with autism to adopt this particular cognitive style. 
Frith (1989) noted that typically developing individuals `draw together diverse information 
to construct higher-level meaning in context. ' It is possible that this `effort after meaning' 
is lacking in individuals with autism as the result of an inability to shift attention rapidly 
and efficiently. This would result in a fragmented perceptual input as the details and 
movements of scenes change. 
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Central coherence and mentalizing 
In the original `central coherence theory' Frith (1989) proposed that the impairment in 
mentalizing ability seen in individuals with autism could be a result of -weak central 
coherence'. Clearly an inability to integrate information from many sources would limit 
understanding of social interactions and the ability to attribute mental states. More 
recently, however, Frith and Happe (1994) have suggested that these two cognitive features 
of autism may be separate. They reason that, while the ability to attribute mental states 
would appear to be of great evolutionary advantage and is acquired at the same age across 
cultures with little variation (Avis & Harris, 1991), processing information in context and 
the precedence normal individuals give to global processing may vary in the population as 
indexed by inter-individual differences in scores on the Block Design or Embedded 
Figures test. They regard a weak central coherence as a particular cognitive style rather 
than a deficit and in this respect individuals with autism may be at the extreme end of a 
normal continuum. 
In support of the opinion that there are two separate cognitive mechanisms 
underlying autistic symtomatology, Happe (1997) showed that individuals with autism at 
all levels of theory of mind performance still displayed a relative failure to process 
information for context-dependent meaning in a homograph reading task. 
1.4.4 Executive Dysfunction 
Recognising the need to explain that some high-functioning autistic subjects can pass 
theory of mind tasks yet still exhibit some autistic behaviours has led researchers to 
speculate an alternative or additional cognitive impairment. The first indication of 
executive function deficits in autism came from a single case study of an adult with 
residual state autism (Steel, Gorman & Flexman, 1984). Executive function is defined as 
the ability to maintain an appropriate problem solving set for attainment of a future goal 
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(Bianchi, 1922: Luria, 1966; Goldstein, 1936,1944) and is associated with the frontal 
lobes (Gorenstein, Mammato & Sandy, 1989; Hebb, 1939,1945; Marlow, 1989; Milner, 
1964). Typical manifestations of executive function include set-shifting and set 
maintenance, interference control, inhibition, integration across space and time, planning 
and working memory. Typical tests of executive function thought to be markers for frontal 
lobe functioning include the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), the Tower of Hanoi, 
the closely related Tower of London, the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT), and the 
Stroop Colour-Word Test among others. 
The most frequently used executive function measure used in studies with 
individuals with autism has been the WCST. This test involves deducing a rule that 
periodically changes, for sorting cards by either colour, shape or number, using feedback 
from the examiner concerning the correctness of each sort. The primary variable of interest 
is the number of perseverative responses, defined as the number of trials in which the 
subject continues sorting by a previously correct category despite negative feedback 
(Heaton, 1981). In the main, studies have found that individuals with autism perform 
poorly on this task relative to matched controls, with deficits evident as perseveration and 
difficulty shifting sorting category (Rumsey, 1985; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988,1990; 
Prior & Hoffman, 1990; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). 
However Schneider and Asarnow (1987) found no group differences in perseveration on 
the WCST. They studied school-aged children with autism, comparing them to children 
with schizophrenia and normal controls. Interpretation of the results is problematic 
because all subjects perseverating throughout the task were eliminated from the analyses. 
In addition, the groups were not matched on ability. A second study though has failed to 
find group differences in a WCST task (Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz & Payton, 1992), with 
no obvious methodological problems. 
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Although the bulk of research would suggest that individuals with autism suffer 
from an executive dysfunction there are at least three issues that cause problems for the 
theory that an executive function impairment underlies autistic symtomatology (Harris, 
1993; Ozonoff, 1995; Pennington, 1994). These include: 
1. The multidimensional nature of executive function tasks. 
2. Autism is not the only disorder in which executive functions are impaired. 
3. The lack of evidence implicating frontal lobe pathology in autism. 
The multidimensional nature of executive function tasks 
Firstly, executive function tasks tap far more than one cognitive operation; therefore it is 
difficult to determine why individuals with autism perform poorly on any of these tasks. 
For example, the Stroop test has been described as measuring inhibition, sensitivity to 
interference, selective attention and focused attention (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn 
& Kellam, 1991). Two studies have found the Stroop effect to be similar in individuals 
with autism and a control sample (Bryson, 1983; Eskes, Bryson & McCormick, 1990). 
Whilst this might suggest that these aspects of executive function relatively spared in 
individuals with autism, some of these components are also involved in other types of 
executive function tasks where individuals with autism perform poorly compared to 
matched controls. While the WCST is generally considered a test of cognitive flexibility, 
successful performance requires a variety of other cognitive operations. These include 
generating of a sorting rule, categorization, working memory, attention to and encoding of 
the examiner's verbal feedback, in addition to inhibition and selective attention to the 
relevant dimensions of the stimuli (Ozonoff, 1995). Moreover, while the MFFT requires 
the inhibition of impulsive responses, visual pattern analysis and attention to detail are also 
important for competent performance. Because of difficulties interpreting precisely why 
individuals with autism show performance deficits on some of these tasks, a number of 
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studies have been designed to dissect the executive function deficit in autism using 
information processing paradigms. 
Componential approach to executive function deficits 
Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon and Filloux (1994) compared non-retarded autistic individuals 
to Tourette's syndrome individuals and normal controls on several simple inhibition tasks. 
The Go-NoGo task consisted of three test conditions. The first `neutral inhibition' 
condition required subjects to respond to a neutral stimulus, while inhibiting responses to 
another neutral stimulus; this condition required no shifting of cognitive set. The second 
`prepotent inhibition' condition required inhibition of a previously reinforced well-learned 
response. The third `flexibility' condition required subjects to frequently shift from one 
response pattern to another. The sample with autism was significantly impaired on 
cognitive flexibility. Predictions regarding the absence of group differences in the neutral 
inhibition were supported. However their hypotheses about performance in the prepotent 
inhibition condition were not fully confirmed. Although performance during this condition 
was slower than the neutral inhibition, the specific pattern of responses predicted was not 
revealed. They argue that while the Go-NoGo task may have been able to differentiate 
neutral inhibition from flexibility, two cognitive operations often confounded in EF tasks, 
the constructs of `pre-potent inhibition' and `flexibility' are more difficult to separate, both 
operations requiring shifts between response sets to varying degrees. Thus, this paradigm 
did not selectively measure inhibition as intended. 
In a later study by Ozonoff and Strayer (1997), two information-processing 
paradigms were selected to focus on specific inhibitory cognitive processes, which are not 
confounded with flexibility operations. These were the Stop-Signal paradigm (Logan, 
1994; Logan, Cowan & Davis, 1984) and a negative priming task (Tipper, 1985). The 
Stop-Signal paradigm is thought to measure the ability to control a voluntary motor 
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response, whereas the negative priming task taps a more central, cognitive inhibitory 
mechanism (Neill, Lissner & Beck, 1990). Ozonoff and Strayer (1997) found that subjects 
with autism were unimpaired on both tests of inhibition relative to normally developing 
controls. Thus it would seem that inhibitory mechanisms are not contributing to the 
executive function impairments seen in individuals with autism. However not all aspects 
of inhibition have been investigated and these studies only explored inhibitory function in 
non-retarded children with autism. It may be possible that lower functioning individuals 
with autism could demonstrate impairments on simple inhibition tasks. 
Hughes, Russell and Robbins (1994) have also employed an information processing 
approach to determine the underlying cognitive operations that contribute to impaired 
performance on the WCST. These authors used the Intradimensional-Extradimensional 
(ID/ED) Shift task to assess set-shifting ability in individuals with autism. This task 
requires subjects to classify abstract patterns according to an initially unknown rule and 
then to shift to a new rule after the previous sorting pattern receives negative feedback. 
While this task appears very similar to the WCST, it does not require verbal ability or 
social interaction as the computer provides both stimuli and feedback. In addition, the task 
is completed in several stages allowing alternative interpretations of poor performance 
such as set-maintenance, rule reversal, transfer of learning and motoric inhibition to be 
excluded. The results showed that the individuals with autism engaged in highly 
perseverative patterns of responding, displaying an inability to flexibly shift mental set. 
The problem of specificity 
A second problem for the executive function hypothesis is that autism is not the only 
disorder in which executive functions are impaired. Significant deficits on EF tasks are 
manifest in several psychiatric disorders, including Conduct disorder (Hurt & Naglieri, 
1992; Lueger & Gill, 1990), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (Head, Bolton & Hymas, 
21 
1989; Martinot et al., 1990) and Schizophrenia (Axelrod, Goldman, Tompkins & Jiron, 
1994). Executive function deficits have also been reported among other developmental 
disorders, such as Turner's syndrome (Romans, Roeltgen Kushner & Ross, 1997), ADHD 
(Chelune, Ferguson, Koon & Dickey, 1986; Benson, 1991), early treated phenylketonuria 
(Welsh, Pennington, Ozonoff, Rouse & McCabe, 1990), Fragile X Syndrome (Mazzocco, 
Hagerman, Cronister-Silverman & Pennington, 1992; Levitas et al., 1983), Tourette 
Syndrome (Bornstein, 1990) and also among individuals with neurological conditions such 
as Parkinson's disease (Owen et al., 1995). Obviously, exactly the same executive deficit 
cannot be the underlying cognitive cause of the vaned pattern of symptoms that 
characterise each of these disorders. This problem of specificity is termed the 
`discriminant validity' problem (Ozonoff, 1997) 
There are a number of studies that have tried to address this discriminant validity 
issue. A study by Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson and Bartolucci (1990) included a comparison 
group of individuals, 80% of whom met the criteria for either ADHD, conduct disorder or 
both. As mentioned above, executive function may be associated with these syndromes as 
well. Despite this choice of control group, subjects with autism still made significantly 
more perseverative errors and completed fewer categories on the WCST. Similarly, 
Ozonoff et al. (1991) demonstrated that individuals with autism perseverated on the WC ST 
significantly more than the comparison group, of whom 25% met the criteria of ADHD. 
These studies would suggest that the WCST is a sensitive indicator of executive 
dysfunction in individuals with autism, however two investigations have failed to find 
deficits on this task in autistic samples as mentioned above (Schneider & Asarnow, 1987; 
Minshew et al., 1992). 
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Lack of evidence for frontal lobe pathology 
A third problem for the executive dysfunction hypothesis of autism is the brain area 
supposed to be implicated in the successful execution of these tasks, namely the frontal 
lobes (see Kolb & Wishaw, 1990 for a review). To date, there have been no consistent 
reports of frontal lobe pathology (see Robbins, 1997 for a review) in autism. Indeed no 
single abnormality has been found in post mortem brain studies and it is uncertain whether 
the abnormalities detected are due to autism, rather than to mental handicap or epilepsy. 
Autopsy studies, usually involving small samples, have provided some evidence of 
abnormalities in the cerebellum with significant Purkinje cell loss (Ritvo et al., 1986). A 
single case study (Bauman & Kemper, 1985) of a severely learning disabled autistic man 
with epilepsy found abnormalities in the hippocampus, amygdala and cerebellum, 
compared with a normal age-matched control. However, the effects of medication or a 
lifetime of `autistic behaviour' (e. g. motor stereotypies) on the brain make these findings 
difficult to interpret. Courchesne, Hesselink, Jernigan and Young-Courchesne, (1987) and 
Courchesne et al. (1988) using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) have found 
abnormalities in the cerebellar vermis of relatively able individuals with autism. Evidence 
from studies using computerised axial tomography (CAT) revealed equivocally, increased 
ventricular dilation (Campbell et al. 1982), which was not replicated in other samples 
(Creasey et al., 1986). 
However, failure on frontal lobe tasks need not indicate damage to the frontal 
lobes. Moreover, the prefrontal cortices have broadly integrative functions and it is 
reasonable to presume that deficient inputs from other systems, especially in the case of 
early and nonfocal brain lesions could disrupt their function. With the advent of novel, 
non-invasive techniques for the assessment of regional blood flow in the central nervous 
system consequent upon neural activation and using the knowledge of autism at the 
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behavioural and cognitive level, it may be possible in future to assess the area of the brain 
that is abnormal in autism. 
Executive function and theory of mind 
To resolve the issue of which deficit is the primary core impairment in autism, the 
relationship between theory of mind and executive functions has become the topic of much 
debate. One position is that the development of executive function allows the child's 
theory of mind to develop (Russell, 1997; Ozonoff, 1997). Secondly, it has been argued 
that there are no specific circuits for processing mental states and that performance on 
theory of mind tasks can be reduced to executive function ability (Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 
1995). Alternatively, Perner and colleagues (Perner, 1998; Perner & Lang, 2000) have 
suggested that the capacity to represent mental states is necessary for the development of 
executive functioning. 
At present it is difficult to find definitive support to distinguish between any of 
these possibilities. A recent study has found that theory of mind and executive function 
abilities are correlated in pre-school children (Hughes, 1998a). Furthermore, executive 
function ability predicted theory of mind performance, but not vice versa (Hughes, 1998b). 
Moreover, Ozonoff et al. (1991) found a correlation between performance on executive 
function and theory of mind tasks in individuals with autism, but not in the comparison 
group. Thus, it has been suggested that individuals with autism have difficulty on theory of 
mind tasks due to their lack of executive control (Russell, 1997). However, theory of mind 
tasks are likely to involve an executive component (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), therefore 
correlations might be expected, especially in populations who do not perform at ceiling on 
executive function tasks (Fine, Lumsden & Blair, 2001). Associations between these two 
cognitive abilities might also be expected, given that both abilities are proposed to be 
mediated by anatomically adjacent or proximal regions of the frontal lobes. 
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While these studies are unable to resolve the issue of the developmental interaction 
between theory of mind and executive functions, a recent single case study of a patient 
with congenital amygdala damage has shown that theory of mind is not simply a function 
of more general executive functions and that executive functions can develop and function 
on-line, independently of theory of mind (Fine et al., 2001). 
1.5 POSSIBLE INADEQUACIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF AUTISM 
The challenge to psychological theories of autism is not only to explain the triad of 
impairments but also to explain the islets of unimpaired or even superior skills in autism. 
Traditionally authors have focused on one core psychological impairment to account for 
the behavioural manifestations found in autism. However, it has been recognised that a 
disorder as complex and severe as autism is unlikely to be the result of one primary deficit 
and indeed it may be more fruitful to consider autism a disorder of multiple aetiology 
(Goodman, 1989). From the studies reviewed above, it can be seen that each psychological 
theory presents problems. 
Mindblindness 
For example, how can `Mindblindness' explain autism if some, still socially handicapped 
individuals with autism appear to possess a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). In 
addition, the `Mindblindness' theory of autism cannot explain the non-social handicaps in 
autism, such as insistence on sameness, repetitive behaviour and stereotypies. Moreover, 
earlier appearing social deficits such as joint attention and imitation, thought to be 
precursors in the development of a `theory of mind' have been reported. It is difficult to 
argue that a lack of mentalizing ability is the core psychological impairment in autism if a 
more basic deficit might underlie the later development of an inability to think about 
thoughts. 
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Central Coherence 
The central coherence theory differs from other theories, claiming some features of autism 
to be as a result of a particular cognitive style rather than a straightforward deficit. This 
plausible hypothesis has enabled many features of autism, often neglected in previous 
investigations to be accounted for. For example, Kanner (1943) highlighted this tendency 
for fragmentary processing and its function in the child with autisms' resistance to change: 
"a situation, a performance, a sentence is not regarded as complete if it is not made up of 
exactly the same elements that were present at the time the child was first confronted with 
it". Similarly this account is able to explain some of the assets found in individuals with 
autism. However the weak central coherence theory of autism is still in its infancy and 
requires considerable empirical work to be refined and become established. 
Executive Dysfunction 
The executive function deficit theory of autism has attempted to account for both the 
social and non-social handicaps. However a good comprehensive theory must encompass 
deficits that are specific to autism and universally found among individuals with autism 
and as outlined above this is not true for the executive dysfunction theory of autism. It is 
also unclear if all executive operations are impaired or only a portion. Moreover, the vague 
term 'executive function' covers many higher cognitive functions and may encompass 
aspects of both central coherence and theory of mind. 
Possible links with an attention dysfunction theory of autism 
Because attention plays an important role in the execution of complex cognitive 
operations, an attentional deficit in autism might therefore hinder the development of 
higher order cognitive and social skills such as executive function and theory of mind. For 
example, it has been suggested that the lack of joint attention behaviours in autism could 
result in damage or delay in the voluntary control over attentional capabilities (Leekam et 
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al., 2000). Abnormal attentional processes are highly likely to be associated with 
difficulties in understanding the meaning of environmental cues, leading to poor choices of 
what to attend to in the absence of clear directives. In addition, social interactions would 
be particularly vulnerable to disruption because the focus of information changes rapidly 
and unpredictably. 
The component process approach has attempted to decompose the complex 
cognitive operations involved in executive function tasks into elementary components, 
identifying inhibition as relatively spared in individuals with autism, with the ability to 
flexible shift mental set relatively impaired. However, it could be argued that an inability 
to flexibly shift mental set could be further decomposed into more basic attentional 
processes such as deficits in attention shifting (Courchesne et al., 1985) or difficulties 
disengaging from a salient object (Hughes & Russell, 1993). Moreover, the tendency to 
focus attention on local attributes of a stimulus without integrating them into a coherent 
whole seen in autism could also be the result of an attention shifting impairment. 
Attention underlies the more complex skills featured in the three main theories and 
points to the fact that this may be the source of their difficulty. The proposal that an 
attentional dysfunction may underlie the symptomatology of autism is reviewed in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Investigating attention: An overview 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This purpose of this chapter is to review the evidence for impairments in visual attention in 
individuals with autism. The chapter begins with a consideration of the behavioural 
evidence that attention is unusual in autism. Then follows a brief review of Courchesne's 
neuropsychological theory of autism which has proposed that an attentional impairment 
related to cerebellar pathology may underlie the behavioural manifestations in autism 
(Courchesne et al., 1985). Before a more detailed consideration of the empirical evidence 
for attentional impairments in autism some of the key ways that attention has been studied 
in typically developing individuals is considered. The chapter concludes with the aims of 
the thesis. 
2.2 BEHAVIOURAL EVIDENCE FOR ATTENTIONAL DYSFUNCTION IN AUTISM 
There is considerable evidence in the literature to suggest that children with autism attend 
to their environments in unusual ways. Kanner's (1943) original description of the disorder 
emphasised " the inability to experience wholes without full attention to the constituent 
parts" (p. 3 8). Reports by clinicians, teachers and parents also confirm abnormal attentional 
focus (Hayes, 1987). In many instances children with autism appear oblivious to other 
people and often become fascinated with certain objects -a fascination that can lead to 
overly focused attention to the exclusion of the rest of the world. Indeed, the very first 
published account of an autistic child stated that the child displayed " an abstraction of 
mind which made him perfectly oblivious to everything about him...... and that to get his 
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attention almost requires one to break down a mental barrier between his inner 
consciousness and the outside world" (Kanner, 1943, p218). Hypo- and hypersensitivity to 
sound, touch, smell and vision are described (Grandin, 1992; Williams, 1994; Stehli, 1991) 
as well as intense experience of normally unnoticed aspects of the environment. This 
becomes evident in their obsessive desire for sameness. Children with autism can become 
extremely upset by changes of routine or surroundings, placated only when the familiar 
order is restored (Turner, 1997). These relatively casual observations of abnormal 
attentional control in autism lead on to the work based on contemporary attention theory 
which will be reviewed in section 2.4 and 2.5 
2.3 ATTENTION DYSFUNCTION-NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
Courchesne (1991) proposes a neuropsychological theory of autism whereby the 
cerebellum plays a critical role in the shifting of attention. Courchesne and colleagues 
(Courchesne, Townsend et al., 1994; Courchesne, Yeung-Courchesne, Press, Hesselink & 
Jernigam, 1988; Townsend, Courchesne & Egaas, 1996; Townsend et al., 1999) have 
theorized that the neocerebellum may play a role in the coordination of attention systems 
that is similar to the role it plays in the control and integration of motor activity (Holmes, 
1939; Hallett, Shahani & Young, 1975). The early absence of this neocerebellar 
coordination in autism would particularly disrupt the processing of sequential information 
whose significance unfolds over time. Although not specific to the more complex social 
domain, social interactions would be especially vulnerable to disruption because of their 
complexity and unpredictability. In addition, Courchesne et al. (1994) propose that there 
may be a neurodevelopmental "domino effect" in autism, whereby primary abnormalities 
of the developing cerebellum might lead to further brain abnormalities, which in turn 
might produce additional functional deficits (Courchesne et al., 1994). In support of this 
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notion, it has been reported in a number of studies that patients with cerebellar lesions 
display frontal like symptoms (Bracke-Tolkmitt et al., 1989; Appollonio et al., 1993)* 
Canavan et al., 1994). Moreover, Holroyd, Reiss & Bryan (1991) report autistic features in 
two children with Joubert Syndrome, a genetic disorder with agenesis of the cerebellar 
vermis. Also, although the cerebellum has traditionally been viewed as essential for the 
control and integration of motor activity (Holmes, 1939; Hallett, Shahani & Young, 1975), 
recent years have seen claims that the cerebellum contributes to higher mental function 
(Leiner, Leiner & Dow, 1986,1993; Schmahmann, 1991; Akshoomoff & Courchesne, 
1992; Kim, Ugurbil & Strick, 1994; Middleton & Strick, 1994; Canavan, Sprengelmeyer, 
Deiner & Homberg, 1994; Gao et al., 1996). 
However, contemporary attention researchers have not implicated this area in the 
brain circuitry involved in attention, which will be reviewed in section 2.4. Moreover, 
contradictory findings have been reported relating impairments in attention shifts with 
cerebellar abnormalities. Yamaguchi, Tsuchiya and Kobayashi (1998) investigated 
visuospatial attention shifting and motor responses in patients with cerebellar degenerative 
disorders and suggest that the cerebellum makes little contribution to visuospatial attention 
shifting in either the voluntary or automatic modes. Their results support a role of the 
cerebellum in the neural systems required for response preparation and selection. 
Similarly, Helmuth, Ivry and Shimizu (1997) found similar attentional cueing effects under 
both exogenous and endogenous cueing conditions between a group of cerebellar patients 
and matched controls. However, both studies used groups of patients who had acquired 
cerebellar disorders as adults. In the Courchesne studies, individuals with autism have 
generally been used as a model for cerebellar dysfunction bolstered by corresponding 
studies using adolescents with acquired cerebellar lesions. Conflicting results could be the 
product of age of onset of cerebellar dysfunction. 
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There remains a number of provocative results regarding the cerebellum and the 
behaviours seen in autism. Firstly, in contrast to the specific social deficit seen in autism, 
individuals with Williams syndrome appear to show almost the opposite neurocornitive 
profile to autism. Williams syndrome is a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder 
resulting in an uneven linguistic-cognitive profile. For example linguistic skills and face 
processing are surprisingly preserved despite low IQs (typically 50-60), with serious 
deficits on visuospatial, number, motor, planning and problem-solving tasks (Karmiloff- 
Smith et al., 1995). Moreover, while only 20% of individuals with autism pass theory of 
mind tasks such as those described earlier, 94% of the Williams syndrome subjects passed 
these tasks. Evidence from structural neuroimaging indicates that Williams syndrome 
brains show a relative increase in volume in particular lobules on the cerebellum which 
contrasts with autism in which the same lobules are relatively smaller than normal 
(Jernigan & Bellugi, 1994). Secondly, as mentioned earlier (p29), a number of studies have 
linked frontal-like symptoms and autistic features in patients to cerebellar lesions (Bracke- 
Tolkmitt et al., 1989; Appollonio et al., 1993; Canavan et al., 1994; Holroyd et al., 1991). 
Before reviewing the empirical evidence for an attentional dysfunction in autism, 
two important dichotomies derived from contemporary attention research with typically 
developing individuals are considered. 
2.4 CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON VISUAL ATTENTION 
Much debate has surrounded the general concept of attention and how it should be 
defined 
(Spearman, 1937). Definitions or metaphors such as a filter (Broadbent, 1958), a selective 
attenuator (Treisman, 1964), a resource (Neisser, 1976), a `spotlight 
beam' within which 
processing is enhanced (Posner, 1980), a `zoom lens' (Eriksen 
& Yeh, 1985), a `glue' that 
binds features together (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) among others, have added to the 
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disunity. Moreover, issues such as capacity, selectivity, control, relationship to 
consciousness and arousal have added further argument. 
In recent decades, most attention researchers have chosen to use visual stimuli 
partly because this allows more precise control over exactly when stimuli are processed 
and much progress has been made in understanding how attention oriented to locations 
and/or objects in visual space is controlled. Research by contemporary attention theorists 
has led to several important distinctions. Two that are relevant to this thesis are the 
distinction between `overt' and `covert' orienting and between issues of control, either 
voluntary or reflexive/automatic. 
2.4.1 Covert orienting of visual attention 
Generally visual attention and eye fixation are synonymous. This occurs because the retina 
of the eye is a heterogeneous structure, containing a foveal area at the centre that provides 
a small area of high acuity. Overt eye movements are required to bring this foveal area to 
bear on peripheral objects for detailed form analysis. However, it has been known at least 
since Helmholtz's time that one can attend to peripheral objects without making an eye 
movement. Helmholtz (1909) conducted an experiment to test his ability to shift visual 
attention independently of eye fixation. He fixed his eyes on an illuminated pinhole in the 
centre of a dark field of large printed letters and illuminated the display with an electric 
spark. The illumination did not last long enough for an eye movement to be made away 
from the fixation point while the display was visible, and Helmholtz was unable to 
perceive all of the letters or even all of those near the fixation point. However, by deciding 
in advance of the illumination which part of the display to attend to, he was able to 
recognise groups of letters in the attended region. Moreover, he was able to voluntarily 
shift his attention to different regions of the display while maintaining eye fixation on the 
central illuminated pinhole. This finding that observers can direct an internal visual 
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attentional mechanism to different areas of visual space independent of eye position has 
been replicated by a number of independent researchers more recently (Eriksen & 
Hoffman, 1972,1973; Hoffman & Nelson, 1981; Posner, 1978,1980). 
In a typical covert orienting experiment, the subject's task is to make a simple 
response when a target is detected in the visual field (Posner, 1980). Prior to the onset of 
the target a warning cue is presented that is either neutral (uninformative with respect to 
the target location), valid (correctly predictive of the target location), or invalid (falsely 
predictive of target location). Eye movements are controlled in two ways. Either the 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) from cue to target is shorter than the time needed to 
make an eye movement (150-200ms), or eye movements are monitored in situations where 
the cue to target delay exceeds this limit. The typical finding is that the response for 
detection is faster on valid trials than neutral trials and slower on invalid trials than neutral 
trials. Even though the status of neutral trials is not yet clear (Gawryszewski, Riggio, 
Rizzolatti & Umilta, 1987; Jonides & Mack, 1984), it is possible to demonstrate the 
benefits and costs of the covert orienting of attention by calculating the difference in 
reaction time between neutral and valid trials and between invalid and neutral trials 
respectively. 
Data from patients with various brain lesions has led Posner and Cohen (1984) to 
propose the `spotlight' model of visual attention and to distinguish three aspects of it: 
1. the ability to engage attention to a target; 
2. the ability to disengage it and 
3. the ability to shift attention from one target to another 
Posner and colleagues have also attempted to associate these attentional processes with 
specific brain areas. Rafal and Posner (1987) argue that patients with lesions to a forebrain 
structure, namely the thalamus have problems in "engaging" their attention on stimuli 
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contralateral to the lesion side, while the pattern of results obtained from a group of 
patients with lesions to the parietal region of the brain would suggest problems in 
"disengaging" attention from ipsilateral stimuli to detect stimuli on the contralateral side 
(Posner & Cohen, 1984). Patients with lesions to parts of the midbrain, including the 
superior colliculus have difficulty shifting their attention vertically (Posner et al., 1985). 
One of the limitations of the spotlight model is the lack of a mechanism that varies 
the spatial extent of the beam. Based on evidence that attentional focus can range from a 
broad extent throughout the visual field to a fine focus at a particular point of interest, has 
led Eriksen and his colleagues (Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Eriksen & St. James, 1986) to 
propose that attention be likened to a `zoom lens'. That is, attentional resources become 
more concentrated as the spatial extent of attentional focus is decreased. Furthermore, 
when attention is shifted, it is claimed to be defocused at one location and then refocused 
at another location. 
2.4.2 Relationship between covert and overt attentional systems 
While it has been demonstrated through performance in laboratory attention tasks that we 
are able to shift visual attention independently of eye fixation, this seems unnatural and 
effortful. Observations that the locations of attentional focus and eye fixation correspond 
so frequently in the real world has led to speculation concerning the relationship between 
them. One view is that attention shifts always precede eye movements (saccades) to their 
destination and attention plays a role in the programming of these eye movements. 
Saccades are rapid, ballistic changes in eye position that occur at a rate of about 3-4 
per second (Becker, 1991). The eye is essentially blind during these movements and 
information is acquired during the relatively long fixations (approx 250ms) that intervene 
between saccades. Saccades are important during reading and scanning of scenes which 
require detailed analysis provided by the fovea. What is it that guides the eye from one 
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fixation to the next? One proposal is that attention serves as an advance scanner allocated 
to the periphery during the course of a fixation that communicates some form of location 
information to the saccade mechanism to program the location of the next fixation. 
Experiments from the saccadic eye movement pattern during reading supports this 
assumption. For example, adult readers tend to fixate most of the `content' words (nouns, 
verbs, adjectives, etc. ) and skip short `function' words (articles, conjunctions, etc. ) in a 
text (Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989). Adult subjects appear to be `previewing' words to the 
right before they are fixated. When these words are short or familiar, this preview is 
sufficient to identify the word, allowing it to be skipped. These results suggest that 
attention normally precedes the eye to its destination, however it is possible that this 
coupling of attention and saccades during reading is one of convenience and not necessity. 
Shepard, Findlay and Hockey (1986) have provided some support for the notion 
that the link between attention and saccades is mandatory. They used a central arrow cue 
pointing to a box on the left or right of fixation to indicate the target of a saccade. 
Attention was manipulated by varying the probability of the target location. Thus, subjects 
could be instructed to move their eyes to the right while target probabilities favoured 
attending to the left. In these conflict situations, subjects detected targets more quickly 
when they occurred in the saccade target location than the position favoured by the 
probability manipulation. When saccades were not required, the probability manipulation 
had the expected effect of speeded responses to targets on the probable side. Shepard et al. 
(1986) concluded that making a saccade requires that attention be allocated to the saccade 
target location. It is not however necessary to adopt the opposite assumption that shifts of 
attention in the absence of saccades require involvement of the saccade system. 
Further debate surrounds the mechanisms involved in mediating attention shifts and 
saccadic operations. One position is that attention and oculomotor operations are carried 
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out independently and share no functional components. For example, there may be a 
general spatial attention mechanism that is capable of indicating locations in visual space. 
Wurtz, Goldberg and Robinson (1980) provide support for this model with the finding that 
there are cells in the parietal cortex that increase their firing rate when an animal attends to 
a location independent of the task being carried out. 
A second position is that both attentional and eye movement components share a 
common mechanism that encodes the location destination. This view is illustrated by the 
oculomotor readiness theory proposed by Klein (1980) and a related theory, the premotor 
theory of attention proposed by Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola and Umilta (1987). According 
to both theories, there is no response-independent representation of space being activated 
by an attentional mechanism. Instead, there are many different representations of space, 
each responsible for certain motor actions such as eye movements, reaching, locomotion, 
etc. Therefore attending involves activating motor actions in the area appropriate for the 
response system being used. 
When experimental psychologists study attention, they take certain precautions in 
order to ensure that the observed empirical effects are attentional and not due to some 
other non-attentional factor. For example, in everyday life it is usual to look at what we 
attend to. However, the evidence reviewed above has revealed that the relationship 
between attention and eye movements is controversial. To avoid such controversy, the 
experimental chapters reported in this thesis using Posner type cueing paradigms involve 
covert attention shifting, whereby subjects are required to maintain fixation and to attend 
to stimulus events `out of the corner of their eyes. ' Moreover, it is possible that individuals 
with autism rely more on their covert attentional system, especially during social 
interactions. For example, the behaviour of individuals with autism can often resemble that 
of a shy, modest, socially inept typically developing teenager (though for very different 
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reasons), whereby both may show an avoidance of the need for direct eye contact during 
social interactions, perhaps relying more on their covert attentional systems. 
2.4.3 Endogenous and exogenous orienting. 
The second distinction that has arisen from the standard cueing paradigm reflects issues of 
control. Attentional cues can be divided into one of two types, endogenous and exogenous. 
Covert orienting can be elicited by a central symbolic cue such as an arrow, or by a 
peripheral cue, such as the brightening at the potential target site. Central symbolic cues 
such as arrows are said to be endogenous, i. e. under voluntary control. A valid arrow cue is 
one that points to the location of the subsequent target, whereas an invalid arrow cue is one 
that points in the other direction. If the proportion of valid cues is high relative to invalid 
cues, reaction times to detect the target are faster following a valid than an invalid cue. 
In contrast, exogenous attentional cues are described as capturing attention at the 
cued location automatically. Performance enhancement occurs following a peripheral cue 
such as a brightening at the potential target site even when the cue does not predict where 
the target is most likely to appear. The effect of an uninformative but salient peripheral cue 
is reported to be reflexive or relatively automatic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
initial advantage on the cued side is unaffected by instructions to ignore the cue (Müller & 
Rabbitt, 1989) or even when the target is actually more likely to appear on the uncued side 
(Jonides, 1981; Spence & Driver, 1994). Secondly, exogenous orienting emerges quickly 
(Cheal & Lyon, 1991) and persists for a relatively short time (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). 
2.4.4 Inhibition of return 
After the initial facilitatory effects of the exogenous spatial cue however, a performance 
deficit or inhibition can emerge. This phenomenon has been referred to as `inhibition of 
return' (Posner & Cohen, 1984; Maylor & Hockey, 1985) or an inhibitory after-effect 
(Tassinari, Aglioti, Chelazzi, Marzi & Berlucchi, 1987). Within the first 50-150 ms 
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following an uninformative peripheral cue, responses to validly cued targets are faster than 
responses to invalidly cued targets. However this facilitation is short lived and -generally 
inhibition becomes evident at the validly cued location by about 300ms, at which point 
invalidly cued targets are responded to faster than validly cued targets. The time course of 
this cueing effect has been explained by Posner and Cohen (1984) in the following way. 
The peripheral cue is assumed to attract attention to its location automatically, resulting in 
faster detection times for targets appearing at that location shortly after the cue. However 
this early facilitation is not observed at longer cue to target delays because the longer 
interval gives attention sufficient time to return to the central location and then moves on 
with an inhibitory bias against returning to regions of space that have been previously 
attended. Thus inhibition of return (IOR) can also be observed when a brief luminance 
increment occurs at the central fixation point after the peripheral cue and prior to the target 
event. This central brightening presumably summons attention away from the cued 
location, allowing IOR to occur. The utility of a bias that favours novelty may be important 
in preventing perseverative types of error in behaviour. Such a mechanism would be useful 
in visual search, for example, where having searched a location, it would be beneficial to 
avoid immediately searching there again (Klein, 2000). 
Although inhibition of return does occur for exogenous cues in covert orienting 
studies, it is not seen following an endogenous attentional cue (arrow pointing left or right) 
(Posner, Rafal, Choate & Vaughan, 1985). A central or endogenous cue will only activate 
IOR if an overt eye movement occurs in response to a central endogenous cue, or when an 
eye movement is planned, not made and then `cancelled' by the subject (Rafal, Calabresi, 
Brennan & Sciolto, 1989) 
In summary, contemporary visual attention research has made the distinction 
between covert and overt orienting and the relationship between them is the subject of 
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much debate. Posner has proposed a `spotlight' model of covert visual attention and has 
identified three possible brain areas involved in processing, namely the thalamus, the 
parietal region and the superior colliculus. In addition, there are several qualitative 
differences between exogenous and endogenous mechanisms for orienting attention 
(Jonides, 1981; Klein, Kingstone & Pontefract, 1992; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner & 
Cohen, 1984), which has given rise to the claim that different neural substrates underlie 
the two mechanisms. Subcortical structures such as the superior colliculus have been 
associated with exogenous orienting (Rafal, Henik & Smith, 1991), whereas many brain 
areas have been suggested to be involved in the voluntary allocation of attention, most 
notably the parietal and frontal cortices (Mesulam, 1981; Petersen, Robinson & Currie, 
1989). 
These two important distinctions derived from contemporary attention theory are 
important in interpreting the pattern of some of the data in the attention-cueing studies in 
individuals with autism that are reviewed in the next section. 
2.5 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON ATTENTION IN AUTISM 
Anecdotal reports of the behaviour of individuals with autism could be consistent with 
abnormalities in either attention, inhibition or both. Kanner's (1943) original description of 
the disorder emphasised "the inability to experience wholes without full attention to the 
constituent parts" (p. 38). Reports by clinicians, teachers and parents also suggest abnormal 
attentional focus (Hayes, 1987). In many instances autistic children appear oblivious to 
other people and often become fascinated with certain objects and may spend an excessive 
amount of time repeating the same activity, excluding the rest of the world (Lovaas, 
Koegel & Schreibman, 1979). This repetitive pattern of activity has long been assumed to 
function as a coping mechanism (Hutt et al., 1964; Hutt & Hutt, 1965,1970; Zentall & 
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Zentall, 1983; Goodall & Corbett, 1982), however this assumption has recently been 
challenged and it has been suggested that an executive dysfunction may explain repetitive 
behaviour by a failure to inhibit ongoing action (Turner, 1997). However the empirical 
evidence for both attentional deficits and inhibitory problems in individuals with autism 
has produced mixed results. 
Lovaas, Schreibman, Koegel and Rehm (1971) were among the first to investigate 
the attention of individuals with autism by experimental means. They reported that the 
attention of children with autism is overfocused so that they respond to fewer components 
of a complex stimulus than do normal or mentally handicapped controls. Lovaas and 
colleagues proposed that children with autism showed evidence of stimulus 
overselectivity, with the result that they often responded to minor and irrelevant cues in the 
environment, which in turn reduces their ability to generalise knowledge or skills learned 
in one environment to another. However this proposal has been criticised as the results 
failed to discriminate between children with autism and children with low IQ (Plaisted, 
1999) 
In spite of this, Rincover and Ducharme (1987) proposed that stimulus 
overselectivity was visible in autism when stimulus cues were spatially separated. These 
authors used the term `tunnel vision' to refer to this overfocused attention. They compared 
the stimulus control acquired in children with autism to typically developing children 
matched on mental age, on two types of task; one where the target attributes (form or 
colour) were overlapping and the other where the target attributes were spatially separated. 
They found that the children with autism responded to both colour and form when these 
dimensions were overlapping, however when the form and the colour of the stimulus were 
separated in space, the children with autism responded to the form rather than the colour. 
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They argue that because this overselective responding only manifests itself when the 
attributes are spatially separate, this would suggest a narrowing of attentional gaze. 
In a similar vein, Townsend and Courchesne (1994) have suggested that individuals 
with autism may have an overly selective `spotlight' of attention. In a study involving eight 
adults with autism (5 with parietal abnormalities) and 10 normal controls, subjects were 
required to view a screen containing five boxes, one of which was red signalling the 
location to be attended. The subjects were instructed to press a button when the circles 
(target stimuli) appeared in the red box (attended location), and ignore the circles (non- 
target stimuli) that occurred in white boxes at the other four (unattended) locations. The 
fastest response times to correctly detected targets were from subjects with autism and 
parietal abnormalities. Using electrophysiological methods, these authors also found that 
subjects with autism with parietal abnormalities showed extremely narrowed regions of 
attention related sensory enhancement of visual stimulation and demonstrated the 
narrowest distribution of spatial attention as evidenced by the P1 attention response of the 
event-related potential. This raises the possibility that autism may be associated with 
parietal abnormalities which produce deficits in spatial attention, however no comparison 
group of individuals, with parietal lesions but without autism, was included in this study 
therefore this proposal remains to be established. However, it should be noted that Bryson, 
Wainwright-Sharp and Smith (1990) argue that autism can be likened to a developmental 
spatial neglect syndrome. 
Further evidence suggesting a narrowing of attentional focus was proposed by 
Wainwright and Bryson (1996). These authors examined lateral differences in spatial 
attention in high functioning young adults with autism. They employed a target detection 
task in which participants were required to detect simple lateralised stimuli. The 
chronological age (CA) control group consisted of 10 normal males matched on age (mean 
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age 23 years 6 months) and handedness. A group of 10 younger normal males (mean age 
11 years 9 months) were matched on handedness and on receptive language ability as 
measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R; Dunn & Dunn, 
1981). Like the normal adults, the individuals with autism showed a reliable left field 
advantage for detecting simple visual stimuli. 
In a second experiment, central targets were included on the assumption that their 
presence might differentially influence the responses of individuals with autism. Different 
patterns of responses were exhibited by each of the three groups. The CA controls 
responded more quickly to lateral than to central targets, MA controls showed no 
differences in response times, while the high functioning adults with autism showed the 
opposite, but non-significant pattern of faster RTs to central than to lateral targets. The 
results of the CA controls is somewhat unexpected, due to the basic architecture of the eye 
and also previous research (Poffenberger, 1912) has shown that participants are faster to 
respond to central targets than to lateral targets. 
In another follow up experiment the task demands were increased from detection to 
identification. In this condition the comparison groups responded with about equal rapidity 
to central and peripheral targets, whereas the individuals with autism responded more 
slowly to the peripheral targets. They argue that these results are consistent with previous 
reports of overfocused attention ("tunnel vision"; Rincover & Ducharme, 1987), and of 
difficulties disengaging and/or shifting attention in space (Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 
1993). An alternative possibility could be that the individuals with autism have reduced 
visual acuity with distance from the fovea. 
Burack (1994) has recently challenged the view that individuals with autism 
invariably suffer from a restricted focus of attention. He compared the speed of target 
discrimination under conditions that varied with regard to the absence of a spatial window 
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cue and the number and location of non-target distracters. Based on the tunnel-vision 
hypothesis (Rincover & Ducharme, 1987), individuals with autism should be less 
influenced by distracters and less able to benefit from the spatial window cue that could be 
used to facilitate focusing on the target. However the results did not support this 
hypothesis. The performance of the individuals with autism improved the most with the 
presence of the window when no distracters were present but this effect was negated when 
distracters were present. Burack (1994) suggests that this pattern of results is consistent not 
with a fixed narrow spotlight of attention but rather a deficit in appropriately sizing the 
attentional lens. 
2.5.1. Endogenous orienting of attention 
Other lines of research have also suggested that children and adults with autism have 
difficulty shifting attention at will. For example, Courchesne et al. (1994) reported that the 
performance of individuals with autism was slower than control subjects on tasks that 
require rapid attentional shifts between stimuli. In this experiment, subjects with autism, 
subjects with acquired cerebellar damage and IQ matched normal individuals were 
required to detect infrequent target stimuli and to alternate attention between visual and 
auditory channels as signalled by the appearance of a target stimulus. The results of this 
study indicated that compared to control subjects, both subjects with autism and subjects 
with acquired cerebellar damage were impaired in the ability to shift attention when 
2.5s 
or less had elapsed since the last target detection. No group differences were reported 
when more time (>2.5-30s) had passed. 
Recently, Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson (1993) have reported evidence to indicate 
that the attentional problems in autism are also manifest in rapid intra-dimensional shifts. 
These authors found that individuals with autism had difficulties shifting attention during 
Posner's endogenous covert visual orienting task. Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson (1993) 
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compared the performance of a group of relatively high-functioning adolescent'young 
adult males with autism (N=8) or Asperger's syndrome (N=3) to a group of typical males 
using a Posner type task with symbolic cues. The control group was matched for 
chronological age and handedness but not for IQ, which was a covariate. In this task design 
an arrow or horizontal line was presented at fixation. The arrow indicated the location of 
the subsequent target in either the left or right visual field whereas the horizontal line 
denoted the neutral condition and gave no information about the subsequent target 
location. In a block of trials, 60% of cues were valid, (correctly indicating the location of 
the subsequent target), 20% invalid, (incorrectly indicating the location of the target) and 
20% were neutral (giving no information about subsequent target location). The cue 
remained on the screen for either 100 ms or 800 ms stimulus onset asynchrony. As 
expected, the results show that the normal group respond more quickly to valid than to 
invalidly cued targets at both SOAs. However with symbolic cues of brief duration (100 
ms SOA) the individuals with autism failed to show the normal RT advantage for validly 
cued targets. These authors conclude that this result is consistent with a deficiency in some 
fundamental information-processing and attentional operation. Previous research with 
normal subjects has revealed that validly cued targets are detected faster than 
invalidly 
cued targets, even when cues are presented for as little as 50 ms (Posner, 1978) With 
brief 
SOAs the subjects with autism may be unable to rapidly shift their attention or 
alternatively it could reflect a more basic deficiency in interpreting 
briefly presented 
symbolic information. The subjects with autism also showed 
larger than normal validity 
effects, as evidenced by their particularly long RTs to invalidly cued targets 
in the 800 ms 
SOA condition. Evidently, these authors suggest that the simple act of engaging attention 
is intact in individuals with autism because their RTs were typical in the validly cued 
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trials, however, something about the operations of engage, shift and disengage may be 
impaired. 
There may have been methodical shortcomings in the design of this study. 
Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson (1993) discuss the SOAs in terms of covert and overt 
orienting. They suggest that 100 ms SOA is a measure of covert orienting as this assumes 
too little time to make an eye movement and 800 ms SOA as a measure of overt orienting. 
However there is no mention of eye movements in this task or whether all subjects 
returned their attention to the fixation point before each trial. Both SOAs were equally and 
randomly distributed within conditions and subjects not returning to fixation may have 
confounded their results. They also did not include catch trials, so we are unsure if subjects 
are actually waiting for the target to appear before they respond. An analysis of the 
anticipatory responses may have provided useful information regarding this point. 
Although these were excluded from the analyses, exact figures were not reported for each 
group. A further issue to be considered is the role that level of cognitive functioning may 
play in determining the pattern of results on this visuospatial cueing task. In the 
Wainwright-Sharpe and Bryson (1993) study, the group with autism were of lower mean 
IQ than the comparison group, although this acted as a covariate in the analyses. 
2.5.2 Exogenous orienting of visual attention 
Using an exogenous covert shifting paradigm, Townsend, Courchesne and Egaas (1996) 
found that individuals with autism (with or without additional parietal abnormality) 
showed significantly longer RTs to targets at an expected or validly cued location when 
they had little time (100ms) to orient attention but RTs that were as fast as those of the 
normal control group at the longer cue to target delay of 800ms. Moreover those with 
additional parietal abnormality were also slow to detect information outside their 
attentional focus. However, methodological issues such as the matching of control subjects 
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on measures of IQ apply to this study also. Although the mean IQ of each of the two 
groups with autism was similar to that of the control group, large standard deviations 
around the mean in the group with autism suggests that the autistic groups may have 
contained some individuals with IQs well below the normal range. Plaisted (2000) has 
suggested therefore that the pattern of results displayed on visuospatial cueing tasks may 
relate to level of intellectual functioning rather than to any characteristic of autism. 
However, this pattern of findings was replicated by Townsend et al. (1999). These 
authors acknowledge that the results showing slowed attention orienting could also reflect 
slowed response preparation. They then rule out this possibility by using a further target 
discrimination task, in which the orientation of the target was required with accuracy as 
the dependent measure. With only 100ms to orient attention, developmentally normal 
controls were as accurate as they were at longer cue to target intervals. Subjects with 
autism and subjects with acquired cerebellar lesions, on the other hand, showed maximal 
performance after the longest cue to target interval. 
Adopting a similar exogenous cueing paradigm, Casey, Gordon, Mannheim and 
Rumsey (1993) found that autistic savants took longer to respond than controls and showed 
larger validity effects when attention was cued to the opposite location from the target. 
However these findings should be regarded as preliminary because of differences in the 
general level of functioning between the savants with autism and the comparison subjects 
and the savants being an unrepresentative sample. 
One study has failed to demonstrate a selective impairment shifting attention on 
low-level tasks of attentional cueing in autism. Burack and Iarocci (1995) found no 
differences between a group of 12 low functioning individuals with autism and matched 
comparison groups using a covert attention shifting paradigm. Here the cue to target SOA 
was 150 ms, a time frame appropriate for measuring covert orienting, and the cue provided 
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no information about the location of the subsequent target. Yet all subjects displayed the 
fastest RT when the target appeared at the same location as the cue. While the children 
with autism were overall slower to respond, they showed patterns of responding similar to 
those in the other two groups, indicating no specific deficit in reflexively disengaging 
and/or shifting attention. 
While the results of most of these studies are interpreted in terms of Posner's 
`spotlight' model of attention, Plaisted (2000) has suggested that it might be the case that 
theories of the attentional spotlight and slowed attention shifting according to Posner's 
attentional framework are inappropriate ones to apply to this data. For example, 
Courchesne et al. (1994) have suggested that the cerebellar abnormalities of individuals 
with autism prevent rapid attention shifting, resulting in slowed orienting to validly cued 
targets at short SOAs. However, on this account validity effects at short SOAs should be 
reduced or absent in groups of individuals with cerebellar abnormalities, because at short 
SOAs there should be insufficient time for attention to be oriented from the fixation point 
to the invalidly cued location: thus eliminating the need to disengage from the invalidly 
cued location, enabling subjects to allocate attention directly to the target at the time of its 
appearance. While the data from Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson (1993) supports this 
prediction, data from the Townsend et al. (1996) does not. Both groups of individuals with 
autism, one with both cerebellar and parietal abnormalities, the other with only cerebellar 
abnormalities, from the Townsend et al. 's (1996) study showed significant validity effects 
at an SOA of 100ms. Plaisted further suggests that it is unlikely that the cerebellar 
abnormality in the group with autism and parietal damage was responsible 
for their 
enhanced validity effect seen at the 800ms SOA, because this effect was not observed 
in 
the group with autism with cerebellar but without additional parietal damage. In addition, 
the idea that individuals with autism with additional parietal damage have a narrow 
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spotlight of attention (Townsend & Courchesne, 1994), or `tunnel vision' (Rincover & 
Ducharme, 1987) predicts enhanced validity effects, which were observed in individuals 
with autism and parietal damage at both 100 and 800 ms SOAs. However, this 
interpretation of enhanced processing due to a narrow spotlight also predicts faster 
responding to validly cued targets, yet both groups of individuals with autism, regardless of 
parietal abnormality, showed slower responses at 100 ms SOA. While this could be 
explained instead by slow attention shifting due to cerebellar abnormalities, an attention- 
shifting deficit also requires the absence of a validity effect at 100ms SOA. As mentioned 
above enhanced validity effects were found at the short SOA of 100ms. 
Given these inconsistencies and in light of recent challenges to the spotlight 
metaphor of attention (Juola, Bouwhuis, Cooper & Warner, 1991), Plaisted (2000) has 
suggested that a new model of attentional orienting as proposed by LaBerge and colleagues 
(LaBerge, 1995; LaBerge, Carlson, Williams & Bunney, 1997) may be usefully applied to 
the data from visuo-spatial orienting studies in autism. Briefly, the two process model 
proposed by LaBerge includes firstly, an attentional preparatory phase triggered by the cue 
and secondly a selective attention process triggered by the onset of the target. The 
preparatory phase corresponds to increased activity in posterior parietal cortex (PPC) with 
a Gaussian-like curve of activation around the location of the cue, in which the peak of 
distribution represents a peak of activity at the centre of the cued area with gradually 
decreasing activation on either side. Selective attention then produces activity at the point 
along the Gaussian curve corresponding to the location of the target, which is assumed to 
be determined by inputs from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Thus, on valid 
trials, selective attention will add to the activity set up by preparatory attention, resulting in 
faster reaction times. In contrast, on invalid trials selective attention needs to boost the 
level of activity because the target has appeared at one of the tails of the Gaussian 
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distribution. Therefore, this model suggests that the additional time required to raise 
activity at the peripheral point results in an increase in reaction time. In this way, different 
patterns of activity are proposed to account for the cueing effect observed in attentional 
cueing studies. 
Based on predictions derived from this model Plaisted (2000) has suggested a 
number of ways that visuospatial orienting may be disrupted in individuals with autism. 
For instance, the rate at which preparatory attention sets up the Gaussian curve of activity 
in the PPC may be slower in individuals with autism, or the spread of activity may be 
different than in typically developing individuals. Alternatively, selective attention could 
be affected by deficient inputs from the DLPFC or by inefficient processing of those inputs 
by the PPC. Any of these possibilities would result in less activity at the point of target 
presentation. 
However criticisms and interpretations such as these are problematic in that 
Plaisted (2000) is comparing data from exogenous and endogenous attention shifting 
paradigms which from the review earlier have important differences. Clearly, these issues 
would be resolved by conducting both reflexive and voluntary cueing paradigms on the 
same subjects. 
2.5.3. Visual search 
In marked contrast to some of the evidence suggesting attentional deficits, a recent study 
by Plaisted, O'Riordan and Baron-Cohen (1998a) has reported that on tasks of visual 
search, individuals with autism performed at a superior level to that of control subjects 
matched for age and verbal mental age. A group of eight high-functioning children with 
autism and a group of eight normal children participated in two search tasks. In one task, 
the target shared colour with one set of distractors but was unique in shape - the feature 
search task. In the other, the conjunctive search task, the target shared colour with one set 
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of distractors and shape with another set of distractors. A typical finding among normal 
individuals is that target detection times increases linearly with increases in the number of 
distractors in the conjunctive search condition but does not increase at larger display sizes 
in feature search tasks (Duncan & Humphries, 1989; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe. 
) 
Cave & Franzel, 1989). 
The results showed that in the feature search task, the children with and without 
autism displayed search times independent of array size, however in the conjunctive search 
task the RTs of the children with autism were not affected by the size of the array, whereas 
the normal children displayed the typical pattern of linear increases in RT with number of 
distractors. Plaisted, O'Riordan and Baron-Cohen (1998a) interpret these findings as 
evidence that children with autism are relatively more proficient at processing unique 
features and that this may underlie their superior performance on tasks such as the 
embedded figures test and the block design test. 
However, although the subjects were matched on verbal MA (as measured by the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn & Dunn, 1981)), the children with autism were 
older and scored higher on a measure of spatial ability (the block design test of the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children -Revised [WISC-R]). Given the possible effect of 
the group differences in spatial ability on task performance and the fact that these authors 
interpret the findings as a possible cause of their good performance on the block design 
test these results can only be interpreted with caution. Future research could give these 
search tasks to groups matched on a measure of non-spatial, general IQ. 
In summary, the research using variations of Posner's cueing paradigms in 
individuals with autism have produced some equivocal results. While some studies have 
suggested that shifting attention at will (Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993; Courchesne et 
al., 1994) and reflexively (Townsend et al., 1996; Casey et al., 1993) is deficient, one 
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study, with low functioning individuals with autism, has failed to show reflexive orienting 
of attention impairments (Burack & larocci, 1995). In comparison, there is tentative 
evidence to suggest that individuals with autism may have a superior ability in shifting 
attention as displayed by their faster target detection on a visual search task (Plaisted et al., 
1998a). However, most of these studies suffer from methodological problems. In addition, 
direct comparisons across studies are problematic due to slight but important differences in 
task design. Future research could address these problems by using larger group sizes, 
ensuring subjects maintain eye fixation, the inclusion of catch trials and better matching of 
control subjects. Moreover, using both exogenous and endogenous cueing paradigms in the 
same group of subjects may solve some of the problems of interpretation of data across 
studies. 
2.6 AIMS OF THESIS 
The first aim of this thesis is to investigate the hypothesis that individuals with autism have 
difficulties in shifting attention (Courchesne et al., 1994). Furthermore, a recent research 
trend has been the use of computerised experimental paradigms designed to examine 
specific aspects of executive function to more precisely determine the nature of the 
executive function impairments underlying autism. This research has identified inhibitory 
mechanisms as a relatively spared component of executive function tasks (Ozonoff et al., 
1994; 1997). The experimental studies reported in this thesis are designed to further 
explore visual attention shifting and inhibition in autism. Chapter 3 examines the 
hypothesis that individuals with autism have impairments in covert visuo-spatial attention 
shifting and inhibition using variations of Posner's (1980) covert attention tasks. Three 
cueing tasks were employed to investigate exogenous and endogenous orienting of 
attention and `inhibition of return'. Methodological issues mentioned earlier are addressed. 
The experiments reported in Chapter 4 continue on the theme of exploring low-level 
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attentional impairments by comparing the performance of individuals with autism and a 
matched comparison group on two visual search tasks. 
The remainder of the thesis is devoted to the investigation of social attention in 
autism. While attention is important for successful performance on low-level tasks 
typically used in research on visual attention, social exchanges are likely to tax attentional 
systems to a greater degree. Chapter 5 reviews the evidence on social attention in typically 
developing individuals before a consideration of joint attention behaviours in individuals 
with autism. There is some suggestion from a review of this literature that individuals with 
autism have a specific deficit in attending to social stimuli. However, this lack of joint 
attention could be caused by a deficit in the ability to shift or modulate attention or by an 
inability to use gaze direction or other social signals as a guide. The experiments in 
Chapter 6 address related issues including the ecological validity and social relevance of 
laboratory type tasks by examining attention-shifting contingent upon social cues. While 
the eyes are of undisputed importance in the resolution of where another person is 
directing their attention, other cues such as head orientation, body alignment or even 
pointing gestures may also provide important information in this regard. Chapter 7 
examines the issue of the relative importance of head or eye gaze in the ability to 
reflexively shift attention. While social exchanges require the ability to follow the shifting 
of another's attention, it is also important to detect when someone is engaging their 
attention with you. Therefore it is important to detect when someone is directing their eye 
gaze at you. Given the evidence that individuals with autism show deviant patterns of eye 
gaze use and have difficulty using information derived from the eyes, combined with the 
results from the previous chapter, Chapter 8 explores the performance of individuals with 
autism on two gaze direction perception tasks. The general discussion in Chapter 9 is 
5? 
intended to place the main findings in the context of the issues arising in the introductory 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Inhibition and covert attention shifting 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Thus, the bulk of evidence derived from attentional cueing paradigms supports the 
suggestion that individuals with autism have impairments in both their automatic and 
voluntary allocation of visual spatial attention, however most of these studies suffer from 
some methodological problems as depicted in Chapter 2. 
The experiments reported in section 2.5 would suggest that both motor and 
cognitive components of inhibition are spared in autism, suggesting that impairments in 
inhibition are not contributing to their deficits on executive function tasks such as the 
WCST. However not all aspects of inhibition have been investigated. Given the 
inconclusive and sometimes contradictory evidence from studies on attentional orienting, 
the present study extends previous work on attention and inhibition in autism by using 
three variations of the covert orienting of visual attention task (Posner et al., 1985). This 
task allows examination of both attentional shifting and an inhibitory mechanism referred 
to as `inhibition of return' (IOR) that is thought to be a low level attentional mechanism 
which provides efficiency of attentional deployment (Klein, 2000). 
In a typical covert orienting attention task, subjects are required to respond as 
quickly as possible on detection of a target event whose probable location has been 
previously cued. Properties of attentional orienting are then inferred on the basis of 
response time differences to targets appearing in cued (valid), uncued (invalid) or neutral 
cued locations. The typical finding is that the response for detection is faster on valid trials 
than on neutral trials and slower on invalid trials than neutral trials (Eriksen & Hoffman, 
54 
1972; Posner, Walker, Freidrich & Rafal, 1984). These two effects are often referred to as 
the `benefits' and `costs' respectively of directing attention to a particular location in space 
prior to the target event. 
However, after the initial facilitatory effects of an exogenous spatial precue, a 
performance deficit or inhibition is found to emerge. This effect has been referred to as 
inhibition of return (IOR)(Posner & Cohen, 1984; Maylor & Hockey, 1985; Klein, 2000). 
Within the first 50 - 150 msec following a peripheral precue, facilitation is typically 
evident at the cued location. Responses to validly cued targets are faster than responses to 
invalidly cued targets. Generally, inhibition becomes evident at the validly cued location 
by about 300msec, at which point invalidly cued targets are responded to faster than 
validly cued targets. IOR is seen as an attentional mechanism that favours novelty which 
prevents against processing of stimuli that correspond to previously attended events. This 
inhibitory mechanism may be useful in visual search, for example, where having searched 
a location, it would be beneficial to avoid immediately searching there again. In this sense, 
it may play an important role in preventing perseverative types of error. 
The design of this study was thus able to examine three attentional mechanisms. 
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate exogenous shifting of visuospatial attention and 
IOR using a peripheral cueing paradigm. Experiment 2 further explored relatively 
automatic shifts of visual spatial attention at short cue to target delays using two types of 
neutral cue, no cue and a double cue. Experiment 3 examined the performance of 
individuals with autism on an endogenous visual orienting task using a central arrow cue. 
Often efficiency of attentional deployment has been examined by comparing the 
magnitude of the invalid-valid RT difference between each group (Casey et al., 1993; 
Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993), termed the `validity effect'. However it is important 
to note that there is no simple prediction relating the size of the validity effect to the 
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efficiency of attentional allocation. Similar validity effects in each group could reflect one 
of three possible outcomes: 
I. Similar benefits on valid trials and similar costs of mis-orienting on invalid trials. 
2. Smaller benefits on valid trials and larger costs on invalid trials. 
3. Larger benefits on valid trials and smaller costs on invalid trials. 
In this study costs and benefits were calculated with reference to the neutral 
condition. In consideration of the warnings of Jonides and Mack (1984) that the properties 
of neutral cues are poorly understood, the question posed was only whether the costs and 
benefits were different in the group with autism compared to the normal subjects and 
whether these changed with SOA. 
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3.2 METHOD - Study 1 
Experiment 1- Inhibition of return 
Participants 
Two groups of participants took part in this study: a group of eighteen high functioning, 
adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) (10 males, 3 females with a diagnosis of 
Asperger's Syndrome, 2 males and 3 females with a diagnosis of high-functioning Autism) 
and a control group of eighteen developmentally normal adults (13 males and 5 females). 
All adults in the group with ASD were attending a special residential provision for autism 
and all were reported by clinical service as having received a diagnosis of ASD by 
experienced consultant psychiatrists using the guidelines of standard criteria, such as those 
specified in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health 
Organisations System for classifying medical disorders, 1990). In addition, the results of 
other standard instruments such as the A-DOS from two subjects and the ADI from eleven 
subjects were available to confirm the diagnosis. The comparison group of normal adults 
was recruited from a local college of further education. Ability was assessed using 6 
subtests of the WAIS-R (Weschler, 1981). The selected three subtests from the Verbal 
Battery were Information, Vocabulary and Arithmetic. Picture Arrangement, Picture 
Completion and Block Design were selected from the Performance Battery. The predicted 
full-length IQ was derived by prorating these six subtests (Crawford, Allen & Jack, 1992). 
Participant's characteristics are shown in Table 3.1. Unpaired t-tests revealed that the 
chronological ages, VIQ, PIQ and IQ of the two groups were not significantly different ([t 
(31.27)=-1, p=0.325], [t (29.16)=-. 58, p=0.565], [t (34)=-. 11, p=0.917] and [t (29.64)=-. 27, 
p=0.792]) respectively. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. Three 
participants from the comparison group and two individuals with autism were left-handed. 
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Table 3.1. Participant characteristics 
Group N AGE(y: m) VIQ PIQ overall IQ 
Autism 18 Mean 20.0 89.89 92.72 91.00 
SD 2.38 15.64 22.25 18.38 
Range 16.9-23.11 72-118 72-13 8 72-132 
Normal 18 Mean 20.8 92.44 93.39 92.39 
SD 1.76 10.15 14.92 12.27 
Range 16.6-23.9 76-125 75-127 75-126 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The covert orienting of visual attention task was presented on a 15-inch computer monitor 
controlled by a Macintosh 6200 PowerBook computer with one millisecond timing for 
control of stimulus display, recording of reaction times and error data. The visual display 
for this task consisted of three 4cm square black boxes. The central box enclosed a central 
fixation point marked by a round black dot. This was flanked by two 4cm square black 
boxes on the left and right set at 6.5 degree of visual angle. The peripheral target was a 
small black square presented in one of the boxes on either side of fixation. The participant 
was seated in front of the computer screen, while the head was held in a fixed position by a 
chin rest, 57cm away from and eye level with the stimuli. The screen subtended a retinal 
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angle of 13 degrees. Participants responded by pressing the space bar of the computer 
keyboard with their dominant hand. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design, with one between subjects factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and within subject factors of Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA)(50,150, 
600 and 1000 ms), Cue (Valid, Invalid and Double) and Visual field (left and right). SOA, 
the time interval between onset of the cue and onset of the target, was randomly varied as 
an interval of 50,150,600 or 1000 msec. Spatial cues were either valid (correctly 
indicating the box in which the target subsequently appeared), invalid (indicating the box 
contralateral to that in which the target subsequently appeared) or double (giving no spatial 
information about subsequent target location). Spatial cues for the appearance of a target 
consisted of a brightening of one of the two peripheral boxes. Double cues for target 
appearance consisted of a brightening of both peripheral boxes. The box was brightened by 
flashing an outline border (6 pixels wide). Trials were designated as being right visual field 
(RVF) or left visual field (LVF) depending on the location of the target, not the preceding 
cue. Figure 3.1 depicts the task in diagrammatic form. 
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Figure 3.1. Diagram of the spatial task in Experiment 
At the start of each trial one of the peripheral boxes brightened. The brightening (cue) 
lasted for 150ms; 500 msec after the onset of the first peripheral cue, a second central cue 
was presented for 50msec. Targets (small bright black boxes inside the larger box) were 
presented either early (50 or 150 msec after the onset of the first cue) or late (600 or 
1000msec after the onset of the first cue). Therefore when an early trial occurred, a second 
cue was never presented. 
Top row - trials began with the basic visual display, followed 
by the cue onset (box 
brightening) and 50 or 150 msec later by the target. 
Bottom row- trials began with the basic visual display, followed by the peripheral cue 
onset, followed by central redirecting cue and 600 or 1000 msec later by the target. 
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An experimental session consisted of 20 blocks of 24 trials, resulting in a total of 
480 trials per session. These included 96 catch trials, in order to minimise anticipatory 
responses, where a cue appeared but no target followed. Rest breaks were offered after 
every 24 trials to meet individual requirements for optimal performance, however most 
participants completed three blocks (72 trials) consecutively before requiring a short break 
of approximately 1-2 minutes. Of the remaining trials 2/3 (256) had valid cues, 1/6 (64) 
had invalid cues and 1/6 (64) had double cues. 
Target location was equally divided between left and right visual fields with SOAs 
being equally and randomly distributed across blocks. Targets remained on the screen until 
the participant depressed the space bar, or for a maximum of 1300ms. If a response was not 
made within this time, the trial was deemed a `miss', excluded from the reaction time 
analyses and included in the error data analysis. Following a response a 500 ms inter-trial 
interval was imposed. As no response was required in catch trials, the display remained on 
the screen for 1300ms and was followed by a 500ms inter trial interval. Erroneous 
responses made on catch trials were categorised as `false alarms'. 
The fixation dot in the centre of the screen flashed to indicate the start of a new 
trial. For each subject, RTs less than 100msec were scored as anticipatory and included in 
error data analysis. Eye movements were monitored by the experimenter and trials where 
eye movements occurred were excluded. In addition to the participants reported in Table 1 
four other participants were tested but their data was excluded from the final analysis. 
Three participants, two from the group with autism and one from the control group were 
unable to refrain from moving their eyes during 50% of trials and one participant from the 
group with autism was unable to make a response within the 1300ms timeframe on 50% of 
trials. 
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Procedure 
Testing of individuals took place in an interview room either in the University of Durham 
or at the participant's institution. Ability testing was carried out on a separate occasion 
prior to the experiment. Each participant was introduced to the testing area and 
familiarised with the equipment. Participants were told that they were helping to find out 
how quickly people could detect a target without moving their eyes and were given a 
description of the task requirements. 
Participants were told to keep their eyes on the round dot in the centre box of the 
screen. They were told that two boxes would be located on either side of this dot. Then 
following a short delay, either one of the boxes would briefly flash, or both boxes would 
flash. Subsequently a small target square would then appear in one of the two boxes. 
Participants were told that the delay between the box flashing and the appearance of the 
target may vary from trial to trial and also on some trials, the centre box may flash during 
this delay. They were told that on some trials no target would appear and that they were to 
refrain from responding on those trials. Participants were instructed to attend to the cues 
but to respond only to the target. The chin rest was introduced and explained that this was 
to ensure that their eyes were level with the display. Participants were encouraged to keep 
their eyes on the fixation point and told to try not to move either their head or their eyes. 
They were asked to press the space bar with their dominant hand as quickly as possible 
when the target square appeared. Participants were given 24 practice trials before the start 
of the experiment. 
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3.3 RESULTS 
Reaction times 
Preliminary analyses revealed no difference between left and right visual field responses 
for either the subjects with autism [F(1,17)=0.008, p=0.931 ], or the comparison group [F 
(1,17) =1.095, p=0.310]. Accordingly, responses were collapsed across this dimension for 
all following analyses. The median reaction time for each target delay and condition were 
calculated for each participant (median reaction time was used as a measure of central 
tendency in line with other research in this area (Posner & Cohen, 1984)). Figure 3.2 
shows the mean of the median RTs for both groups. While the overall reaction times in the 
groups differ, the results with respect to cueing are similar: an early facilitation of the 
validly cued side (versus the invalidly cued side) which is eliminated at the longer SOAs of 
600 msec and 1000msec (inhibition of return). 
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Figure 3.2. Mean (SEM) reaction times to targets occurring at varying intervals following 
the cue for both autistic and normal groups in Experiment 1.0 Autism group invalid cue; 
" Autism group valid cue; Q Normal group invalid cue;   Normal group valid cue. 
The mean RT scores were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor 
of Group (Autism/Normal) and within subjects factors of Cue (Valid/Invalid) and SOA 
(50,150,600 and 1000ms). This revealed a significant effect of Group, [F (1,34) = 5.67, 
p<0.023], a significant main effect of Cue [F (1,34) = 6.62, p<0.015], a significant main 
effect of SOA [F (1.67,102) =23.56, p< 0.001] (Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon corrected) and 
a Cue by SOA interaction [(F2.41,102) = 21.22, p<0.001 ](Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon 
corrected). Simple effects tests revealed that the Cue by SOA interaction was attributable 
to a significant effect of SOA for invalid trials [F (3,102) = 28.8, p<0.025] but not for valid 
trials [F (3,102) = 2.35, p>0.05] and significant effects of Cue for SOAs of 50ms [F (1,34) 
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= 20.13, p<0.025], 150ms [F(1,34) = 11.70, p<0.011, but not at SOAs of 600ms [F(1,34) = 
2.84, p> 0.05] or 1000ms [F(1,34) = 1.16, p>0.05]. 
This pattern of data supports the results reported by Posner and Cohen (1984) 
where the faster responses occurring at the validly cued side at short SOAs reverses to an 
advantage towards the invalidly cued side at longer SOAs. While the simple effect tests do 
not show an advantage, merely comparable response times, it should be noted that there 
was a significant effect of SOA for invalid trials but not valid trials. This is also shown in 
Figure 3.2 where the validly cued side is relatively flat, while the invalidly cued side shows 
a reduction in RT with time. In most experiments a cue produces a reduction in RT with 
SOA, thus the relatively flat function for the cued side indicates that something is 
preventing the usual decrease of RT with SOA. This pattern of results is sufficient to 
determine an inhibition of return effect (Posner & Cohen, 1984). 
To examine the `validity' effect the mean of the RT scores of the invalid trials were 
subtracted from the valid trials at each SOA. The scores from both groups are shown in 
Table 3.2. These were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and a within subject factor of SOA (50,150,600 and 1000ms). This 
analysis revealed a main effect of SOA [F (3,102)=21.22, p<O. 001 ] but no main effect of 
Group [F(1,34) <1, ns] and no Group by SOA interaction F(3,102)<1, ns]. 
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Table 3.2. Validity effects in Experiment 1. A comparison of the mean RT at each SOA 
for valid and invalid trials of each group. Validity effect = valid-invalid trials. 
Autism 
SOA Valid Invalid 
50 439.5 472.19 
150 424.28 450.92 
600 412.72 402.36 
1000 417.56 411.67 
Normal 
Validity 
Effect 
-32.69 
SOA Valid Invalid 
50 387.61 411.14 
-26.64 150 
+10.36 600 
+5.89 1000 
387.28 403.5 
378.72 367.97 
382.81 375.19 
Validity 
Effect 
-23.53 
-16.22 
+10.75 
+7.62 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Although there were no significant differences between the groups in terms of validity 
effects a cost/benefit analysis was undertaken to examine this further. To examine the 
effect of the `costs' associated with orienting to an invalid cue the mean RT scores of the 
invalid trials were subtracted from the double trials at SOAs of 50 and 150 ms. Figure 3.3 
shows a comparison of the `costs' and `benefits' of both groups at 50,150,600 and 1000 
ms. These were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group (Normal/ 
Autism) and a within subject factor SOA (50 and 150 ms). This revealed that the group 
with autism showed a relative greater cost associated with orienting attention to an invalid 
cue [F (1,34)= 8.67, p<0.006]. There was no significant main effect of SOA 
[F(1,34)<1, 
ns] and no Group by SOA interaction [F(1,34)<1, ns]. 
To examine the effects of the `benefits' associated with orienting to a valid cue the 
mean of the median RT scores of double trials were subtracted 
from the mean of the valid 
trials at SOAs of 50 and 150 msec. This revealed that the normal group showed a 
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significantly greater benefit associated with a valid cue [F 4) = 5.41. P<0.026]. There 
was no significant main effect of SOA [F(1,34)=2.29, p=0.14] or a Group by SOA 
interaction [F(1,34) < l, ns]. 
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Figure 3.3. A comparison of the `costs' and benefits' for both groups at each SOA in 
Experiment 1. 
  Autism group; Q Normal group. * P<0.05 
This shows that at short cue to target delays of 50 and 150 ms there are 
different patterns 
of costs and benefits between the two groups, with autistic subjects showing 
larger costs 
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and less benefits of the attention directing cue. There were no group differences at the 
longer cue to target delays of 600 and 1000ms. 
Error Data 
Anticipations 
A small number of `anticipatory ` responses i. e. RTs less than 100 ms were excluded. 
These accounted for less than 0.1% of responses for each group. Given this very low rate 
of errors, no analysis was undertaken on this measure. 
False Alarms 
The mean percentage of error scores for catch trials was calculated for each group. The 
normal adults were able to withhold a response correctly on 98.96% of the catch trials. The 
autistic adults were able to withhold a response correctly on 98.09% of the catch trials. 
Independent sample t-tests revealed that the percentages of `false alarms' in each group 
were not significantly different [t (34)=1.56, p=0.12]. 
Misses 
Of the remaining 384 trials the normal adults failed to make a response within 1300msec 
on 0.39% of trials versus 1.28% for the adults with autism. Independent sample t-tests 
revealed a significant difference between the two groups on this measure [t (34)=2.37, 
p<0.03]. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 1 show that overall the reaction times of the group with autism 
were significantly slower than those of the matched comparison group. However, both the 
group with autism and the comparison group show a similar pattern of attentional cueing. 
When the onset of the cue was followed shortly after (50 or 150ms) by the onset of the 
target, detection times were faster at the validly cued than at the invalidly cued location. 
However, when the interval between the cue onset and target onset was 600 or 1000ms, 
detection times were slower at the validly cued than the invalidly cued location. This 
replicates data reported by Posner and Cohen (1984) for normal adults, revealing reliably 
slower detection times at valid as opposed to invalid locations when the interval between 
cue onset and target onset was 300ms or greater. In other words both groups show 
evidence of an intact low-level attentional mechanism - inhibition of return, which is a 
phenomenon that appears to reflect a form of bias favouring novelty (see Klein & Taylor, 
1994; Rafal & Henik, 1994 for a review). Given these results it would seem that the 
inhibitory capacity of the group with autism was comparable to that of the matched normal 
controls, as shown in Figure 3.2 where the cross-over between valid and invalid trials is 
occurring after a comparable time delay in both groups. 
These results are consistent with the results reported by Ozonoff et al. (1994) and 
Ozonoff and Strayer (1997) in their component process approach to extract the deficient 
cognitive processes involved in executive function tasks found in autism. They found no 
group differences on both motor and cognitive components of inhibition. Similarly Burack 
and larocci (1995) found no differences 
between relatively low functioning individuals 
with autism and matched controls 
in the ability to filter distracters in an attentional task. 
However, they are not concordant with accounts of `overfocused ` attention in autism 
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(Lovaas, Koegel, & Schreibman, 1979; Rincover & Ducharme, 1987), a finding that could 
be interpreted as showing a superior inhibitory capacity among individuals with autism. 
This paradigm also allowed the effect of exogenous covert attentional orienting to 
be examined. There were no significant differences between the two groups in terms of the 
`validity effect'. However a cost-benefit analysis was conducted to ascertain the ambiguity 
inherent in validity effects. This analysis, although not definitive (Jonides & Mack, 1984) 
highlighted a difference between the groups. Specifically the group with autism displayed 
significantly greater cost associated with an invalid cue and less benefit from a valid cue 
than the comparison group. These differences were small and were only apparent at short 
cue to target delays (50 and 150ms). 
The cost of orienting attention on invalid trials can be understood both within the 
spotlight metaphor of spatial attention made popular by Posner (1980) and within the zoom 
lens metaphor of attention favoured by Eriksen (Eriksen & Yeh, 1985). According to the 
spotlight metaphor, there are three distinct components of spatial attention that correspond 
to three stages involved in the operation of the spotlight: engagement of attention by a 
stimulus, disengagement from a stimulus and movement of attention to a stimulus (Posner 
et al., 1987). Larger orienting costs for the subjects with autism in this study suggest that 
they were slower to disengage from an invalid cue in order to attend to the uncued target. 
Less benefits associated with a valid cue would suggest that the individuals with autism are 
slower to shift their attention at short cue to target delays. 
According to the zoom lens metaphor, spatial attention can be contracted or 
expanded. All stimuli within the attentional lens are processed 
in parallel, but the 
efficiency of processing varies inversely with the size of the 
field. Larger orienting costs 
for the autistic subjects in this study suggest that they were less able to flexibly expand the 
field of view on invalid trials and thus had to process the target with fewer resources. 
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These results are compatible with those of Courchesne et al. (1994) and Townsend et al. 
(1996,1999) who found deficits in shifting attention during short time frames. Moreover, 
these results are convergent with results reported by Burack (1994) who has suggested that 
individuals with autism have difficulty in appropriately sizing the attentional lens. 
However, the properties of neutral cues are poorly understood (Jonides & Mack, 
1984), therefore it is possible that the reason that the individuals with autism failed to 
show comparable costs and benefits to the control group was because they found the 
neutral cue (double flash) too alerting. This prompted the design of experiment 2 which 
employed the same design at short cue to target delays of 50 and 150 ms using two types of 
neutral cue, both no cue and a double cue. As no significant differences were found 
between the two groups at the longer SOAs of 600ms and 1000ms these were omitted from 
Experiment 2. This also reduced the total number of trials required. 
3.5 METHOD 
Experiment 2- exogenous orienting of covert visual spatial attention. 
Participants 
Two groups of participants took part in this study: a group of sixteen high functioning 
adults with ASD (9 males, 3 females with Asperger's Syndrome and 2 males, 2 females 
with high-functioning Autism) and a control group of sixteen (11 males and 5 females) 
developmentally normal adults. Fourteen of the group with ASD and eight of the control 
group participated in Experiment 1 approximately four months before. Recruitment and 
ability testing were as described in Experiment 1. Participants' characteristics are shown in 
Table 3.3. Independent sample t-tests revealed that the chronological ages, VIQ, PIQ and 
IQ of the two groups were not significantly different ([t(28)= -0.06, p=0.95], [t(21)= 0.64, 
p=0.53], [t(31)=1.03, p=0.31] and [t(27) =0.79, p=0.44]) respectively. All participants had 
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normal or corrected to normal vision. Three of the comparison group and two subjects 
from the group with autism were left-handed. 
Table 3.3. Participant characteristics in Experiment 2 
Group N AGE(y: m) VIQ PIQ overall IQ 
Autism 16 Mean 20.6 88.6 85.5 86.8 
SD 2.31 14.4 14.5 13.7 
Range 16.3-24.2 72-120 72-112 72-113 
Normal 16 Mean 20.6 91.13 90.09 90.12 
SD 1.85 6.72 15.00 9.72 
Range 17.0-25.0 76-101 75-128 75-123 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli were presented on a 15-inch computer monitor controlled by a Texas 
Instruments Travelmate 6030 computer with one millisecond timing for control of 
stimulus display, recording of reaction time and error data. The visual display for this task 
was identical to that in Experiment 1. Participants responded by pressing a button on a 
button box. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design, with one between subject factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and within subject factors of Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA) (50 and 
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150ms), Cue (Valid, Invalid, No Cue and Double Cue) and Visual Field (left and right). 
All other aspects of the design were as for Experiment 1. 
An experimental session consisted of 4 blocks of 68 trials, resulting in a total of 
272 trials per session. These included 48 catch trials in order to minimise anticipatory 
responses, where a cue appeared but no target followed. Of the remaining trials 128 had 
valid cues, 32 had invalid cues, 32 had no cue and 32 had a double cue. Rest breaks of 
approximately 1-2 minutes were offered after every block. Target location was equally 
divided between right and left visual fields. SOAs were equally and randomly distributed 
across blocks. Targets remained on the screen until the participant depressed the button, or 
for a maximum of 1300ms. Error data was recorded as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1 except notice that the centre box may 
flash was omitted from the instructions. Participants were asked to press the button on the 
button box as quickly as possible when the target square appeared. Participants received 24 
practice trials before the start of the experiment. 
3.6 RESULTS 
Reaction Times 
As in Experiment 1, there was no effect of visual field for the group with autism 
[F(1,15)=0.275, p<O. 61 ] or the comparison group[F(1,15)= 0.07, p<O. 79] and this 
dimension was collapsed for all following analyses. The median reaction time 
for each 
target delay and condition were calculated for each subject. Figure 3.4 shows the mean 
RTs for both the group with autism and the comparison group. 
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Figure 3.4. A comparison of reaction times in response to each attentional cue in 
Experiment 2. The left graph displays the mean reaction times (RT) ±SEM from both the 
comparison group and the group with autism at a cue to target SOA of 50ms. The right 
graph displays the results from the comparison group and the group with autism at a cue to 
target SOA of 150ms. Subjects: 0 Autism,   Normal. 
The mean RT scores were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of 
Group (Autism/Normal) and within subject factors of Cue (Valid/Invalid/No Cue/Double) 
and SOA (50 and 150ms). This revealed significant effects of Cue [F(3,90)=21.49, 
p<0.001] and SOA [F(1,30)=9.08, p<0.005]. This shows that both groups were faster on 
valid than invalid trials with no cue and double trials lying somewhere in between. Both 
groups of subjects were also faster with a longer cue to target delay. There were no 
significant differences in RTs between the two groups [F(1,30)= 1.33, p=0.26] and all 
other interactions were not significant (Cue by Group [F(3,90)= 0.29, p=0.84], 
SOA by 
Group [F(1,30)= 0.09, p=0.76], Cue by SOA [F(3,90)= 1.92, p=0.13] and Cue by SOA by 
Group [F(3,90)= 0.94, p=0.42]. 
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To answer the question of whether there were differences between the effects of 
orienting to a neutral (no cue) compared to a double cue a three way repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted with one between subject factor of Group and within subjects 
factors of Cue (No and Double) and SOA (50,150ms). This analysis revealed no 
significant differences between the two groups [F(1,30)= 1.34, p=0.25]. There was a main 
effect of SOA [F(1,30)=4.23, p<0.05] indicating that both groups were faster at longer cue 
to target delays and a Cue by SOA interaction [F(1,30)= 8.26, p<0.007]. Simple effect tests 
revealed that this interaction was attributable to a significant effect of SOA for the No Cue 
trials [Fs(1,30)= 10.10, p<0.01] but not for double trials [Fs(l, 30)=0.07, p>0.05]. The 
effects of Cue at SOAs of 50ms [Fs(1,30)<l, ns] and 150ms [Fs(1, )'0)=3.66, p>0.05] were 
not significant. 
To examine the `validity' effect the mean of the RT scores of the invalid trials were 
subtracted from the valid trials at each SOA. The scores from both groups are shown in 
Table 3.4. These were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and a within subject factor of SOA (50,150ms). No significant results 
were found. (Group [F(1,30)= 0.36, p=0.56], Group by SOA [F(1,30)= 1.43, p=0.24] and 
SOA [F(1,30)= 0.09, p=0.76]. 
Table 3.4. Validity effects in Experiment 2. A comparison of the mean RT at each SOA 
for valid and invalid trials of each group. Validity effect = valid-invalid trials. 
SOA 50 150 
Valid Invalid Validity Valid Invalid Validity 
Autism 360.84 396.20 -35.36 340.36 384.89 -44.53 
Control 330.47 373.25 -42.78 327.09 354.44 -27.35 
75 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
To examine the effect of the `costs' associated with orienting to an invalid cue the mean 
RT scores of the double trials were subtracted from the invalid trials at SOAs of 50 and 
150 ms. These were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group and 
a within subject factor SOA (50 and 150 ms). This analysis revealed no significant 
differences between the two groups [F(1,30)<l, ns] and no main effect of SOA [F(l, 30)= 
2.59, p<O. 12] or SOA by Group interaction [F(1,30)= 0.001, p<0.98]. 
To examine the effects of the `benefits' associated with orienting to a valid cue the mean 
RT scores of double trials were subtracted from the mean of the valid trials at SOAs of 50 
and 150 ms. These were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and a within subject factor of SOA (50 and 150 ms). This analysis 
revealed no significant differences between the two groups [F(1,30)<1, ns], no main effect 
of SOA [F(1,30)= 2.94, p=0.09] and no SOA by Group interaction [F(1,30)=2.58, p=0.12]. 
Because there were no differences between the no cue trials and the double cue trials in 
both groups, only the costs and benefits of the double trials are reported above however 
both comparisons are depicted graphically in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. Mean (+SEM) of the difference between the costs and benefits following a 
neutral (No) cue and a neutral (double) cue for both the autism group and the comparison 
group in Experiment 2.   Cue to target SOA of 50ms; Q Cue to target SOA of 150ms. 
Error Data 
Anticipations 
A small number of `anticipatory' responses i. e. RTs less than 100ms were excluded. These 
accounted for less than 1% of responses for each group. There were no significant 
differences between the two groups [t(30)=-0.63, p=0.53]. 
False alarms 
The mean percentage of catch trials on which subjects incorrectly responded were 
calculated for each group. The control group produced a `false alarm' response on 6% of 
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trials in comparison with 10% for the group with autism. An independent sample t-test 
revealed no significant difference between the groups on this measure [t(30)= -1.58, 
p=0.12]. 
Misses 
Of the remaining 224 trials the normal adults failed to make a response on only 0.3% of 
trials. The group with autism made 0.4% errors. Again this difference was not significant 
[t(30)=-0.48, p=0.63]. 
3.7 DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 show no significant differences between the group with 
autism and the comparison group in their relatively automatic allocation of visual attention 
at short cue to target delays. Also, analyses designed to compare the effects of a double cue 
with no cue produced no significant differences between the two groups. These results are 
in contrast to the small differences found in both overall reaction times and the costs and 
benefits at short SOAs between the two groups in Experiment 1. There are at least three 
possible reasons for this discrepancy. Firstly the task demands of the two experiments were 
different. Secondly, the participants were slightly different in the two experiments, with 
fourteen from the original group with autism and eight from the original comparison group 
available for re-testing. Finally, there may have been practice effects. 
It may be possible to reconcile the failure to replicate the results of Experiment 1 in 
light of theories that disordered attention/arousal might underlie the symptoms found in 
autism. Dawson and Lewy (1989) suggest that children with autism suffer from a deficit in 
their arousal regulation and deficient orienting responses to novel stimuli. Experiment 2 
required participants to be highly alert at all times with target stimuli appearing at a fast 
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pace. Clearly both groups found this task more difficult as evidenced by their increase in 
error data, however again there were no significant differences between the groups. When 
the task demands required participants to be alert at all times and respond to rapid stimuli 
as in Experiment 2, no differences were found between the two groups. In contrast, 
Experiment 1 varied from short cue to target delays to longer cue to target delays that did 
result in small group differences. The notion of a deficit in orienting to novel stimuli was 
not tested in this paradigm in view of the repetitive nature of the task. However, it seems 
that in this group of subjects with autism there was no pervasive deficits in reflexively 
shifting their attention. 
These results are not convergent with other studies reporting attentional shifting 
impairments in individuals with autism using a similar exogenous covert shifting paradigm 
(Townsend et al., 1996; Casey et al., 1993; Townsend et al., 1999). However, as mentioned 
previously most of these studies suffer from some methodological problems. In these 
studies there is often no mention of including catch trials so there is no way of knowing 
whether participants are actually waiting for the target to appear before responding. Also, 
although the authors suggest that participants maintain fixation there is no mention of 
excluding trials where eye movements occur, an oversight that could confound the reaction 
time data 
These results are however, consistent with the findings of Burack and larocci 
(1995) who also found no significant differences between low functioning individuals with 
autism and comparison groups in a similar shifting covert attention paradigm. 
In this study, 
following an exogenous cue, a target appeared to the left or right of fixation at an SOA of 
150ms, a time frame appropriate for the measurement of covert orienting. Although they 
found that the children with autism were overall slower to respond to both validly and 
invalidly cued targets, the group with autism, a MA-matched group of developmentally 
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delayed individuals without autism and typically developing children all displayed fastest 
RTs when the target appeared in the same location as the cue, indicating no specific deficit 
in reflexively disengaging and/or shifting attention among the individuals with autism. 
In view of the fact that this group of individuals with autism showed no 
impairments in their relatively automatic allocation of visual attention, Experiment 3 was 
designed to examine their performance on a task of voluntary attention shifting. 
3.8 METHOD 
Experiment 3- Endogenous orienting of covert attention 
Participants 
All participants who took part in experiment 2 were available for re-testing approximately 
2 weeks later. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
These were the same as Experiment 2 
Design 
The experiment had a similar design to Experiment 1 with one exception. The spatial cues 
for the appearance of a target in this experiment were either an arrow (valid/invalid) or a 
dash (neutral). All other aspects of the design were as Experiment 1. An example of the 
task is shown in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6. A diagram of the spatial cueing task in Experiment 3 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that described for Experiment 2 except that the participants 
were told that on 80% of the trials the arrow would point to the location of the target and 
20% of the trials the arrow would point to the opposite box. A dash would suggest that the 
target could appear in either of the peripheral boxes. Participants completed 24 practice 
trials before the start of the experiment. 
3.9 RESULTS 
Reaction Times 
The median RT for each target delay and condition were calculated for each subject. 
Figure 3.7 shows the mean RTs for both the group with autism and the comparison group. 
The left graph shows the RT for targets appearing in the left visual field. The right graph 
shows the RTs for targets appearing in the right visual field. 
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Figure 3.7. Mean Reaction times to targets occurring at varying intervals following a valid 
or invalid cue for both autism and comparison groups in Experiment 3. The left graph 
shows RT to targets occurring in the left visual field. The right graph shows RT to targets 
occurring in the right visual field; " Autism group valid cue; --- " ---Autism group invalid 
cue;   Normal group valid cue; ---   ---Normal group invalid cue; 
These data were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group 
(Autism/Normal) and within subject factors of Cue (Valid/Invalid/Neutral), SOA (50,150, 
600 and 1000ms) and Visual Field (Left/Right). There were no significant differences 
between the two groups [F(1,30)=2.09, p=0.16]. There were significant effects of Cue 
[F(2,60)=27.42, p=0.001], SOA [F(3,90)=18.96, p=0.001] and Visual Field [F(1,30)=7.39, 
p=0.01]. Finally there was a Visual Field by Group interaction [F(l, 30)=7.39, p=0.0l]. 
Simple effect tests revealed that this interaction was attributable to a significant effect of 
Visual Field for the comparison group [Fs(1,30)=11.46, p<0.01] but not for the group with 
autism [Fs(1,30) <1, ns] and a significant effect of Group for the right visual field 
[Fs(1,30)=3.85, p<0.05] but not the left visual field [Fs(1,30) <l, ns]. All other interactions 
were not significant (Cue by Group [F(2,60)<l, ns], Cue by SOA [F(1,30)= 2.12, p=0.09], 
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Cue by SOA by Group [F(6,180)=0.37, p=0.89], Cue by Visual Field [F(2,60)=0.85, 
p=0.28], Cue by Visual Field by Group [F(2,60)= 0.85, p=0.43], SOA by Visual Field 
[F(3,90)= 0.94, p=0.43], SOA by Visual Field by Group [F(3,90)= 0.51, p=0.67], Cue by 
SOA by Visual Field [F(6,180)=0.58, p=0.75] and Cue by SOA by Visual Field by Group 
[F(6,180)=0.70, p=0.65]). Table 3.5 shows the mean RT of both groups for the valid and 
invalid trials and the validity effect which is the difference between the RT to an invalid 
cue and a valid cue for the left visual field only. Table 3.6 shows a comparison of the 
validity effect of each group for the right visual field. 
Table 3.5. Validity effects in Experiment 3. A comparison of the mean RT at each SOA 
for valid and invalid trials of each group in the left visual field. 
Left Visual Field 
Autism Normal 
SOA Valid Invalid Validity Valid Invalid Validity 
Effect Effect 
50 389.00 399.84 +10.84 366.68 381.09 +14.41 
150 367.09 375.44 +8.35 343.00 372.09 +29.09 
600 343.47 375.13 +31.66 336.44 351.25 +14.81 
1000 360.69 364.53 +3.84 336.03 350.00 +13.97 
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Table 3.6. Validity effects in Experiment 3. A comparison of the mean RT at each SOA 
for valid and invalid trials of each group in the right visual field. 
Right Visual Field 
Autism Normal 
SOA Valid Invalid Validity Valid Invalid Validity 
Effect Effect 
50 380.25 421.97 +41.72 342.25 359.37 +17.12 
150 357.31 383.84 +26.53 325.25 343.19 +17.94 
600 342.66 364.31 +21.65 317.75 338.84 +21.09 
1000 358.25 366.97 +8.72 327.94 332.28 +4.34 
To examine the validity effect the mean of the RT scores of the valid trials were subtracted 
from the invalid trials at each of the SOAs. These were compared using ANOVA with a 
between subject factor of Group (Normal/Autism) and a within subject factors of SOA 
(50,150,600 and 1000ms) and Visual Field (Left/Right). This analysis revealed no 
significant differences between the two groups [F(1,30)=0.14, p=0.71 ]. There were no 
significant main effects of SOA [F(3,90)=2.62, p=0.07] or Visual Field [F(1,30)= 0.75, 
p=0.40]. All other interactions were not significant (SOA by Group [F(3,90)=0.97, 
p=0.41 ], Visual Field by Group [F(1,30)= 2.24, p=0.14], SOA 
by Visual Field 
[F(3,90)=0.78, p=0.51] and SOA by Visual Field by Group [F(3,90)= 1.11, p=0.35]). 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
To examine the effect of the `benefits' associated with orienting to a valid cue the mean of 
the RT scores of the neutral trials were subtracted from the mean of the valid trials. These 
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were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group (NormaL'Autism) 
and within subject factors of SOA (50,150,600 and 1000 ms) and Visual Field 
(Left/Right). This revealed a significant effect of SOA [F(2.41,90) = 3.275, p<0.035 
(Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon corrected)]. There were no significant differences between 
the two groups [F(1,30)= 1.56, p=0.22]. All other main effects and interactions were not 
significant (SOA by Group [F(3,90)= 0.26, p=0.85], Visual Field [F(1,30)= 2.69, p=0.11 ], 
Visual Field by Group [F(1,30)= 0.42, p=0.52], SOA by Visual Field [F(3,90)=0.91, 
p=0.44] and SOA by Visual Field by Group [F(3,90)= 0.2, p=0.99. To examine the effect 
of the `costs' associated with orienting to an invalid cue the mean of the RT scores of the 
neutral trials were subtracted from the mean of the invalid trials. These were compared 
using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group (Normal/Autism) and within 
subject factors of SOA (50,150,600 and 1000ms) and Visual Field (Left/Right). No 
significant results were found (SOA [F(3,90)=0.57, p=0.64], SOA by Group [F(3,90)=0.17, 
p=0.92, Visual Field, [F(1,30)= 0.59, p=0.45], Visual Field by Group [F(1,30)= 0.34, 
p=0.56], SOA by Visual Field [F(3,90) 0.21, p=0.89] and SOA by Visual Field by Group 
[F(3,90)=0.89, p=0.45]). Figure 3.8 shows the costs and benefits associated with orienting 
to a valid and an invalid cue. As there was no effect of visual field that dimension has been 
collapsed in the following figure. 
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Figure 3.8. A comparison of the costs and benefits for both groups at each SOA in 
Experiment 3.   Autism group; Q Normal group. 
Error Data 
Anticipations 
A small number of anticipatory responses i. e. RTs less than 100ms were excluded. These 
accounted for 0.8% and 1.6% of the responses from the comparison group and the group 
with autism respectively. There were no significant differences between the groups on this 
measure [t(30)=1.87, p=0.08]. 
False Alarms 
The mean percentage of catch trials on which subjects incorrectly responded were 
calculated for each group. The comparison group produced a `false alarm' response on 
86 
1.6% of trials in comparison with 2.6% for the group with autism. An independent sample 
t-test revealed no significant difference between the groups on this measure [t(30)= -1.17, 
p=0.25]. 
Misses 
Of the remaining 384 trials the comparison group failed to make a response on only 0.1% 
of trials. The group with autism made 0.24% errors. Again this difference was not 
significant [t(30)=-0.78, p=0.44]. 
3.10 DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 3 show that the individuals with autism have no impairment in 
their voluntary allocation of visual attention. Both groups showed comparable reaction 
times, validity effects and costs and benefits. The finding that the comparison group was 
faster to shift their attention to the right visual field than the left visual field possibly 
reflects the preponderance of right-handed participants in the sample studied (Carter, 
Krener, Chaderjian, Northcutt & Wolfe, 1995). This right field advantage was not present 
in this group in the previous two experiments perhaps reflects the fact that Experiment 3 
involved investigation into voluntary attention whereas the previous experiments involved 
reflexive attention shifting. That this lateralized attentional difference was not present in 
the group with autism may lend support to the suggestion that language lateralization is 
less marked in this subject group (Dawson & Lewy, 1989). 
The present pattern of results contrasts with those of the study by Wainwright- 
Sharp and Bryson (1993) who examined the performance of relatively high-functioning 
adolescents and young adults with autism using this type of paradigm at cue to target 
delays of 100ms and 800ms. The group with autism failed to show the normal RT 
advantage for validly cued targets at the shorter cue to target delay, indeed they failed to 
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show any effect of cue which suggests that they did not process the spatially informative 
cue. At the longer cue to target delay however, the individuals with autism showed a robust 
advantage of valid over invalid trials that was significantly greater than the comparison 
group. However, Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson go on to discuss that the particularly slow 
responses to the left field invalid trials is largely accounted for by the two left-handed 
participants in the group with autism. They also analyse the Group by Delay interaction by 
multiple t-tests, which runs the risk of making a Type 1 statistical error. Alternative 
explanations for the differences found between the groups in the Wainwright-Sharp and 
Bryson study could be an impairment in processing the central cue and/or a delay in motor 
response preparation and not to difficulties in the shifting of attention. 
3.11 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The three experiments reported in this study were designed to investigate the hypothesised 
attentional impairments in autism. The first experiment examined the low level attentional 
mechanism `inhibition of return' which is thought to act as a novelty bias which impedes 
the processing of stimuli or locations that have been previously attended to. This was 
deemed important given that individuals with autism show high perseveration on tasks like 
the WCST and engage in repetitive behaviour. However our evidence would suggest that 
this mechanism is intact in individuals with autism and provides further support for the 
position that inhibitory mechanisms are not contributing to their impaired performance on 
tasks of executive function (Ozonoff et al., 1994; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997). There was 
however, some suggestion that the individuals with autism showed a reduced magnitude in 
reflexively shifting their attention in space at short cue to target delays. 
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate this further by examining the differences 
between two types of neutral cue. There were no group differences between reaction times 
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following no cue or a double cue, suggesting that the reason for the small differences in the 
costs and benefits associated with cueing between the two groups found in Experiment 1 
was not due to the fact that the group with autism found the double cue too alerting as 
hypothesised. Differing task demands and the possibility of carry over practice effects are 
possible candidates for the discrepancy between the two experiments. The results failed to 
replicate the overall reaction time and small cost and benefit differences found in 
Experiment 1 indicating no pervasive deficit in reflexively orienting attention among 
individuals with autism. Attentional orienting was further explored in Experiment 3, which 
examined voluntary attention shifting ability. As a group the individuals with autism were 
not slower in responding on the spatial reaction time task. Moreover, analyses designed to 
focus on the speed of attentional deployment did not reveal a selective deficit in the 
individuals with autism compared with the matched control group. 
It is difficult to make direct comparisons between this study and those reported by 
Courchesne and colleagues and others reporting attentional problems in autism 
(Wainwright-Shape & Bryson, 1993; Casey et al., 1993) given the slight differences in task 
design, subject's ability and age range. However, when methodological problems are 
controlled for, well-matched control groups are used and larger numbers in each group are 
employed, no differences in either their relatively automatic or their voluntary allocation 
of visual attention are found. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Visual Search 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
While the weight of evidence reported in Chapter 2 would suggest that individuals with 
autism have difficulties shifting their attention, this proposal was not supported by the 
results of chapter 3. Moreover, in marked contrast to the evidence reporting disordered 
control over their attentional capabilities, a recent study by Plaisted, O'Riordan and Baron- 
Cohen (1998a) has reported that on tasks of visual search, individuals with autism 
performed at a superior level to that of age and verbal mental age matched control 
subjects. 
Tasks of visual search require the subject to detect a target from an array 
containing varying numbers of distractors. If the target differs from the distracters in some 
simple property or feature, such as colour (e. g. a red X among green X's- feature search), 
the target is detected about equally fast in an array of 20 items as in an array of 6 items. 
Such targets pop out of the display, so that the time taken to find them is independent of 
the number of distracters. On the other hand, if a target is characterised only by a 
conjunction of properties (e. g. a red X among green X's and red O's - conjunctive search), 
the time taken to find the target or to decide that the target is not present increases linearly 
with the number of items in the display. 
Strikingly, Plaisted et al. (1998a) found that children with autism showed no 
significant slowing in reaction time with set size in the conjunctive search task and were 
faster than the normally developing children. This result is particularly surprising as it 
would appear that visual search makes increased demands on the ability to shift attention 
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between stimuli as subjects must move their attention around a host of potential targets 
and not simply to a single target as in attentional cueing paradigms. Treisman and Gelade's 
(1980) initial account of visual search performance suggests that in the conjunctive search 
condition subjects must serially focus their attention on each item in the display until the 
target is detected. More recently, Treisman and Sato (1990) and Findlay (1997) have 
suggested that several locations may be processed in parallel, but the need to move 
attention between clusters of stimuli (especially with larger display sizes) remains. 
There are two possible explanations of the discrepancy between the results of this 
study and the literature on shifting attention. Plaisted et al. (1998a) suggest that the 
superior performance of the subjects with autism may reflect a superior ability to integrate 
information about individual stimuli and thus better discriminate between targets and 
distractors. However, this account is at odds with the evidence suggesting individuals with 
autism are poor at integrating information to form a gestalt and better able to focus on 
local details of a complex stimulus (Frith, 1989). A second possible explanation noted by 
the authors is that it may be that individuals with autism just have superior visuospatial 
skills and so have a performance advantage on a wide range of visuospatial tasks. A 
visuospatial advantage has also been proposed to explain the performance peaks of 
individuals with autism on the Block Design and Object Assembly tasks of the WAIS 
(Shah & Frith, 1983; Asarnow, Tanguay, Bott & Freeman, 1987). If this is the case, then it 
may be a confounding factor that the autistic children in the Plaisted et al. study had a 
significantly higher performance IQ than the control subjects. On this account, the superior 
performance of the group with autism might then reflect the importance of visuospatial 
ability to task performance rather than a characteristic of autism per se. Although Plaisted, 
O'Riordan and Baron-Cohen (1998a) do acknowledge this possibility, they point out that 
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there was no correlation between the block design test and the average RTs in the 
conjunctive search condition for each group. 
The aim of the present study is to extend work on visual search in autism. 
Experiment I was designed to overcome some of the difficulties of the Plaisted et al. study 
by using (i) a bigger sample size, (ii) control subjects matched for chronological age, 
verbal and performance IQ, and (iii) a display density which was held constant across 
changes in display size. Palmer, Ames and Lindsay (1993) have suggested that sensory 
processes such as lateral masking or perceptual grouping may confound the measurement 
of attention in simple visual search tasks. Therefore alterations in stimuli density may 
serve to interfere with or facilitate perception. A group of adolescents and young adults 
were chosen as subjects because of difficulties encountered in a previous study (Neely, 
1998) using the same task. The results of this study revealed no significant differences 
between the children with autism and a control group of typically developing children 
matched for chronological age, verbal and performance IQ. However, keeping children on 
task across a large number of trials was problematic and therefore reaction time data taken 
from a group of adults was deemed more reliable. 
4.2 METHOD - Study 2 
Experiment 1 
Participants 
Two groups of participants took part in this study: a group of sixteen high functioning 
adults with ASD (9 males, 3 females with Asperger's Syndrome and 2 males, 2 females 
with high-functioning Autism) and a comparison group of sixteen (11 males and 5 
females) developmentally normal adults. Diagnostic criteria and ability assessment were as 
specified in Chapter 3. Participants' characteristics are shown in Table 4.1. Unpaired t- 
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tests revealed that the chronological ages, VIQ, PIQ and IQ of the two groups were not 
significantly different ([t (28)= -0.06, p=0.95], [t (21)=0.64, p= 0.53], [ t (31)= 1.03, 
p=0.31 ] and [t (27)=0.79, p=0.44] respectively). All participants had normal or corrected 
to normal vision. Three participants from the comparison group and two participants from 
the group with ASD were left-handed. 
Table 4.1. Participant characteristics in Experiment 1. 
Group N AGE(y: m) VIQ PIQ overall IQ 
Autism 16 Mean 20.6 88.6 85.5 86.8 
SD 2.31 14.4 14.5 13.7 
Range 16.3-24.2 72-120 72-112 72-113 
Normal 16 Mean 20.6 91.13 90.09 90.12 
SD 1.85 6.72 15.00 9.72 
Range 17.0-25.0 76-101 75-128 75-123 
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Stimuli and Apparatus 
Stimulus displays consisted of 6,10 or 20 letter characters arranged in an imaginary grid. 
randomly selected from a set of grid positions. The imaginary grid decreased in size from 
16.4cm X 12.5cm (approximately 16° visual angle) in the 20 element condition to 12.4cm 
X 8.5cm (approximately 12° visual angle) in the 10 element condition to 9.6cm X 6.5cm 
(approximately 9° visual angle) in the 6 element condition. This reduction in size ensured 
that stimulus density remained constant across conditions. Viewing distance was 
approximately 57cm. Each element measured 0.5cm X 0.5cm subtending approximately 
0.5° of visual angle horizontally and 0.5° vertically. The minimum distance between 
elements in any display were 0.5cm between positions in a row and 0.5cm between 
positions in a column. Display elements comprised two dimensions, colour (red and green) 
and shape (X and 0). The stimuli were generated by a Texas Instruments Travelmate 6030 
notebook computer and displayed on a 15-inch colour monitor. The computer recorded 
reaction time and error data. Subjects responded by pressing one of two buttons on a 
button box (the right button for the right hand signalling target present and the left button 
for the left hand signalling target absent). The buttons were reversed for left handed 
subjects; therefore participants responded `target present' with their dominant hand. An 
example of the task is shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. The left figure (a) shows an example of a feature search, target present. 
The right figure (b) shows an example of a conjunctive search, target 
present. Black Xs represented green stimuli in the task. Grey Xs and Os 
represented red stimuli in the task. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design, with one between subjects factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and three within subject factors of Condition, Display size and Probe. 
The experiment comprised two search tasks (Condition), one for a feature target and one 
for a conjunctive target. Each search task contained two crossed factors: Display size (6,10 
or 20 letters) and Probe (target present or absent), so that 6 combinations exhausted each 
experimental factor. There were 16 trials for each combination of factors yielding a total 
of 96 trials per condition. Trials were randomised in two blocks of 48 trials balanced for 
equal presentation of all experimental factors. In this way, each subject completed four 
blocks of 48 trials within the testing session. The order of target present and target absent 
trials and of different display sizes were randomised. The subjects performed a binary 
choice reaction time task in which search was conducted for a prespecified target (a red 
X). In the feature condition, non-targets differed from the target on one dimension - colour 
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(i. e. a red X among green X distracters). In the conjunctive condition each distracter 
shared one feature with the target (i. e. a red X among green X and red 0 distracters). The 
order in which the condition was presented (feature or conjunction) was randomised to 
counterbalance any order effects. 
Procedure 
Ability testing was carried out in sessions prior to the start of the experiment. For the 
search tasks, each participant was tested in a quiet room in his/her college. Each 
participant was tested on both the feature and conjunctive search tasks during one session. 
The participant was seated 57cm in front of the monitor and was told that they were 
helping to find out how quickly people could find a target when it was mixed up with other 
items. The participant was informed that the target was a red X. They were told that on 
some of the trials the target would be presented alongside green X's, some the target 
would be interspersed among green X's and red O's and on some of the trials the target 
would not be there at all. If the target was present, they were to respond by pressing the 
right button and if the target was absent they were to respond by pressing the left button. 
For left handed participants this instruction was reversed, i. e. they were told to press the 
left button if the target was present and the right button if the target was not present. 
Participants were asked to keep their index fingers poised over these buttons at all times. 
They were instructed to respond as quickly as possible with as few mistakes as possible 
and were encouraged to stare at the middle of the screen. Eye movements were 
uncontrolled, as previous research using relatively large items spaced fairly widely to limit 
peripheral crowding effects (Levi, Klein & Aitsebomo, 1985) has obtained the same 
pattern of reaction time data regardless of the presence or absence of eye movements 
(Klein & Farrell, 1989). The display remained in view until the participant responded. The 
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next display appeared 500ms after the response. Each session was split into four blocks of 
48 trials. After each block of trials participants were offered a short break of 
approximately 1-2 minutes. 
Participants were given 12 search trials of both feature and conjunctive conditions 
before the start of the experiment. In addition to the participants reported in Table 1 two 
other participants were tested but had difficulty with the task requirements. One 
participant from the comparison group showed evidence of a speed accuracy trade off with 
extremely fast reactions times and a high error rate. He was not complying with the 
experimental instructions and his data were excluded from the analyses. One participant 
from the group with autism showed some evidence of a co-morbid tic disorder with 
excessive tics interfering with the reliability of his reaction time data therefore his data 
were excluded from the analyses. 
4.3 RESULTS 
Reaction Time 
Figure 4.2 shows the mean RT data from both groups of subjects in each search task. The 
left panel shows the pattern of results for the comparison group. RT for the comparison 
subjects to detect the feature target showed minimal effects of the display size with RT 
increasing non-linearly as the number of distracters increases. In contrast, RT for the 
comparison subjects to detect the conjunctive target increased linearly with display size. 
Overall RT was much slower in the conjunctive condition than the feature conditions. The 
right panel shows the pattern of results for both search tasks for the group with autism. 
Both groups were slower in the conjunctive condition than in the feature condition with the 
slope for absent responses steeper than that for present responses. That is, there was a 
much more marked effect of the display size when the target is absent than present. 
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Figure 4.2. RT (mean +SEM) in visual search tasks for control subjects (N=16) and 
subjects with autism (N=16) in Experiment 1. A. Feature present condition; B. Conjunctive 
present condition; C. Feature absent condition; D. Conjunctive absent condition. The left 
graph shows the RT data for the comparison group whereas the right graph shows the RT 
data for the group with autism. 
The mean RT scores were analysed using ANOVA with a between subject factor of 
Group and within subjects factors of Condition (feature or conjunctive), Probe (target 
present or target absent) and Display Size (6,10 or 20 items). This revealed significant 
main effects of Condition, [F (1,30) = 200.47, p<0.001]; Probe, [F (1,30) = 55.67, 
p<0.001]; and Display Size, [F (2,60) = 113.59, p<0.001], indicating faster reaction times 
in the feature condition, faster reaction times on target present trials and longer reaction 
times with increasing display sizes. The group with autism were overall significantly 
slower [F (1,30)= 17.36, p<0.001. 
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The Group by Condition interaction was also significant [F (1,30) = 4.45, p<0.04']. 
Simple effects tests revealed that this interaction was attributable to a more significant 
effect of Condition for the group with autism [Fs(1,30 )= 132.31, p<0.01 ] than the 
comparison group [Fs(1,30) =72.60, p<0.01] and a more significant effect of Group for the 
conjunctive condition [Fs(1,30) = 55.47, p<0.01] than the feature condition [Fs(1,30)= 
19.95, p<0.01]. This pattern of results suggests that whilst the subjects with autism were 
slower overall, this difficulty was most marked in the conjunctive condition. 
The remaining interaction terms involving the between subjects factor of Group 
were non-significant (Group by Probe [F(1,30) = 3.26, p=0.08], Group by Size [F(2,60)= 
2.98, p=0.06], Group by Condition by Probe [F(1,30)=1.21, p=. 28], Group by Condition by 
Size [F(2,60)=0.73, p=0.49], Group by Probe by Size [F(2,60)=1.85, p=0.17] and Group by 
Condition by Probe by Size [F(2,60)=0.52, p=0.60]). However, four further interaction 
terms were found to be significant replicating standard visual search performance. The 
Condition by Display Size interaction was found to be significant [F(2,60)= 126.08, 
p<O. 001 ]. Simple effects tests revealed that the source of this interaction was a significant 
effect of Size for the conjunctive condition [Fs(2,60)= 183.44, p<0.01] but not for the 
feature condition [Fs(2,60)= 2.43, p>0.05] and significant effects of condition for 
increasing display sizes (6 element size [Fs(1,30) = 22.59, p<0.01], 10 element size 
[Fs(1,30)= 37.55, p<0.01] and 20 element size [Fs(1,30)= 186.13, p<0.01]. Therefore an 
increase in display size slowed performance to a greater extent in the conjunctive 
condition than in the feature condition. 
The Probe by Display Size interaction was also significant [F(2,60) = 45.23, 
p<0.001]. Simple effect tests revealed a more significant effect of Size for absent trials 
[Fs(2,60)= 119.93, p<O. 01 ] than for present trials [Fs(2,60)= 17.14, p<O. 01 ] and a 
significant effect of Probe for increasing display sizes (6 element size [Fs(1,30)=6.42, 
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p<O. 05], 10 element size [Fs(1,30)= 9.15, p<0.01] and 20 element size [Fs(1,30) = 54.25, 
p<0.01 fl). Therefore an increase in display size slowed responding to a greater extent in 
target absent trials than target present trials. 
The Condition by Probe interaction was also found to be significant [F(1,30) = 
42.35, p<O. 001]. Simple effect tests revealed that there was a significantly greater effect of 
Probe in the conjunctive condition [Fs(1,30)=71.25, p<0.01] than the feature condition 
[Fs(1,30)= 4.45, p<0.05] and a greater significant effect of Condition for absent trials 
[Fs(1,30)=175.78, p<0.01] than present trials [Fs(1,30)=45.77, p<0.01]. These results 
indicate that RT is slowed in target absent trials more in the conjunctive condition than in 
the feature condition. 
Finally there was a significant Condition by Probe by Display Size interaction, 
[F(2,60)= 3 8.12, p<O. 001 ]. Two separate ANOVAs were conducted for each condition 
which revealed a significant Probe by Display Size interaction in the conjunctive condition 
[F(2,60)= 54.24, p<O. 001 ] but not the feature condition F(2,60)=1.58, p=0.21 ]. Combined 
with the results mentioned above, this indicates that RT was significantly higher in the 
conjunctive condition, was higher on absent than present trials and was higher with larger 
display sizes. 
Relationship between RT and ability 
Mean RTs across both condition of the task were calculated for each group. Pearson's 
correlation coefficients were then calculated to examine the relationship 
between overall 
RT and VIQ, PIQ and full scale IQ for each group. These analyses revealed no significant 
pattern of association between reaction time and ability for either the group with autism 
[mean RT and VIQ: r= -0.31, ns; PIQ: r=-0.21, ns; FSIQ: r=-0.30, ns] or the comparison 
group [mean RT and VIQ: r=-O. 16, ns; PIQ: r=-O. 37, ns; FSIQ; r-O. 32, ns]. 
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Error data 
For both groups, rates of errors were low with the subjects with autism making on average 
2.84% errors and the comparison subjects making 2.44% errors. The mean error scores 
were analysed using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group and within subject 
factors of Condition and Probe. There were no significant differences in the overall rate of 
errors for the two groups [F(1,30) <1, ns]. However, there was a significant Condition by 
Group interaction [F (1,30)=4.59, p<0.04]. Simple effects revealed that the group with 
autism produced significantly more errors in the conjunctive condition than the feature 
condition [Fs (1,30)= 8.64, p<0.05] but there were no such significant difference between 
conditions for the comparison subjects [Fs(1,30)<l, ns]. This analysis also revealed a 
significant main effect of Condition [F (1,30) = 4.06, p<0.05], reflecting higher rates of 
error for the conjunctive condition (3.16%) than the feature condition (2.11%), and a 
significant main effect of Probe [F (1,30)= 32.15, p<0.001] , 
indicating a greater rate of 
errors in the target present condition (3.87%) than in the target absent condition (1.4%). 
All remaining interaction terms were found not to be significant. 
Relationship between reaction time and error rate 
Pearson's correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the relationship between 
reaction time (mean RT across conditions) and overall rate of errors for each group. These 
analyses revealed no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade off for either group [autism: r= 
0.30, ns; control: r=0.05, ns]. Therefore, any differences between groups can be taken to 
reflect differences in visual search rather than differences in detection criteria between 
groups. 
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4.4 DISCUSSION 
Results from Experiment 1 show that the individuals with autism displayed significantly 
longer reaction times than the control group when searching for a target and this deficit 
was most marked in the conjunctive condition. These results are in marked contrast to the 
study by Plaisted et al. (1998a), in which the children with autism were significantly faster 
than the normal control group in the conjunctive search task, with no linear increase in 
reaction time with increasing set size. No group differences were found in the feature 
search condition. These authors suggest that the absence of a linear increase in RT in the 
conjunctive search condition for the children with autism may reflect a superior ability in 
target-distracter discrimination. Plaisted et al. (1998a) also suggest that faster target 
detection in conjunctive search tasks among individuals with autism may be related to the 
superior performance of individuals with autism on the embedded figures task (Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1997: Shah & Frith, 1983). 
An alternative explanation for the faster reaction times shown by the children with 
autism may be that these subjects had a higher spatial IQ than the developmentally normal 
children. Acknowledging this possibility, the authors suggest that these results be regarded 
as preliminary until replicated with groups of children matched on a measure of general 
IQ. Whilst a higher spatial IQ may be consistent with faster reaction times, it is not clear 
how this might explain the absence of slope in the search function of the group with autism 
in the conjunctive condition. 
In the present study, both groups showed the typical pattern of response in standard 
visual search tasks. In the feature search task, reaction time to detect the target showed 
minimal effects of display size. Active attention has been suggested not to play a part in a 
feature search since when the target is distinct from the distracters in one simple property, 
colour, it should `pop out' of the display (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). In the conjunctive 
102 
search task, reaction time to detect the target or to decide that the target is not present 
increased linearly with the number of distracters. The search time in target absent trials 
increased at more than twice the rate of the search time in target present trials with 
increasing display sizes, which would imply that search was serial and self terminating 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
While the subjects with autism were slower to detect the target overall, this 
difficulty was most marked in the conjunctive condition. This deficit could be consistent 
with reports of difficulties disengaging and/or shifting attention in space (Wainwright- 
Sharp & Bryson, 1993, Casey et al., 1993). However, an attention shifting impairment 
account would predict that the individuals with autism would show increasing difficulties 
with increasing set size in the conjunctive search task. This pattern of results was not 
found. 
These results could be consistent with those reporting difficulties in the adjustment 
of the `attentional lens' in autism (Burack, 1994). In order to maintain stimulus density, 
the size of the imaginary grid was expanded and contracted with the number of stimuli in 
the display. It is possible therefore, that the individuals with autism were having difficulty 
adjusting the attentional lens accordingly. This would account for the overall reaction time 
differences in the conjunctive search task, however this explanation cannot account for the 
overall differences in reaction time on the feature search in the individuals with autism, as 
active attention is generally assumed not to play a part in a simple feature search. 
That the individuals with autism were slower in both search tasks raises the 
possibility that some other more general aspect of the task was posing difficulties for the 
subjects with autism. The demands of a visual search task requires subjects to hold in mind 
the nature of the target, scan the display looking for a match of this template and then 
make the appropriate response when the decision has been reached as to whether the target 
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is present or not. In this way, poor performance could stem from difficulties in perception, 
a reduced ability to hold in mind the nature of the target, an inability to conduct an 
appropriate and efficient search or, at a more basic level, a deficit in making a final 
decision and executing the appropriate response. 
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the possibility that impaired response 
selection and execution might underlie the performance deficit shown by the group with 
autism. This experiment compared the performance of the individuals with autism and the 
matched control group when given only one response option (target present). Evidence 
from the dyslexia literature (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1994a) has shown that dyslexic subjects 
were unimpaired on simple reaction time tasks, however deficits in performance were 
observed in a selective choice reaction time task. As there is now increasing evidence that 
a cerebellar dysfunction may contribute to the difficulties experienced by both dyslexic 
and autistic children (Nicolson et al., 1999; Fawcett & Nicolson, 1999; Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 1994b; Fawcett, Nicolson & Dean, 1996; Yap & Van der Leij, 1994), we wished 
to explore the possibility that response selection deficit may underlie the poor performance 
of the autistic group. Although the cerebellum has traditionally been viewed as essential 
for the control and integration of motor activity (Holmes, 1939; Hallett, Shahani & Young, 
1975), recent years have seen claims that the cerebellum contributes to higher mental 
function (Leiner, Leiner & Dow, 1986,1993; Canavan, Sprengelmeyer, Deiner & 
Homberg, 1994; Schmahmann, 1991; Gao et al., 1996; Bracke-Tolkmitt et al., 1989; 
Akshoomoff & Courchesne, 1992; Kim, Ugurbil & Strick, 1994; Middleton & Strick, 
1994)). Given the evidence for cerebellar abnormalities in autism (e. g. Courchesne et al., 
1994), it was predicted that this manipulation would be especially advantageous 
for the 
subjects with autism. 
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4.5 METHOD 
Experiment 2 
Participants 
Fifteen participants from each group who took part in the visual search task were available 
for re-testing approximately six weeks later. Unpaired t-tests revealed that the 
chronological age, VIQ, PIQ and overall IQ of the two groups were not statistically 
different ([t (28) = -0.05, p=0.89], [t (28)=-1.54, p=0.134], [t (28)= -1.27, p=0.215] and [t 
(28)=-0.57, p=0.57]) respectively. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli and apparatus were identical to the previous experiment with the exception of 
the response box. Subjects in this experiment responded by pressing the button on a single 
button box signalling target present. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design with one between factor of Group (Normal/Autism) 
and within subject factors of Condition (Feature/Conjunctive) and Size (6,10,20). All other 
aspects of the design were identical to the previous experiment except that subjects only 
responded when the target was present. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 except for a slight change in the experimental 
instructions given to participants. In this experiment participants were asked to press the 
button on the response box as quickly as possible if the target (red X) was present in the 
display. They were told that the next trial would appear 500ms following their response. 
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They were told not to press the button if the target was not present in the display', the 
display would simply remain on the screen for 2 sec, followed by the next trial. None of 
the participants had any difficulty with the task requirements. 
4.6 RESULTS 
Reaction time 
Table 4.2 shows the mean RT data from both groups of participants in each search task. 
Figure 4.3 displays the mean RT data as a function of the experimental design. RT for all 
subjects to detect the feature target showed minimal effects of display size. In contrast, RT 
for all subjects to detect the conjunctive target increased linearly with display size. 
Table 4.2. Mean (SD) reaction times in Experiment 2. 
Autism Normal 
Size Feature Conjunctive Feature Conjunctive 
6 490.73 615.53 417.67 506.27 
(71.96) (87.67) (54.03) (53.84) 
10 489.93 668.53 411.13 550.07 
(68.61) (90.26) (52.01) (50.60) 
20 543.00 846.80 438.53 689.07 
(59.97) (130.32) (53.59) (72.21) 
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Figure 4.3. RT (mean +SEM) in visual search task (target present) for control subjects 
(N=15) and subjects with autism (N=15) in Experiment 2. A. Autism group Feature 
Condition; B. Control Feature Condition; C. Autism group Conjunctive Condition; D. 
Control Conjunctive Condition. 
The mean RT scores were analysed using ANOVA with a between-subjects factor 
of Group and within-subjects factors of Condition and Display Size. This revealed a 
significant effect of Group [F (1,28)=26.95, p=0.001] indicating that the RT of the group 
with autism was overall significantly slower. The Group by Size interaction was also 
significant [F(2,56)=4.11, p<O. 02]. Simple effect tests revealed a significantly greater 
effect of Group for increasing display sizes (6 element size [Fs(1,28)= 6.53, p<0.05], 10 
element size [Fs(l, 28)= 7.64, p<0.05] and 20 element size [Fs(1,28)= 13.49, p<0.01] and a 
significantly greater effect of Size for the group with autism [Fs(2,56)= 103.93, p<0.01) 
than the control group [Fs(2,56)= 53.67, p<0.01]. 
There was also a significant main effect of Condition [F (1,28)=177.27, p<0.00113 
showing faster RTs in the feature than the conjunctive condition, and a significant main 
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effect of Size [F(2,56)=153.48, p<0.001] indicating that RT was slowed with larger display 
sizes. The Condition by Size interaction was also found to be significant [F (2,56)= 112.5 
P'-0.0011. Simple effect tests revealed that the source of this interaction was attributable to 
a more significant effect of Size for the conjunctive condition [Fs (2,56)=2 ? 
1x. 11, p<0.01 ] 
than the feature condition [Fs(2,56)=9.03, p<0.01] and a greater significant effect of 
Condition for increasing display sizes (6 element size [Fs (1,28)= 20.56, p<0.01], 10 
element size, [Fs(1,28)= 45.53, p<0.01] and 20 element size [Fs(1,20)= 138.75), p<0.01]. 
Therefore an increase in display size slowed performance to a greater extent in the 
conjunctive condition than in the feature condition. 
The Group by Condition interaction [F(1,28)= 2.51, p=0.12] and the Group by 
Condition by Size interaction [F(2,56)=0.3, p=0.74] all failed to reach significance. 
Comparing performance on the binary and single choice paradigms 
To further explore the effect of employing a single choice paradigm, a difference score 
was calculated by subtracting the mean RT for each participant in each condition in the 
simple RT task (Experiment 2) from the comparable mean RT in the binary choice task 
(Experiment 1). Table 4.3 shows the mean difference score for each group and each 
condition at each display size. 
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Table 4.3. Mean paired differences between RT in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Autism 
Size Feature Conjunctive 
Normal 
Feature Conjunctive 
6 76.20 109.47 40.13 60.47 
10 92.73 133.80 42.73 64.60 
20 67.93 120.07 36.20 56.87 
From this table it can be seen that the difference scores for the group with autism are 
notably greater than the comparable scores for the control subjects. This is particularly 
noticeable in the conjunctive condition where the difference scores of the subjects with 
autism are approximately double that of the comparison subjects. 
Figure 4.4 shows a comparison of the mean RT data of both groups for target present trials 
in both experiments. 
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Figure 4.4. RT (mean +SEM) in visual search tasks for the control subjects (N=15) and 
subjects with autism(N=15). A. Feature Visual Search (Exp 1), B. Conjunctive Visual 
Search (Exp 1), C. Feature Target Present (Exp 2), D. Conjunctive Target Present (Exp 2). 
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The left panel shows the pattern of results for the comparison group and the right 
panel shows the results from the group with autism. These data were analysed using 
ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group and within subject factors of Test 
(Experiment 1 versus Experiment 2), Condition (feature versus conjunctive) and Size (6, 
10 or 20). This analysis revealed that both groups had faster reaction times in Experiment 
2 [F(1,28)= 44.03, p=0.001], however the group with autism were still significantly slower 
than the control group [F(1,28)= 30.94, p=0.001]. The significant result of interest was a 
Test by Group interaction [F (1,28)=4.85, p<0.03]. Simple effect tests indicated that the 
this interaction was attributable to a more significant effect of Group for Experiment 1 
(binary choice reaction time) [F(1,28)= 21.87, p<0.01] than Experiment 2 [F(1,28)= 10.17, 
p<O. 01] and a more significant effect of Test for the group with autism [F(1,28)=39.06, 
p<0.01] than the control group [F(1,28) = 9.82, p<0.01]. Thus, the individuals with autism 
showed a greater improvement in performance between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
All other results simply replicated the effects described in Experiment 1 
(significant main effects of Condition [F (1,28) = 436.75, p=0.001]; Size [F(2,56)= 138.55, 
p=0.04]; Group by Condition [F(1,28)=8.13, p<. 008]; Group by Size [F(2,56)=3.95, p<. 04); 
and Condition by Size F(2,56)=120.78, p<. 001]). All other effects failed to reach 
significance (Test by Condition [F(1,28)=3.58, p=0.07], Group by Test by Condition 
[F(1,28)=0.40, p=0.53], Test by Size [F(2,56)=0.84, p=0.44], Group by Test by Size 
[F(2,56)=0.31, p=0.74], Group by Condition by Size [F(2,56)=0.70, p=0.50], Test by 
Condition by Size [F(2,56)=0.12, p=0.89] and Group by Test by Condition by Size 
[F(2,56)=0.11, p=0.89] ). 
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Error data 
Error rates were extremely low in both groups with only one subject in the comparison 
group and seven subjects in the group with autism making one error each (0.04% of trials 
for the control subjects and 0.63% of trials for the group with autism). Given this very low 
rate of errors, no further analyses were undertaken. 
4.7 DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that an impaired 
ability to make and execute the appropriate response was contributing to the impaired 
visual search performance of the individuals with autism. When the demands of the task 
were reduced to require a single response, the performance of the group with autism 
improved to a greater extent than the comparison group. Moreover, the significant Group x 
Condition interaction found in Experiment 1 was no longer apparent indicating that the 
group with autism were no longer relatively more impaired on the conjunctive search 
condition. This pattern of results is consistent with recent findings in the dyslexia literature 
(Nicolson & Fawcett, 1994a) and may reflect cerebellar abnormalities in both groups. 
There is evidence for cerebellar pathology in autism (Courchesne et al., 1994) and 
traditionally the cerebellum is viewed as essential for the control and integration of motor 
activity (Holmes, 1939; Hallett, Shahani & Young, 1975). 
Alternatively, the amelioration of the deficits displayed by the autistic group in 
Experiment 1 could be due to a relatively greater practice effect for this group, or possible 
ceiling effects limiting the scope for improvement in the control subjects. Whilst this 
account is consistent with the overall improvement of the group with autism it would not 
necessarily predict a relatively greater amelioration of the autistic deficit in the conjunctive 
search condition. This would suggest that the findings of a greater deficit in the 
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conjunctive search condition among the group with autism in Experiment 1 is not very 
robust or alternatively that minimising the response demands ameliorate deficits on harder 
tasks to a greater extent in individuals with autism. 
However, response selection impairment can only be part of the problem that 
individuals with autism are experiencing on these visual search tasks as the overall 
reaction time differences remained. Possible explanations will be explored in the general 
discussion. 
4.8 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results show that the group with autism was significantly slower in both search tasks, 
however the results of both groups replicated standard visual search performance. That is, 
reaction time for target detection in the feature search condition was independent of the 
number of distracters, compared to a linear increase in reaction time for a conjunctive 
search with increasing numbers of items in the display. While attentional impairments 
could account for the relatively greater deficit seen in the group with autism on a 
conjunctive search task in Experiment 1, this was not replicated in Experiment 2. 
Moreover, deficits in shifting attention during a visual search task would predict a greater 
slope for increasing display sizes in the conjunctive search condition. This pattern of 
results was not found, therefore these results do not support the notion of an attention 
shifting impairment in autism (Courchesne et al., 1994; Townsend et al., 1996; 
Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993). This supports the results reported in Chapter 3 where 
the subjects with autism and the matched comparison group showed comparable 
performances, indicating no difficulties in shifting visual attention either voluntarily or 
reflexively. However, other difficulties unrelated to attention shifting could arise when 
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completing a visual search task, including problems with perceptual grouping, memory, 
strategy use and decision-making. 
That individuals with autism may have problems with perceptual grouping has 
been highlighted by the central coherence theory (Frith, 1989). This theory proposes that 
individuals with autism have a particular cognitive style whereby they fail to integrate 
separate threads of information into a more meaningful whole, focusing on local attributes 
while ignoring a global gestalt. Since the letters in the visual search tasks were randomly 
placed on the screen they were unlikely to have produced a global pattern. However, lack 
of central coherence has been seen both at a conceptual level (Langdell, 1978; Frith & 
Hermelin, 1969; Frith & Snowling, 1983) and a perceptual level (Happe, 1996; Jarrold & 
Russell, 1997). Therefore, problems with perceptual grouping could be contributing to 
their overall slower reaction times in the feature search condition. 
Grouping problems could also contribute to search success on conjunctive 
searches. Alternatives to Feature Integration Theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) have been 
proposed to account for search efficiency that emphasise the degree of discriminability 
between the target and distracters as factors determining the search function slope (Duncan 
& Humphries, 1989). Wolfe, Frankel and Cave (1989) have suggested that a conjunctive 
search may be treated as two simple feature searches under some circumstances. This has 
been called guided search. Guided search means that the subject might be able to look at 
only the green X's, ignoring the red O's, while searching for the red X. In this sense, the 
figure ground pre-attentive process could be used to group all distracters that can be ruled 
out on the basis of a simple feature and rejected, leaving only a second simple search to 
complete. While the display density was kept constant across display sizes to minimise the 
possible confounding effect of perceptual grouping in this study, a more direct way of 
assessing problems in this area would be to manipulate the degree of target and distracter 
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discernment. Predictions based on a lack of central coherence would suggest that 
individuals with autism would show a greater steepness of the RT slope across display 
sizes when target-distracter discriminability was decreased. 
Difficulties with strategy use are another possible contender for impaired 
performance on visual search tasks. Findlay (1997) has also questioned the need for an 
item-to-item selection in conjunctive visual search as proposed by Feature Integration 
Theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Findlay (1997) investigated saccade target selection 
during conjunctive visual search tasks. He has suggested that not all positions in peripheral 
vision are equivalent and that several search locations can be processed in parallel. This 
raises the possibility that some form of strategy may be useful in visual search tasks 
especially with larger display sizes. Pashler (1987) has also suggested that using a grouping 
strategy; smaller arrays can be searched in parallel for both features and conjunctions. That 
subjects with autism have a problem with the use of strategy has been demonstrated in 
their poor performance on tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi (or other closely related 
measures, such as the Tower of London; Shallice, 1982)(Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 
1991; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Hughes et al., 1994), and the Milner Maze (Prior & 
Hoffman, 1990). Therefore, an alternative possibility that the subjects with autism are 
performing poorly on this task relates to an executive impairment in strategy use. 
The results of Experiment 2 would suggest that making the appropriate response 
decision was contributing to their impaired performance on the visual search tasks. When 
the demands of the task were reduced to require a single choice instead of a binary choice 
the group with autism improved their performance to a greater extent than the comparison 
group. Alternative explanations for this result could be due to a ceiling effect in the normal 
group and/or greater practice effects among the group with autism. 
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Although it is difficult to rule out any of these possibilities, a more parsimonious 
explanation for the overall reaction slowing seen in both search tasks among the 
individuals with autism may reflect some more general arousal and/or processing 
impairment. The proposal that individuals with autism may have a deficit in their 
homeostatic arousal modulating system was first suggested by Hutt, Hutt, Lee and 
Ounsted, (1964) and was later expanded on by Ornitz and Ritvo (1968). Hutt et al. (1964) 
proposed that the child with autism is in a chronic state of over arousal whereas Ornitz and 
Ritvo (1968) modified this hypothesis to suggest that autism is characterised by 
fluctuations between states of over and under arousal. A processing impairment 
explanation would predict that individuals with autism would display generally slower 
responses on a simple reaction time task. This remains to be investigated. 
In conclusion, the results reported in this chapter provide no evidence for attention 
shifting impairments in autism. However, deficits in orienting may become apparent when 
shifting attention dependent upon social cues. Recent research from the vision literature 
has established that orienting in the direction of seen gaze can arise in a fairly 
"mechanical" or automatic fashion in normal individuals in response to either cartoon 
faces (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), eyes only (Driver et al., 1999) or both head and eye 
direction changes (Langton & Bruce, 1999). A more in-depth review of this evidence is 
reported in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Social Attention 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The experimental chapters reported so far have explored the hypothesis that 
individuals with autism have impairments in shifting attention. No pervasive deficits 
were found. Although attention is important for successful performance on low-level 
tasks typically used in research on visual attention, in the real world, social 
interactions tax the ability to control and shift attention to a greater extent. Following 
the unpredictable ebb and flow of joint social exchange may pose the greatest 
challenge to attentional systems and it may be that individuals with autism only have 
difficulty with social attention leading to the particular and characteristic disruptions 
of cognitive functioning and failure to develop key socio-cognitive skills. This 
chapter begins with a review of recent research that has adapted traditional cueing 
paradigms to investigate social attention in typically developing individuals. The 
chapter progresses along the framework of Chapter 1 with a review of social 
attention at the biological, behavioural and psychological levels. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a review of the earliest identified social impairment in autism; lack of 
joint attention behaviours. There is some suggestion from this evidence that shifting 
attention is only problematic when social cues are involved. 
5.2 SOCIAL ATTENTION AT THE BEHAVIOURAL LEVEL 
The significance of the direction in which another individual is directing their 
attention is important to many species. For example, animals use gaze to convey to 
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others the state of their emotional disposition (threatening or submissive). In 
addition, a sudden gaze aversion will often signify a significant environmental event 
such as the presence of a predator or a potential mate. In humans, direct gaze can 
express intimacy and attraction or alternatively threat and dominance. Moreover, the 
detection and response to another's gaze is also important during social interactions, 
where gaze functions as the regulator of turn-taking in conversation, expressing 
intimacy and exercising social control (Kleinke, 1986). Indeed, it has been suggested 
that humans may have evolved eyes with a greater contrast between iris and sclera 
precisely because of the added benefits of an enhanced gaze signal in terms of 
communication and cooperation (Langton, Watt & Bruce, 2000). In contrast, most 
animal species do not have a widely exposed white sclera surrounding a much darker 
iris, so that the direction of gaze will be relatively disguised. This might have 
evolved in order to deceive predators or prey or even fellow conspecifics competing 
for food. 
5.3 SOCIAL CUEING STUDIES 
While the vast literature on visuospatial orienting has aided our understanding on 
many aspects of attention, such research has recently been criticised by Driver et al. 
(1999) for its lack of ecological validity and social significance. Driver et al. (1999) 
suggest that mainstream attention researchers have entirely overlooked Brothers' 
(1990) dictum that the human brain is largely a social brain and have focused instead 
on non-social situations. Recent research from the visual attention literature has 
addressed this issue and proposed that visuospatial orienting can arise in response to 
a `social' cue. Several studies have shown a strong cueing effect produced by the 
direction of seen gaze of a central face picture cue even when counter to intentions 
(Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999; Langton & Bruce, 1999) 
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The first published account of social orienting was a study by Friesen and 
Kingstone (1998). Friesen and Kingstone (1998) modified the standard Posner 
cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980) so that subjects were presented with a schematic 
face as the central cue, whose eye direction pointed left, right or straight ahead. The 
adult subjects in this study participated in three target response tasks: detection, 
localization and identification. Despite the fact that they were told that gaze direction 
did not predict where the target would occur, subjects were fastest to respond to the 
target when the gaze was directed towards the target in all three conditions. 
Friesen and Kingstone (1998) proposed that the facilitation effect produced 
by the gaze cue reflects the involvement of exogenous (reflexive) covert attention. 
Their conclusions were based on criteria such as: the cueing effect emerged rapidly 
(appearing at the shortest SOA of 105ms) (Cheal & Lyon, 1991), it occurred even 
though subjects were informed that the gaze cue did not predict the target location 
(Jonides, 1981), the cueing effect exhibited a relatively short time course (Müller & 
Rabbitt, 1989) and it was characterised by benefits at the cued location (valid cue RT 
faster than neutral cue RT) without costs at the invalid location (invalid cue RT = 
neutral RT) (Posner & Snyder, 1975). Similar results have been reported by Langton 
and Bruce (1999), using a digitised head stimulus, and Driver et al. (1999) who used 
a computerised face where the direction of the eye gaze was manipulated. 
Although the pattern of results bears the hallmark of exogenous or reflexive 
orienting of attention, the attentional cue was presented centrally at fixation. 
Typically, central cues have been associated with voluntary attentional shifts to 
peripheral locations by predicting where the target will appear in the periphery 
whereas a non-predictive abrupt onset occurring at a peripheral location is assumed 
to produce a reflexive attentional shift. Friesen and Kingstone suggested the fact that 
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a non-predictive centrally presented gaze cue can initiate a reflexive shift of attention 
indicates that the human brain may be specialised to shift attention in response to 
gaze direction. 
5.4 SOCIAL ATTENTION AT THE BIOLOGICAL LEVEL 
Given the functional significance of the eyes, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
existence of a functionally separate module dedicated to the perception of gaze has 
been speculated upon (Campbell, Heywood, Cowey, Regard & Landis, 1990; Perrett, 
Smith, Potter, Mistlin, Head, Milner & Jeeves, 1984; Perrett, Hietanen, Oram & 
Benson, 1992). Neuropsychological studies have provided evidence of a double 
dissociation between face recognition and gaze perception. Campbell et al. (1990) 
report evidence from a prosopagnosic patient K. D. who was relatively unimpaired in 
an eye-gaze discrimination task. The reverse pattern of results comes from a study by 
Perrett et al. (1992) who report on a patient who was impaired on gaze recognition 
tasks but only mildly impaired in the recognition of famous faces. While 
prosopagnosia is associated with lesions in ventral occipitotemporal cortex that are 
usually but not always bilateral (Benton, 1980; De Renzi, 1986), the exact extent and 
location of the lesions reported in these patients is unclear. 
However, neuroimaging studies have recently highlighted a role for specific 
areas in the temporal lobes involved in gaze processing. The dissociation of the 
functional contributions of the superior temporal sulcus and lateral fusiform gyrus to 
face perception has been demonstrated in an flvMI experiment by measuring how 
selective attention to eye gaze direction and to face identity elicits different responses 
to faces in these regions (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). In this experiment, subjects 
viewed static pictures of faces presented sequentially. In one condition, subjects had 
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to indicate whether the direction of gaze was the same as in the previous picture and 
in the other, subjects were required to indicate whether each picture was of the same 
individual as the previous picture. The results showed that selective attention to eye 
gaze elicited a stronger response in the superior temporal sulcus than selective 
attention to identity did. In contrast, selective attention to identity produced a 
stronger response in the lateral fusiform gyrus than selective attention to gaze did. 
Comparative studies have also suggested that the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) is important for coding information about eye gaze. Campbell et al. (1990) 
found that bilateral STS ablation in monkeys impaired accuracy at perceiving frontal 
eye gaze. Furthermore Heywood and Cowey (1992) found that the removal of this 
region of the monkey cortex impaired gaze direction discriminations but did not 
impair performance on other face processing tasks. However, Eacott, Heywood, 
Gross and Cowey (1993) reported that in addition to impairments in discriminating 
eye gaze deviations, the STS lesioned animals were also impaired on a task involving 
a two-choice discrimination between different groups of ASCH characters. They 
concluded that the deficits in processing eye gaze among monkeys with lesions of the 
STS were due to deficits in two-choice discrimination learning. 
Despite this, the idea that the STS is important in eye gaze perception 
persists. Based on recordings from single cells in awake behaving monkeys, Perrett 
et al. (1992) found cells in this region of the temporal lobe to respond to eye gaze 
direction. However, those cells that were active when presented with a pair of eyes 
looking downwards also responded strongly when heads were directed downwards or 
when the body adopted a quadruped position. 
Based on this evidence, Perrett and colleagues proposed the existence of a 
direction-of-attention detector (DAD), which is a hierarchically arranged mechanism 
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that analyses the direction of the eyes, head and body to determine where another 
individual is directing their attention. This process is assumed to be achieved by a 
network of inhibitory connections. While the eyes hold prime importance in this 
model, if for example the eyes are concealed or the face is viewed at a distance, the 
mechanism signals the direction of attention from the orientation of the head, or if 
this too is obscured, from the orientation of the body. 
5.5 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ATTENTION 
Baron-Cohen (1994,1995) also places particular emphasis on the eyes in his "mind- 
reading system" to account for the processes involved in social cognition. The mind- 
reading system comprises four components; the intentionality detector, the eye- 
direction detector (EDD), the shared attention mechanism (SAM) and the theory-of- 
mind mechanism (ToMM). The utility of the EDD serves to detect the presence of 
eyes and to measure whether the eyes are directed towards it or towards another 
object in the environment. This in turn feeds information to the SAM, which is an 
important mechanism involved in the development of a child's understanding of 
mental state concepts such as desire, belief, pretence. The ToMM is then able to 
combine this mental state knowledge thus permitting the child or adult to explain and 
predict another's behaviour. 
While both these models place particular significance on eye gaze as a cue to 
the direction of another's attention, other evidence would suggest that the perception 
of another's attention relies more on the head than eye-gaze orientations or on some 
combination of the two. Anstis, Mayhew and Morley (1969) reported that the 
perceived direction of a looker's gaze strayed in the opposite direction to the turn of 
the head. Therefore if someone were staring directly at your face, with the head 
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oriented towards your right shoulder, you would perceive them as gazing somewhere 
near the left side of your nose. More recently, Maruyama and Endo (1983) showed 
that subjects' perception of gaze direction in schematic faces lay in the middle 
between the eyes' actual line of gaze and the orientation of the head. Their results 
also suggest that the head orientation plays a relatively greater role in the direction of 
social attention detection, as although the processing of gaze direction was 
influenced by head orientation, the perception of head direction was not influenced 
by the perception of the eye gaze direction. 
More recently, Langton (submitted) has suggested that both head and eyes 
have an equally mutual influence on decisions concerning the direction of social 
attention. He adapted an interference paradigm to examine the relationship between 
head orientation and eye-gaze direction. In this study, subjects had to respond to 
either the head or eye direction, where on half of the trials the head and eye were 
directed to the same location and the other half of the trials the head and eyes pointed 
in conflicting directions both in the horizontal and vertical plane. In one block of 
trials subjects responded to the orientation of the head and tried to ignore the 
direction of eye gaze and in the second block of trials subjects responded to the gaze 
direction and were asked to ignore the orientation of the head. The results showed 
interference effects that were symmetrical in nature. Langton (submitted) concluded 
that head and gaze are mutually influential in social attention detection and that 
information derived from the orientation of the head plays a greater role in the 
processing of social attention direction than either Perrett et al. 's (1992) or Baron- 
Cohen's (1994) models predict. 
In summary, this review has suggested that typically developed individuals 
are particularly attuned to the social signals of others. Indeed, it has been shown that 
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these social cues are difficult or almost impossible to ignore and responses occur in a 
reflexive manner. Furthermore, brain areas dedicated to the analysis of social cues 
have been proposed. However, a review of the evidence for lack of joint attention 
behaviours and gaze following in autism will show that individuals with autism are 
less sensitive to the attentional signals of others. 
5.6 EVIDENCE FOR JOINT ATTENTION BEHAVIOURS IN AUTISM 
The earliest social impairment yet identified in autism is seen in the failure of normal 
infant-mother joint attentional interactions. Joint attention has been defined both 
narrowly and broadly in the research literature. Narrowly defined the term joint 
attention refers to "looking where someone else is looking" (Butterworth, 1991, 
p223). For instance, an infant may notice that another person has turned their eyes or 
head in a certain direction and then follows suit, or an infant may move their eyes or 
head towards the direction that someone is pointing. The broader definition of joint 
attention includes these behaviours in addition to checking another person's face 
while playing, after the infant has pointed to something or in an ambiguous situation. 
From observational studies, it appears that joint attention behaviours occur far 
less frequently in children with autism than in non-autistic control groups (Loveland 
& Landry, 1986; Landry & Loveland, 1988; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer & Sherman, 
1986; Sigman, Mundy, Ungerer & Sherman, 1986). However, a deficit in joint 
attention could be caused by an inability to shift or modulate attention or by an 
inability to use gaze direction or other social signals as a guide. If the former view is 
indeed correct, deficits in orienting attention among individuals with autism should 
not be specific to social stimuli. Predictions based on the latter view would suggest 
that individuals with autism have a specific deficit in attending to social stimuli. 
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In a study of home videotapes of one-year-old toddlers, Osterling and 
Dawson (1994) found that in addition to deficits in shared attention, toddlers with 
autism failed to orient to social stimuli (faces, speech) in their environment. In a 
subsequent study, Dawson, Meltzoff and Osterling (1995) showed that this failure to 
orient was not confined to social stimuli. Children with autism in this study were 
compared to a matched control group of children with Down's syndrome. They 
observed head turns in response to non-social stimuli (a musical jack-in-the-box 
played for six seconds and a rattle being shaken) and social stimuli (clapping hands 
and calling the children by name). The children with autism were impaired at 
orienting to all stimuli but this failure was more extreme for social stimuli. 
Earlier work by Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) also reveal abnormal 
attention control in children with autism that is not specific to social stimuli. 
Children with autism and matched comparison groups were presented with two 
displays in a viewing box with visual fixation time and switches of attention being 
recorded. Between group comparisons revealed that the children with autism looked 
for longer at the facial stimuli than at other nonfacial stimuli. However, they also 
looked more briefly at all stimuli and also showed fewer switches of attention 
between one object and another than the control children. These studies suggest that 
the lack of joint attention behaviours and the abnormal patterns of eye gaze often 
reported in autism may derive less from an avoidance of social stimuli than from a 
more general attentional abnormality. 
However, a more recent study by Swettenham et al. (1998) examined the 
frequency and distribution of attention shifts between social and non-social stimuli in 
a naturalistic setting. Three types of attention shifting were observed; between an 
object and another object, between an object and a person and between a person and 
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another person. The typically developing and non-autistic developmentally delayed 
infants shifted attention more frequently between an object and a person than 
between an object and another object or between a person and another person. In 
contrast, the infants with autism shifted attention between an object and another 
object more than any other type of shift and showed fewer shifts of attention between 
an object and a person and between person and person than both the control groups. 
They also spent less time overall looking at people, looked more briefly at people 
and for longer durations at objects, compared to the two control groups. In addition 
the infants with autism also showed less attention shifting overall than the two 
control groups. From this pattern of results, Swettenham et al. (1998) suggest that 
children with autism have a specific deficit in attending to social stimuli. 
Swettenham et al. (1998) highlight age as a possible reason for the 
discrepancy between their study and the earlier study by Hermelin and O'Connor 
(1967). The children in the Hermelin and O'Connor study had a mean chronological 
age of 11 years and 4 months whereas those in the Swettenham study were aged 20 
months. They suggest that an abnormality in orientation to social stimuli, present at 
an early age in autism may diminish during development. 
Leekam, Lopez and Moore (2000) have also found difficulties in orienting 
which were specific to social cues. This study examined the ability of preschool 
children with autism (mean age 4 years 4 months) to orient to an adult's bid for 
attention and to follow the direction of a human or non-human cue. The results 
showed that children with autism were less responsive than developmentally delayed 
control children in orienting to attention bids and in following a human head turn 
cue, yet had no difficulty in shifting attention and were faster overall in orienting to 
non-social targets. Thus, from the results of these studies it is unclear whether 
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shifting attention poses a problem for the child with autism or whether they do not 
understand the significance of eye direction and other social signals as a guide to 
shift their attention to something of interest. 
A number of studies have reported that eye gazes and faces in general lack 
significance for children with autism. For example, studies examining performance 
on visual perspective taking and gaze monitoring suggest that children with autism 
are able to monitor another's gaze but fail to do this spontaneously. Children with 
autism show a comparable performance to matched control groups on tasks in which 
a person turns their head or eyes towards an array of objects and they are asked to 
report what the person is looking at (visual perspective taking) (Baron-Cohen, 1989b, 
1991; Dawson & Fernald, 1987; Hobson, 1984; Tan & Harris, 1991; Leekam, Baron- 
Cohen, Perrett, Milders & Brown, 1997). In contrast, children with autism fail to 
spontaneously monitor another's gaze on tasks that examine responses to a person's 
change of head or eye position (Scaife & Bruner, 1975; Leekam et al., 1997). 
The latter observations have led Baron-Cohen (1995) to propose two 
mechanisms involved in joint attention behaviours. One mechanism (an eye direction 
detector or EDD) is responsible for the perception of another's gaze direction 
whereas the second mechanism (a shared attention mechanism or SAM) functions to 
identify if the subject and another person are both attending to the same thing. The 
EDD would seem to be intact in children with autism, while the SAM is in most 
cases impaired. Therefore, children with autism are able to detect whether eyes are 
looking at them, however were impaired in the use of eye direction to infer want and 
goal (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996). 
Children with autism have also been found to rarely look at people's faces for 
information or reassurance. Sigman, Kasari, Kwon and Yirmiya (1992) conducted a 
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study where adults posed either fear or amusement at the arrival of a small robot. 
Few of the children with autism looked at either the parent or the experimenter and 
when they did look, their glances were much briefer than those of the mentally 
retarded or normal children who searched the faces of adults for reassurance. 
Similarly, Phillips, Baron-Cohen and Rutter (1992) showed that very young children 
with autism do not appear to use eye contact to disambiguate ambiguous actions. 
This study found that, on at least half of the trials, 100% of the typically developing 
children responded to the ambiguous action by instantly looking at the adult's eyes, 
showing that in conditions of uncertainty the first place young children look for 
information is the eyes. In contrast, only 11% of the children with autism seemed to 
use eye contact to resolve the uncertainty. Rutter and Schopler (1987) have also 
suggested that children with autism exhibit gaze avoidance and deviant patterns of 
reciprocal gaze. A similar conclusion was also reached by Volkmar and Mayes 
(1990) who assessed the spontaneous gaze behaviour in older children with autism 
and found that, compared to a developmentally delayed group, they looked less at 
staff with whom they were familiar. Other studies have shown that there may be a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative difference between eye gaze use in children with 
autism. Sigman, Mundy, Ungerer and Sherman (1986) found that children with 
autism looked at their caregivers as much as normal children although not at the 
same times as children without autism. Similarly, a study by Mirenda, Donnellan and 
Yoder (1983) has shown that children with autism tended to look at caregivers for 
longer periods during their own monologues than during a dialogue. 
Clinical observations also indicate that children with autism fail to understand 
the significance of the eyes. They often fail to use eye contact to punctuate key parts 
of a conversation, for example when starting their utterance, to acknowledge praise 
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or interest, seek clarification, to read body language or to signify the end of the 0 
utterance (Attwood, 1998). Recent research studies (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; 
Tantam, Holmes & Cordless, 1993) have also suggested there is a lack of eye gaze 
when the other person is talking. Personal accounts also confirm that eye gaze and 
looking at people's faces can be extremely difficult for the person with autism as 
described in the following quotation: 
"Looking at people's faces, particularly into their eyes, is one of the hardest 
things for me to do. When I do look at people I have nearly always had to make a 
conscious effort to do so and then I can usually only do it for a second.......... I 
cannot take in the whole face in one go (Jolliffe, Lansdown & Robinson, 1992, p15). 
5.7 SUMMARY AND RATIONALE FOR SUBSEQUENT EXPERIMENTAL CHAPTERS 
In summary, the bulk of evidence suggests that joint attention behaviours are deviant 
in children with autism. However it is unclear whether lack of joint attention 
behaviours stem from an inability to shift or modulate attention or whether social 
signals fail to be interpreted as cues to objects or situations of interest. On one hand 
studies have suggested that orienting attention is only problematic when it requires 
responding to social signals. Other studies have reported orienting deficits to both 
social and non-social cues. 
However, most of these studies use accuracy as the dependent measure. It is 
also possible that children with autism might be slower to shift their attention. 
Leekam et al. (2000) used latency as the dependent measure and found that preschool 
children with autism were faster in orienting to targets. Joint attention or gaze 
following is often gauged by an overt head turn or eye shift by the child. This 
neglects the possibility that the visual orienting involved in the establishment of joint 
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attention could be the result of a covert process; that is, a shift of attention without 
the accompanying movement of the eyes or head. Moreover, it is unclear from the 
developmental studies on gaze following and joint attention whether orienting arises 
because of an automatic or relatively reflexive response or whether orienting is under 
voluntary control. 
The results from the experiments reported in Chapter 3 would suggest that 
individuals with autism do not have difficulties in shifting attention covertly in either 
the voluntary or reflexive modes. Moreover, the pattern of results from the visual 
search tasks reported in Chapter 4 are not indicative of an attention shifting 
impairment in autism. It is possible therefore that the lack of joint attention 
behaviours seen in younger individuals with autism stems from difficulties in 
interpreting social signals as cues to objects or situations of interest. This could be 
the result of either a deficit in their covert attentional system, or to a lack of or delay 
in reflexively orienting to social cues. 
The following three experimental chapters were designed to explore social 
attention in autism by adapting the paradigms used to study social orienting from the 
visual literature. The experiments reported in Chapter 6 examined whether 
individuals with autism orient their attention in an automatic fashion to social cues as 
seen in typically developing individuals and whether they could use these social cues 
as effectively as typically developing individuals. 
The series of experiments in Chapter 6 also investigated two types of social 
cue, both eye gaze and head orientation. Previous research has indicated that eye 
gaze use is deviant in individuals with autism (see section 5.6), however, it was 
deemed important to consider whether a larger and more salient head direction cue 
would also pose difficulties. While the relative importance of eye gaze over head 
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orientation in the analysis of social attention among typically developing individuals 
is in dispute, the experiments reported in Chapter 7 were designed to investigate this 
in individuals with autism. While it is important to be attentive to the change in the 
direction of another's attention to facilitate the ebb and flow of a social interaction, it 
is equally important to be able to detect frontal eye gaze. The final experimental 
chapter reports on the results of a gaze perception task. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Social Orienting 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The series of experiments reported in this chapter seeks to investigate social orienting in 
autism. The first three experiments were designed to investigate whether individuals with 
autism would show the typical orienting response to the direction of another's attention. 
The further three experiments explored whether individuals with autism were able to use 
social cues such as eye gaze and head direction information as effectively as normal 
controls when instructed to do so. 
Experiment 1 adapted a traditional central cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980) where a 
digitised photograph of a face replaced the central arrow and the direction of seen gaze 
was manipulated. The pattern of results obtained by Driver et al. (1999) suggests that gaze 
perception triggers a reflexive visuospatial orienting response in normal adults. In 
Experiment 1 the eye gaze cues were completely uninformative of the likely target 
location. The same paradigm was used in Experiment 2 except the central stimulus was a 
photographed face where the direction of the whole head was manipulated. Thus the 
cueing stimuli in this experiment comprised both head and eye signals. 
Experiment 3 involved the inversion of the stimuli used in Experiment 1. Face 
inversion severely disrupts face perception in normal subjects (Yin, 1969; Valentine, 1988; 
Rhodes, Brake & Atkinson, 1993; Farah, Wilson, Drain & Tanaka, 1998), although 
Langdell (1978) reported that children with autism do unexpectedly well in recognising 
upside-down faces. It was deemed important to investigate the performance of individuals 
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with autism on inverted stimuli and to ascertain whether a full face configuration is 
necessary to elicit a reflexive or relatively automatic orienting response. 
In order to test subject's ability to use head and eye gaze cues to direct attention at 
will Experiments 4 to 6 selectively manipulate the likelihood that the cue accurately 
predicts the location of the target. Experiment 4 and 5 use the same stimuli as Experiments 
1 and 2 respectively except the probability that the cue is predictive of target location is 
increased from 50% to 80% correct. Experiment 6 again used the same stimuli as 
Experiment 1 but the probability that the cue was predictive of target location was reduced 
to 20%. This manipulation therefore requires subjects to direct their attention away from 
the direction of seen gaze. 
The results of Experiments 1-5 indicated that the group with autism displayed an 
optimal performance to targets following a SOA of 150ms. In the design of this series of 
experiments, cue duration was confounded with target onset at a SOA of 150ms. Therefore 
two additional experiments were carried out to investigate this possible confound. 
Experiments 7 and 8 were similar to Experiments 1 and 2 respectively except the cue 
duration varied with SOA. 
6.2 METHOD - Study 3 
Participants 
Two groups of participants took part in this study: a group of seventeen high 
functioning 
adults with ASD (10 males, 2 females with Asperger's Syndrome and 
3 males, 2 females 
with high-functioning Autism) and a comparison group of seventeen 
developmentally 
normal adults (14 males and 3 females). Recruitment, diagnosis and ability testing were 
performed in the same way as previous experiments. Ten subjects from 
both groups had 
participated in the visual search tasks reported in Chapter 4 approximately six months 
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previously. Participants' characteristics are shown in Table 6.1. Independent sample t-tests 
revealed that the chronological ages, VIQ, PIQ and IQ of the two groups were not 
significantly different ([t(32)=1.07, p=0.29], [t(32)=0.15, p=0.88], [t(32)=-0.06, p=0.95] 
and [t(32)=0.06, p=0.96]) respectively. All participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision. 
Table 6.1. Participant characteristics 
Group N AGE(y: m) VIQ PIQ Overall IQ 
Autism 17 Mean 20.10 88.88 92.12 89.47 
SD 3.3 13.13 16.85 14.33 
Range 16.6-26.6 73-112 72-123 72-118 
Normal 17 Mean 19.9 88.29 92.41 89.24 
SD 2.5 9.48 12.17 10.10 
Range 16.6-25.9 75-110 75-120 75-114 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The visual attention task was presented on a 15-inch monitor controlled by a Texas 
Instruments Travel mate 6030 computer with one millisecond timing for control of 
stimulus display, recording of reaction time and error data. The visual display for this task 
consisted of a4 cm square central box marked by a fixation point (+) in the middle and 
flanked by two 4cm square boxes on the left and right set at 6.5 degree of visual angle. The 
peripheral target was a small white square presented against a dark display background in 
one of the boxes on either side of fixation. A scanned photograph of a female face served 
as the central cue in Experiment 1. This was 4 degrees in height and width. The left and 
right gaze cues were produced by a mirror reflection of the eye region to ensure symmetry 
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between stimuli. The differing eye regions were pasted onto the same scanned face 
photograph using Adobe Photoshop software. The central cue in Experiment 2 was a 
scanned photograph of a female face whose head direction was manipulated. The head 
direction cues were produced using a mirror reflection of the opposite facing cue. The 
central cues for Experiment 3 involved rotating the images used in Experiment 1 through 
180 degrees. Experiment 4 and 6 used the same stimuli as Experiment 1 where the 
probability of the eye direction being predictive of target location was manipulated. In 
Experiment 4 the probability of the eye direction being predictive of target location was 
80% correct. In Experiment 6 this probability was reduced to 20% correct. Experiment 5 
used the same stimuli as experiment 2 where the probability of the head direction being 
predictive of target location was 80%. An example of each of the 6 experiments is shown 
in Figures 6.1 to 6.6. 
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Figure 6.1 An example of a congruent trial in Experiment 1 
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Figure 6.2 An example of an incongruent trial in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 6.3. An example of a congruent trial in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 6.4. An example of an expected trial in Experiment 4. 
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Figure 6.5. An example of an expected trial in Experiment 5 
139 
+ 
0 
Figure 6.6. An example of an expected trial in Experiment 6 
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The participant was seated in front of the computer screen, while the head was held 
in a fixed position by a chin rest, 57cm away from and at eye level with the stimuli. 
Participants responded by pressing a button on a button box. 
Design 
Experiments 1-3 
These experiments had a mixed design, with one between subjects factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and within subject factors of Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA) 
(50,150,600 and 1000 msec) and Cue (Congruent/Incongruent). SOA, the time interval 
between onset of the cue and onset of the target was randomly varied as an interval from 
the range 50,150,600 or 1000msec. Spatial cues were either congruent (gaze towards the 
target) or incongruent (gaze away from the target). Cue duration was 150msec. 
An experimental session consisted of 6 blocks of 40 trials, resulting in a total of 
240 trials per session. Rest breaks of approximately 1 minute were offered after every 
block. In order to minimise anticipatory responses 48 catch trials were included, where a 
cue appeared but no target followed. Of the remaining trials, 96 had congruent cues and 96 
had incongruent cues. Target location was equally divided between right and left visual 
fields and SOAs were equally and randomly distributed between blocks. Targets remained 
on the screen until the participant responded or for a maximum of 1500msec. Trials were 
deemed misses if a response was not made within 1200 msec and were included in the 
error data analyses. Following a response a 500ms inter-trial interval was imposed. In 
catch trials, the display remained on the screen for 1500msec and was then followed by a 
500msec inter-trial interval. For each participant, RTs less than 100msec were scored as 
anticipatory and included in the error data analyses. 
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Experiments 4-6 
These experiments had a mixed design, with one between subjects factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and within subject factors of SOA (50,150,600 and 1000ms) and Cue 
(Expected/Unexpected). In Experiments 4 and 5 participants were told to direct their 
attention towards the direction in which the image was looking as 80% of the time the 
image predicted where the target was likely to appear. In Experiment 6 participants were 
told try and direct their attention away from the direction in which the eyes were looking 
as only 20% of the time was the eye direction predictive of target location. Spatial cues 
were either expected or unexpected. An experimental session consisted of 6 blocks of 48 
trials, resulting in a total of 288 trials. Of these 192 were expected trials, 48 were 
unexpected trials and 48 were catch trials. All other aspects of these experiments were as 
described in Experiments 1-3. 
Experiments 7-8 
Experiment 7 and 8 were identical to Experiments 1 and 2 respectively except the cue 
duration coincided with variations in SOA. 
Procedure 
Experiments 1-3 
Testing of individuals took place in an interview room at the participant's institution. 
Ability testing was carried on a separate occasion prior to the experiment. Each participant 
was told that they were helping to find out how quickly people could detect a target. They 
were told to keep their eyes on the fixation cross in the centre of the screen. Then 
following a short delay a series of pictures would appear at fixation. It was repeatedly 
emphasised that the central face cues were entirely irrelevant to the target detection task 
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and they were to ignore these, as the direction of the gaze gave no information about the 
likely location of the target. Participants were told that on some trials no target would 
appear and they were to refrain from responding on those trials. The chin rest was 
introduced and explained that this was to ensure that their eyes remained level with the 
display. Participants were encouraged to keep their eyes on the fixation cross and told not 
to move either their eyes or their head. Participants were asked to press the button on the 
button box with their dominant hand as quickly as possible when the target square 
appeared. Participants received 16 practice trials before the start of the experiment. The 
order in which participants received experiment 1,2 and 3 was counterbalanced. 
Experiments 4-6 
The procedure for this set of experiments was similar to Experiments 1-3 except for a 
slight change in the experimental instructions. In Experiment 4 and 5 subjects were now 
told to pay attention to the central pictures as 80% of the time the direction of "looking" 
was predictive of where the target was likely to appear. In Experiment 6 they were told to 
try and attend in the opposite direction of where the central stimulus was looking, as she 
was correct only 20% of the time. The order in which participants received experiment 
4,5 
and 6 was counterbalanced. 
Experiments 7-8 
The procedure for these two experiments was identical to that of Experiment 
I and 2 
respectively. All participants received Experiments 1-3 before completing 
Experiments 4-6 
approximately 6 weeks later. Subsequently 16 participants from each group were available 
for re-testing and Experiments 7 and 8 were conducted after a period of approximately 
4 
months. Figure 6.7 provides a summary of the 8 experiments reported in this chapter. 
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Experiment Cue duration stimuli 
1 150ms 
2 150ms 
3 150ms 
Probability of cue being Instructions with regard 
predictive of target 
50% 
50% 
Ignore 
Ignore 
50% 
to the central cue 
4 150ms 80% - SSM 
5 150ms 80% Attend to direction 
7 Varied with SOA iý 50° ö I, nore 
8 Varied with SOA or-lw 1 50% Ignore 
Figure 6.7. A summary of the methods used in all eight experiments 
144 
Ignore 
Attend to direction 
6.3 RESULTS 
Experiment 1 (Eye gaze cue) 
Reaction times 
The median reaction for each target delay and condition were calculated for each subject. 
Figure 6.8 shows the mean RTs in Experiment 1 for both the group with autism and the 
comparison group. This data was compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor 
of Group (Autism/Normal) and within subject factors of Cue (Congruent/Incongruent) and 
SOA (50,150,600 and 1000msec). 
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Cue to target SOA (ms) 
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--f- -autism incongruent 
-ý---- normal congruent 
-- ý- - -normal incongruent 
Figure 6.8. Mean reaction times in Experiment 1 to targets at varying intervals following 
an eye gaze directional cue (50% probability). 
There was a significant difference between the two groups in overall reaction time [F 
(1,32)=11.62, p=0.002]. There was a significant main effect of Cue [F (1,32)=8.94, 
p<0.005] and a significant main effect of SOA [F (3,96)=3.24, p<0.03]. This analysis 
confirmed that RT was facilitated on congruently cued trials relative to incongruently cued 
trials and that response latencies varied with SOA. Two interaction terms were also 
significant. These were a SOA by Group interaction [F (3,96)=4.21, p<0.008] and a Cue by 
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SOA interaction [F (3,96)=2.80, p<0.04]. All other interaction terms were not significant 
(Cue by Group [F (1,32)<1, ns] and Cue by SOA by Group [F (3,96)<1, ns]. 
Simple effects tests revealed that the SOA by Group interaction was attributable to 
a significant effect of SOA for the group with autism [F (3,96)=6.75, p<O. 0 1] but not for 
the comparison group [F (3,96)<1, ns] and a significant effect of Group at an SOA of 50ms 
[F (1,32)=4.23, p<0.05] but not at SOAs of 150ms[F (1,32)=1.79, p>0.05], 600ms [F 
(1,32)=3.88, p>0.05] or 1000ms [F (1,32)=2.11, p>0.05]. This pattern of results suggests 
that the subjects with autism are especially slow at an SOA of 50ms but show a marked 
amelioration of this deficit at 150ms which is not maintained at the longer SOA periods. In 
contrast, the profile shown by the comparison group is remarkably consistent across 
changes in SOA. 
Simple effects tests revealed that the Cue by SOA interaction was attributable to a 
significant effect of SOA at congruent trials [F (3,96)=3.14, p<0.05] but not incongruent 
trials [F (3,96)<1, ns] and a significant effect of Cue at an SOA of 150ms [F (1,32)= 11.69, 
p<O. 01] but not at SOAs of 50ms [F (1,32)=1.14, p>0.05], 600ms [F (1,32)=2.52, p>O. 05] 
or 1000ms [F (1,32)=1.94, p>0.05]. 
Validity Effects 
To examine the `validity' effects of cueing the mean of the RT scores of the 
invalid trials 
were subtracted from that for the valid trials at each SOA. Figure 
6.9 shows the validity 
effects from both groups. These were compared using ANOVA with a 
between subject 
factor of Group (Normal/Autism) and a within subject factor of SOA (50,150,600 and 
1000msec). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of SOA [F (3,96)=2.80, 
p<0.04]. There was no significant effect of Group [F (1,32<1, ns] or SOA 
by Group 
interaction [F (3,96)<1, ns]. 
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Figure 6.9. Validity effects in Experiment 1n (difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials) following an eye gaze directional cue (probability 50%). 
Error data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.2 shows the error 
data from Experiment 1. 
Table 6.2. Mean (SD) number of errors from both groups in Experiment 1. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 0.35 (0.61) 0.76 (1.03 ) 
(Response made) 
Anticipations 1.06 (1.20) 1.29 (1.31) 
(RT < 100ms) 
Miss 0.35 (0.61) 1.41 (1.94) 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
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Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences on either catch trials [t(32)=1.42, 
p<0.17] or anticipations [t(32)= 0.55, p<0.59]. The group with autism were significantly 
more likely than the comparison group to miss the target [t(32)=2.15, p<0.039]. 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 1 provide some evidence that both groups showed reflexive 
spatial orienting to centrally located eye gaze cues. Both the individuals with autism and 
the comparison group were faster to detect the presence of a target when it was 
immediately preceded by a congruent eye gaze cue than when it was preceded by an 
incongruent eye gaze cue. While central cues are normally thought to engage an 
endogenous orienting mechanism (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989), the observations reported in 
this study are consistent with an exogenous or stimulus driven orienting mechanism based 
on three criteria. Firstly, this facilitatory effect occurred despite the fact that these centrally 
located eye gaze cues were not predictive of the location of the target and secondly the 
participants were instructed to ignore the cue. Finally, this cueing effect was rapid, 
appearing at 150ms after the onset of the eye gaze cue, and was short lived (absent for the 
longer SOAs). These results are concordant with those reported by Driver et al. (1999) who 
adopted a similar cueing methodology using normal adults. Participants in the Driver et al. 
(1999) study were faster to discriminate peripheral target letters on the side the 
computerized face gazed towards, even though the seen gaze did not predict target side and 
despite participants being asked to ignore the face. 
The fact that the group with autism were overall slower in detecting the target and 
were more likely to miss the target perhaps reflects a general arousal problem (Hutt et al., 
1964) or perhaps an autism-specific deficit in social-motivational factors. This finding of 
longer target detection latencies has been found in other studies with these subjects (Neely 
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et al., submitted). Moreover, it should be noted that general slowing in reaction times on 
Posner type spatial cueing tasks has been observed in patients with frontal-lobe lesions 
(Petersen et al., 1989) 
6.5 RESULTS 
Experiment 2 (Head directional cue) 
Reaction times 
These data were treated in the same way as Experiment 1. Figure 6.10 shows the mean 
RTs for both the group with autism and the comparison group. This analysis confirmed 
that the group with autism were overall slower in responding [F (1,32)= 10.59, p<0.003]. 
There was also a main effect of SOA [F (3,96)=4.20, p<0.008] and an SOA by Group 
interaction [F (3,96)=4.15, p<0.008]. All other main effects and interaction terms were not 
significant (Cue [F (1,32)=2.53, p>0.05], Cue by Group [F (1,32<1, ns], Cue by SOA [F 
(3,96)<l, ns] and Cue by SOA by Group [F (3,96)=1.36, p>0.05)]. 
Simple effect tests revealed that the SOA by Group interaction was attributable to 
an effect of SOA for the group with autism [F (3,96)= 7.66, p<0.01] but not the 
comparison group [F (3,96)<1, ns]. There was no effect of Group at each of the SOAs (50 
[F(1,32)=3.94, p>0.05], 150 [F(1,32)=1.56, p>0.05], 600 [F(1,32)=3.57, p>0.05] and 1000 
[F(1,32)=1.92, p>0.05]). 
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Figure 6.10. Mean reaction times in Experiment 2 to targets at varying intervals following 
the head cue (50% probability). 
Validity effects 
These data were calculated and compared as above. Figure 6.11 shows the validity effects 
from both groups. No significant results were found. (SOA [F (3,96)=0.34, p=0.80], SOA 
by Group [F (3,96)=1.36, p=0.26] and Group [F (1,32)=0.15, p=0.70]). 
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Figure 6.11. Validity effects in Experiment 2 (difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials) following a profile head cue (probability 50%). 
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Error Data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.3 shows the error 
data from Experiment 2. Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences on either 
catch trials [t(32)=1.497, p<O. 14], false alarms [t(32)= 1.596, p<O. 12] or misses 
[t(32)=1.084, p<O. 287]. 
Table 6.3. Mean (SD) number of errors for each group in Experiment 2. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 0.29 (0.77) 0.82 (l 
. 
24) 
(Response made) 
False Alarm 0.65 (0.86) 1.24 (1.25) 
(RT < 100ms) 
Miss 0.41 (0.62) 1.00 (2.15) 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
6.6 DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 did not provide evidence of reflexive orienting in response to 
a head cue in either group. Although in this experiment both the head and the eyes were 
oriented towards one of the possible target locations, subjects from both groups were able 
to ignore these cues as they were instructed to do. These results are not concordant with 
those of Langton and Bruce (1999) using normal adults. In the Langton and Bruce (1999) 
study participants were required to detect a target in one of four possible locations, left, 
right, above or below the cue. The results revealed that uninformative and to be ignored 
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head cues produced faster target detection latencies at cued relative to uncued locations, 
but only when the cues appeared 100ms before the onset of the target. At the longer SOA 
of 1000ms, no effects of cue were found. While the slight differences in task design may 
reconcile the discrepancy between the two studies it is unclear why subjects in Experiment 
I were unable to ignore the eye gaze direction whereas they were able to ignore both the 
eye and head direction in Experiment 2. 
Hietanen (1999) has reported similar findings to those recorded in this paper and 
has proposed a possible reason for this discrepancy. Hietanen (1999) examined the 
contribution of gaze direction and head orientation on attentional shifts and found that a 
laterally averted view of a head with a straight gaze did not elicit fast automatic shifts in 
visual attention whereas a frontal face with an averted gaze did. Hietanen (1999) suggests 
that psychologically, a head directed and looking away may be interpreted as a situation 
that is totally unrelated to ones-self, perhaps depicting a person engaged in his/her own 
thoughts. In contrast, a frontal view of a face with a gaze turned away is much more 
powerful, signalling that something has attracted his/her attention so much that he/she is 
looking at it. A laterally averted gaze indicates that the person is actively looking at 
something, thus pulling our attention to the same spatial location. In this way, it is possible 
that a frontal view of a face is interpreted as a more powerful social signal. 
6.7 RESULTS 
Experiment 3 (Inverted eye gaze cue) 
Reaction times 
These data were also calculated and compared as above. Figure 6.12 shows the mean RTs 
for both the autism and the comparison group. There was a main effect of Group [F 
(1,32)= 15.61, p<0.001] suggesting a significant difference in overall reaction times 
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between the two groups. This analysis also revealed a significant main effect of SOA [F 
(3,96)=7.23, p<0.001J, a Cue by Group [F (1,32)=7.21, p<0.01] and a SOA by Group [F 
(3,96)=4.05, p<0.009] interaction. All other main effects and interaction terms were not 
significant (Cue [F (1,32)=0.25, p=0.62], Cue by SOA [F (3,96)=0.40, p=0.76] and Cue by 
SOA by Group [F (3,96)=0.33, p=0.80]. 
Simple effect tests revealed that the Cue by Group interaction was attributable to a 
significant effect of Cue for the group with autism [F (1,32)=5.07, p<0.01 ] but not the 
normal control group [F (1,32)=2.39, p>0.05] and a more significant effect of Group for 
the congruent trials [F (1,32)=9.12, p<O. 01] than the incongruent trials [F (1,32)=6.60, 
p<0.05]. 
Simple effect tests show that the SOA by Group interaction was attributable to a 
significant effect of SOA for the group with autism [F (3,96)= 8.77, p<0.01] but not for the 
normal control group [F (3,96)=2.50, p>0.05] and a significant effect of Group for SOAs 
of 50ms [F (1,32)=4.96, p<0.05] and 600ms [F (1,32)=5.54, p<0.05] but not at SOAs of 
150ms [F (1,32)=3.09, p>0.05] or 1000ms[F (1,32)=2.44, p>0.05]. 
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Figure 6.12. Mean reaction times in Experiment 3 to targets at varying intervals following 
an inverted eye gaze directional cue (50% probability). 
Validity effects 
Figure 6.13 shows the scores from each group on this measure. This analysis revealed a 
significant difference between the two groups [F (1,32)=7.21, p=0.01]. There was no main 
effect of SOA [F (3,96<1, ns] nor a SOA by Group interaction [F (3,96<1, ns]. 
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Figure 6.13. Validity effects (difference between congruent and incongruent trials) in 
Experiment 3 following an inverted eye gaze directional cue (50% probability). 
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Error Data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.4 shows the error 
data from Experiment 3. Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences on either 
catch trials [t(32)=1.573, p=0.126], false alarms [t(32)= 0.736, p=0.467] or misses 
[t(32)=1.012, p=0.319]. 
Table 6.4. Mean (SD) number of errors from both groups in Experiment 3. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 0.18 (0.39) 0.65 (1.17) 
(Response made) 
False Alarm 0.71 (0.99) 1.06 (1.71) 
(RT < IOOms) 
Miss 0.29 (0.59) 0.71 (1.57) 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
6.8 DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 3, the cueing stimuli used in Experiment 1 were each rotated about 180 
degrees to produce a set of inverted frontal faces with laterally averted gaze. The results 
showed that for the comparison group, inversion of the stimuli disrupted the reflexive 
orienting response seen in Experiment 1. This is in accordance with results from Langton 
and Bruce (1999) who found that inversion of the facial stimuli reduced the cueing effect 
to targets appearing on the horizontal axis and abolished the effect of cueing to targets on 
the vertical axis. These results are also in line with numerous studies that have 
demonstrated that inversion severely disrupts various aspects of face processing (Yin, 
1969; Valentine & Bruce, 1986: Bruce & Langton, 1994). In addition Vecera and Johnson 
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(1995) demonstrated that sensitivity to gaze direction in schematic faces was reduced 
when the eyes were in the context of an inverted or scrambled face compared to an upright 
face. 
However, the group with autism produced a different pattern of results, indicating 
that inversion of the stimuli did not disrupt the processing of the eye gaze direction. This 
may be related to a pioneering study of face recognition in adolescents and young adults 
with autism by Langdell (1978), where two peculiarities were reported. While the 
individuals with autism were as proficient as control subjects matched on chronological 
age and performance IQ in their ability to identify their peers, they did so by relying on the 
lower parts of the face (i. e. the mouth region), rather than the upper parts of the face (i. e. 
the eye region) which is a more normative strategy (McKelvie, 1976). In addition they also 
failed to show the typical decrement in performance when asked to identify inverted faces. 
Similar results were obtained by Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988) who found that the 
individuals with autism in their study, when asked to identify upside down faces, 
performed better than control subjects matched for verbal mental age. 
This enigma has been interpreted as evidence of a lack of central coherence 
(Happe, 1994) as, although the processing of faces involves both featural (part) and 
configural (whole) processing (Tanaka & Farah, 1993), it appears that configural 
processing is interrupted by the inversion of faces. Alternatively, while neuropsychological 
evidence suggests a dissociation between neural mechanisms for face and object 
perception (Yin, 1970; Farah et al., 1998; Farah, 1996), recent investigations using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Haxby et al., 1999) have indicated that 
failure of face perception systems with inverted faces leads to the recruitment of 
processing resources in object perception systems. Therefore it is possible that individuals 
with autism do not have specialised systems for the perception of faces, relying instead on 
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an intact object recognition system for their analysis. Indeed, there is some preliminary 
data that appears to point in this direction (Schultz et al., 2000), showing abnormal ventral 
temporal cortical activity among individuals with autism and Asperger's Syndrome during 
a face discrimination task. It was suggested by these authors that the individuals with 
autism demonstrated a pattern of brain activity during face discrimination that was 
consistent with feature-based strategies that are more typical of non-face object perception. 
6.9 RESULTS 
Experiment 4 (Predictive eye gaze cue) 
Reaction times 
The median reaction time for each target delay and condition were calculated for each 
participant. Figure 6.14 shows the mean RTs for both the group with autism and the 
comparison group. The mean RT scores were compared using ANOVA with a between 
subject factor of Group (Autism/Normal) and within subject factors of Cue 
(Expected/Unexpected) and SOA (50,150,600 and 1000msec). There were no significant 
differences between the two groups in overall reaction time [F (1,32)=2.83, p>0.05]. There 
was a main effect of Cue [F (1,32)=20.46, p<0.001] and a main effect of SOA [F 
(3,96)=7.84, p<O. 001 ] indicating faster reaction times for expected targets at increasing 
cue to target delays. There was also a significant SOA by Group interaction [F (3,96)=4.26, 
p<0.007] and a Cue by SOA by Group interaction [F3,96)=4.36, p<0.006]. All other 
interaction terms were not significant (Cue by Group [F (1,32)=2.06, p>0.05], Cue by SOA 
[F (3,96)=0.94, p>0.05]. 
Simple effect tests revealed that the SOA by Group interaction was attributable to a 
more significant effect of SOA for the group with autism [F (3,96)=7.34, p<O. 0 1] than the 
comparison group [F (3,96)=4.75, p<0.05]. 
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The three-way interaction of Cue by SOA by Group was attributable to a significant 
Cue by SOA interaction for the normal group [F (3,96)=3.79, p<0.05] but not the group 
with autism [F (3,96)=1.51, p>0.05]. 
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Figure 6.14. Mean reaction times in Experiment 4 to targets at varying intervals following 
an eye gaze directional cue (probability 80% correct). 
Validity effects 
To examine the `validity' effect of cueing the mean of the RT scores of the unexpected 
trials were subtracted from the expected trials at each SOA. The scores from both groups 
are shown in Figure 6.15. These were compared using ANOVA with a between subject 
factor of Group (Normal/Autism) and a within subject factor of SOA (50,150,600 and 
1000msec). There was no main effect of Group [F (1,32)=2.06, p >0.05] or SOA [F 
(3,96)=0.94, p >0.05]. However there was a significant SOA by Group interaction [F 
(3,96)=4.36, p<0.006]. Simple effect tests revealed that this interaction was attributable to 
a significant effect of SOA for the comparison group [F (3,96)=3.79, p<0.05] but not the 
group with autism [F (3,96)=1.51, p>0.05]. Independent sample t-tests revealed that the 
difference between groups was apparent at SOAs of 600 [t (32)=2.73, p<0.01] and 
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1000msec [t (32)=2.01, p<0.05] but not at SOAs of 50 [t (32)=-0.42, p=0.68] or 150msec [t 
(32)=-0.84, p=0.41]. 
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Figure 6.15. Validity effects (difference between expected and unexpected trials) in 
Experiment 4 following an eye gaze directional cue (80% probability). 
Error Data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.5 shows the error 
data from each group in Experiment 4. Independent t-tests revealed no significant 
differences on either catch trials [t(32)=0.385, p<0.703], false alarms [t(32)=-0.296, 
p<0.769] or misses [t(32)=0.739, p<0.465]. 
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Table 6.5. Mean (SD) number of errors in each group in Experiment 4. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 1.12 (1.27) 1.29 (l 
. 
40) 
(Response made) 
False Alarm 2.47 (2.53) 2.24 (2.08) 
(RT < 100ms) 
Miss 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
6.10 DISCUSSION 
0.53 (1.07) 0.88 (1.65) 
The stimuli for Experiment 4 were identical to that in Experiment 1 except that the 
probability of the central gaze cue being predictive of subsequent target location was 
increased to 80% and participants were encouraged to pay attention to the cue. It was 
predicted that this manipulation would produce little difference in results from Experiment 
1 at the shorter SOAs of 50 and 150ms if we assume that these were the consequence of a 
purely stimulus-driven or exogenous orienting process. However with increasing cue to 
target delays participants should have enough time to be able to interpret the cue and affect 
a strategic or endogenous shift of attention contingent on the direction of the cue. The 
results from the comparison group supported this prediction and show that the comparison 
subjects were able to supplement their relatively automatic tendency to align their 
attention with the direction of seen gaze with their voluntary allocation of attention with 
longer cue to target delays of 600 and 1000ms. However, it seems that the individuals with 
autism were not as efficient in voluntarily using the eye gaze cue to direct their attention as 
evidenced by the differences between groups in terms of validity effects at the longer cue 
to target delays of 600 and 1000ms. These results may be concordant with studies 
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reporting difficulties with eye gaze use among younger individuals with autism (Mirenda 
et al., 1983; Sigman et al., 1986; Volkmar & Hayes, 1990; Rutter & Schopler, 1987; 
Phillips, Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 1992) and also clinical, anecdotal and personal evidence 
among older individuals (Attwood, 1998; Jolliffe et al., 1992). 
The overall group differences in reaction time were no longer significant in this 
experiment. This may be due to the effect of greater practice or a more general feeling at 
ease with the experimental procedure among the group with autism. Indeed, this 
amelioration in overall reaction time with subsequent similar experiments was reported in 
previous experimental chapters. 
6.11 RESULTS 
Experiment 5 (Predictive head cue) 
Reaction times 
Figure 6.16 shows the mean RT for both groups. The data were compared as above. This 
analysis revealed no significant differences between the two groups in overall reaction 
times [F (1,32)=1.29, p>0.05]. There were significant main effects of Cue [F (1,32)=12.08, 
p<O. 001 ] and SOA [F (3,96)=8.62, p<O. 001 ] indicating faster reaction times for expected 
targets at increasing cue to target delays. There was also a significant Cue by SOA 
interaction [F (3,96)=3.31, p<O. 02] and a SOA by Group interaction [F (3,96)=3.01, 
p<0.03]. All other interaction terms were not significant (Cue by Group [F (1,32)<l, ns], 
Cue by SOA by Group [F (3,96)<1, ns]. 
Simple effect tests revealed that the source of the Cue by SOA interaction was 
attributable to a significant effect of Cue at a SOA of 600ms [F (1,32)= 7.81, p<0.01] but 
not at SOAs of 50 [F (1,32)<1, ns], 150 [F (1,32)=1.94, p>0.05] or 1000msec [F 
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(1,32)=3.73, p>0.05] and a more significant effect of SOA at expected trials [F (3,96)=5.37, 
p<0.01] than at unexpected trials [F (3,96)=4.98, p<0.01]. 
Simple effect tests revealed that the SOA by Group interaction was attributable to a 
significant effect of SOA for the autistic group [F (3,96)=9.87, p<O. 0 1] but not the 
comparison group [F (3,96)=1.76, p>0.05]. 
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Figure 6.16. Mean reaction times in Experiment 5 to targets at varying intervals following 
the head cue (probability 80% correct). 
Validity effects 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of SOA [F (3,96)=3.31, p=0.02]. The 
scores from both groups are shown in Figure 6.17. There was no main effect of Group [F 
(1,32)<1, ns] nor a SOA by Group interaction [F (3,96)<1, ns]. 
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Figure 6.17. Validity effects in Experiment 5 (difference between expected and 
unexpected trials) following a profile head directional cue (80% probability). 
Error Data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.6 shows the error 
data from Experiment 5. Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences on either 
catch trials [t(32)=-0.941, p<0.354], false alarms [t(32)=0.699, p<0.490] or misses [t(32)=- 
0.672, p<0.506]. 
Table 6.6. Mean (SD) number of errors from both groups in Experiment 5. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 1.18 (1.33) 0.71 (1.57) 
(Response made) 
False Alarm 1.71 (1.72) 2.47 (4.17) 
(RT < 100ms) 
Miss 0.94(l. 56) 0.59(l. 50) 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
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6.12 DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 5 the cue was a photographed head, with both head and eye gaze as 
directional cues. In Experiment 2, uninformative head stimuli produced no cueing effect at 
any of the SOAs. However, by increasing the informativeness of the head cues in 
Experiment 5 to 80% correct, a pre-cueing effect was produced and was most evident at a 
longer SOA of 600ms. These findings are consistent with a slower acting endogenous 
orienting mechanism at the 600ms SOA. The results show that there were no significant 
differences between the two groups in their ability to use this cue to direct their attention. 
This is in contrast to the reduced ability of the group with autism to use an eye gaze cue as 
effectively as control subjects in Experiment 4. This could be an indication that the 
individuals with autism have particular difficulty with the eyes. Head direction and gaze 
direction were always perfectly correlated in Experiment 5. Possibly the subjects with 
autism were able to use the larger and more salient head direction as the cue. Alternatively, 
as mentioned previously, the individuals with autism may have a tendency to shift their 
attention to the lower regions of the face (Langdell, 1978) thus using the nose as a 
directional cue. 
6.13 RESULTS 
Experiment 6 (Invalidly predictive eye gaze cue) 
Reaction times 
These data were treated as above. Figure 6.18 shows the mean RT for both groups. This 
analysis revealed no significant differences between the two groups in overall reaction 
time [F (1,32)<1, ns]. There were main effects of Cue [F (1,32)=9.45, p<0.004] and SOA 
[F (3,96)=3.35, p<0.02]. There was also a significant Cue by SOA interaction [F 
(3,96)=7.20, p<0.001 ]. The Cue by Group [F (1,32)=2.02, p>0.05] and the SOA by Group 
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[F (3,96)<1, ns] interactions were not significant, however the Cue by SOA by Group 
interaction approached significance [F (3,96)=2.40, p=0.071. 
Simple effect tests revealed that the Cue by SOA interaction was attributable to a 
significant effect of Cue at SOAs of 600 [F (1,32)=6.71), p<0.05] and l 000msec [F 
(1,32)=7.81, p<0.01] but not at SOAs of 50 [F (1,32)<l, ns] or 150msec [F (1,32)<l, ns] 
and a significant effect of SOA at expected trials [F (3,96)=4.70, p<O. 0 1] but not at 
unexpected trials [F (3,96)=1.78, ns]. 
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Figure 6.18. Mean reaction times in Experiment 6 to targets at varying intervals following 
an eye gaze directional cue (20% probability). 
Validity effects 
The data was treated as above. The scores from each group are shown in Figure 6.19. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of SOA [F (3,96)=7.20, p<0.001]. There were 
no significant differences between the two groups [F (1,32)=2.02, p>0.05]. The SOA by 
Group interaction approached significance [F (3,96)=2.40, p=0.07]. For completeness, 
planned comparisons were conducted at each SOA. These revealed a significant difference 
165 
01:: zi 
between the two groups at a SOA of 600msec [t (32)=2.47, p=0.02] but not at SOAs of 
50msec [t (32)=0.60, p=0.56], 150msec [t (32)=-0.01, p=0.99] or 1000msec [t (32)=1.01, 
p=0.32]. 
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Figure 6.19. Validity effects (difference between expected and unexpected trials) in 
Experiment 6 following an eye gaze directional cue (20% probability). 
Error Data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.7 shows the error 
data for Experiment 6. Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences on either 
catch trials [t(32)=-0.118, p<0.907], false alarms [t(32)=-0.105, p<0.917] or misses 
[t(32)=0.496, p<O. 623]. 
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Table 6.7. Mean (SD) number of errors in both groups in Experiment 6. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 1.24(l. 35) 1.18(l. 55) 
(Response made) 
False Alarm 2.82 (3.52) 2.71 (2.97) 
(RT < IOOms) 
Miss 1.00 (1.84) 1.35 (2.29) 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
6.14 DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 6 the same stimuli as Experiments 1 and 4 were used, however the target 
was now four times as likely to appear on the side away from where the central face gazed 
than to appear on the side that the face gazed towards. Participants were explicitly 
instructed to try and direct their attention in the other direction away from the eye gaze 
cue. However, if people cannot suppress an automatic tendency to orient attention in the 
direction of seen gaze, we would expect that participants might still show an advantage on 
the side that the face gazed towards at the shorter SOA of 150ms as seen in Experiment 1. 
At the longer SOAs of 600 and 1 000ms however, sufficient time should have passed to 
enable participants to push their attention endogenously to the other side where they 
expect the target to appear. In general the results from the comparison group support this 
prediction. While the validity effects were small at the shorter SOAs of 50 and 150ms 
these were greatly enhanced at the longer SOAs of 600 and 1000ms. In contrast the group 
with autism displayed reduced validity effects. This effect, although not statistically 
significant, approached significance and was reduced at the longer SOAs in the group with 
167 
autism, indicating that this group were having more difficulty using the eye gaze 
directional cue. This was most apparent at an SOA of 600ms, however by the longest SOA 
of 1000ms the individuals with autism were as proficient as controls in their ability to 
interpret the central eye gaze cue and direct their attention in the opposite direction. 
6.15 RESULTS 
Experiment 7 (Eye Gaze Cue- Modification of Experiment 1) 
Reaction time 
The median reaction time for each target delay and condition were calculated for each 
group. Figure 6.20 shows the mean RT for both the group with autism and the comparison 
group. This data were compared using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and within subject factors of Cue (Congruent/Incongruent) and SOA 
(50,150,600 and 1000ms). 
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Figure 6.20. Mean reaction times in Experiment 7 to targets at varying intervals following 
an eye gaze directional cue. (50% probability) where the cue duration varied with SOA 
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There were no differences in overall reaction times between the two groups [F (1,30)<I, 
ns]. There was a main effect of Cue [F (1,30)=19.70, p<O. 001], a main effect of SOA [F 
(3,90)=8.46, p<0.001] and a significant interaction between these two factors [F 
(3,90)=4.44, p<0.006]. Simple effect tests revealed that the source of this interaction was 
due to a significant effect of Cue at SOA's of 600ms [F (1,30)=14.68, p<0.01] and 1000ms 
[F (1,30)=12.95, p<0.01] but not at SOA's of 50ms [F (1,30)<1, ns] or 150ms [F 
(1,30)=1.38, p>0.05]. Similarly there was a significant effect of SOA for incongruent trials 
[F (3,90)= 8.65, p<0.011, but not for congruent trials [F (3,90)=2.38, p>0.05]. All other 
interaction terms were not significant (Cue by Group [F (1,30)=2.91, p>0.05], SOA by 
Group [F (3,90)=1.30, p>0.05] and Cue by Group by SOA [F (3,90)<1, ns]). 
Validity effects 
The data was calculated and compared as above. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of SOA [F (3,90)=4.44, p<0.006]. There was no significant effect of Group [F 
(3,90)=0.92, p=0.44] or any interaction between these two terms [F (1,30)=2.91, p<0.09]. 
Independent sample t-tests were calculated at each SOA. This revealed a significant 
difference between the two groups at an SOA of 150 ms [t (30)=2.13, p<0.04] but not at 
SOAs of 50ms [t (30)=-0.3, p<0.77], 600ms [t (30)=0.64, p<0.53] or 1000ms [t (30)=1.38, 
p<O. 18]. Figure 6.21 shows the validity effect of each group at each SOA. 
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Figure 6.21. Validity effects in Experiment 7 (difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials) following an eye gaze directional cue (probability 50%) where the cue 
duration varied with SOA. 
Error Data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.8 shows the error 
data from Experiment 7. 
Table 6.8. Mean (SD) number of errors in Experiment 7. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 0.56 (1.15) 0.75 (1.57) 
(Response made) 
False Alarm 1.63 (4.96) 1.19 (1.76) 
(RT < 100ms) 
Miss 0.06 (0.25) 0.31 (0.60) 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
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Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences on either catch trials [t(32)=0.385, 
p<0.703], false alarms [t(32)=-0.332, p<0.742] or misses [t(32)=1.534, p<0. l36]. 
6.16 RESULTS 
Experiment 8 (Head Directional Cue- Modification of Experiment 2) 
Reaction time 
This data was calculated and compared as above. Figure 6.22 shows the mean reaction 
times for both groups following a profile head directional cue that was correct 50% of the 
time. There were no differences in overall reaction times between the two groups [F 
(1,30=2.89, p>0.05]. There was a main effect of Cue [F (1,30)=20.25, p<0.001 ] and SOA 
[F (3,90)=4.92, p<0.003]. All other interaction terms were not significant. Cue by Group [F 
(1,30)= 1.59, p>0.05], SOA by Group [F (3,90)=1.56, p>0.05], Cue by SOA [F 
(3,90)=1.70, p>0.05] and Cue by SOA by Group [F (3,90)<1, ns]. 
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Figure 6.22. Mean reaction times from both groups in Experiment 8 to targets appearing at 
varying intervals following a profile head directional cue (50% probability) whose duration 
varied with SOA. 
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Validity effects 
The data was calculated and compared as above. No significant results were found. (SOA 
[F (3,90)=1.70, p<O. 17], SOA by Group [F (3,90)=0.03, p<0.99] and Group [F (1,30)=1.59, 
p<0.22]. Figure 6.23 shows the validity effect of both groups at each SOA. 
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Figure 6.23. Validity effects in Experiment 8 (difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials) following a profile head cue (probability 50%) where the cue duration 
varied with SOA. 
Error Data 
The mean (SD) number of errors was calculated for each group. Table 6.9 shows the error 
data in Experiment 8. 
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Table 6.9. Mean (SD) number of errors in Experiment 8. 
Normal Autism 
Catch 0.63 (0.72) 1.00 (1.41) 
(Response made) 
False Alarm 1.00 (1.41) 1.44 (2.97) 
(RT < 100ms) 
MISS 0.00 (0.0) 0.19 (0.40) 
(RT > 1200 ms) 
Independent t-tests revealed no significant differences on either catch trials [t(32)=0.946, 
p<0.352], false alarms [t(32)=0.533, p<0.598] or misses [t(32)=1.861, p<0.073]. 
6.17 DISCUSSION 
Experiment 7 and 8 
The main reason for conducting these two experiments was to investigate the shorter target 
detection latencies at the SOA of 150ms seen in experiments 1-5 in the group with autism. 
Because the cue duration in the previous experiments was also 150ms, we wondered 
whether target onset at cue offset gave an additional warning that the target was going to 
appear thus affecting RT or whether, given the range of SOAs, 150ms was the optimal 
time difference between cue and target for processing. This latter position was supported, 
as even when the cue duration varied, latencies were quicker at a SOA of 150ms in 
both 
the head and eye gaze experiments in both groups. 
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As in Experiment 1, the direction of gaze by the central face in Experiment 7 had a 
reliable effect on detection latencies even though the gaze was totally irrelevant to the task 
and provided no information about where the target letter was likely to appear. However 
the congruence effect on RTs interacted with SOA at 600 and 1000ms. This is in 
comparison to the earlier appearing effect at 150ms in Experiment 1. While this was taken 
to imply a relatively automatic orienting to gaze direction in Experiment 1, this is less 
attractive an opinion at the longer SOA's of 600 and 1000ms. In addition, the results of 
Experiment 8 are in direct contrast to those of Experiment 2. In the earlier experiment the 
profile head direction cue had no effect on target detection times, whereas in Experiment 8 
a reliable effect of cue was found, thus showing that although the cues provided no 
information about where the target was likely to appear, target detection latencies were 
significantly faster on the side that the head cue gazed towards. Taken together, these 
results might suggest that, having completed Experiments 4-6 where one was required to 
attend to the central stimulus, this tendency is difficult to overcome in subsequent 
experiments. 
6.18 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this chapter was to investigate whether individuals with autism would 
show the relatively automatic or reflexive orienting response to social cues that has been 
reported for normal adults (Driver et al., 1999: Langton et al., 1999). The pattern of results 
has indicated that normal adults are unable to suppress an automatic tendency to orient 
their attention in the eye gaze direction (Driver et al., 1999) or head orientation (Langton et 
al., 1999) of others. In addition, the ability to use this social information voluntarily to 
direct their attention as efficiently as control subjects was explored. The results show that 
both the comparison group and the group with autism showed evidence of reflexive 
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orienting to the eye gaze direction of others (Experiment 1). Experiment 2 revealed that 
both groups of subjects were able to ignore the head directional cue, indicating that a 
laterally averted view of a head with a straight gaze did not produce fast automatic shifts in 
visual attention in either group. The reflexive orienting response to eye gaze direction was 
disrupted by the inversion of the stimuli in the comparison group. However the group with 
autism still showed a significant cueing effect when the eye gaze stimuli were inverted 
(Experiment 3). While the individuals with autism were overall slower than the 
comparison group in responding to targets in the first set of experiments (Experiment 1-3 ), 
these differences were no longer significant in the second set of experiments (Experiment 
4-6). Greater practice effects or increased familiarisation with the experimental procedure 
among the group with autism were possible reasons proposed to account for this 
discrepancy. 
There were also no significant differences between the group with autism and the 
comparison group in their ability to use a head directional cue when they were informed of 
the probable contingencies (Experiment 5). Experiment 4 did however reveal a difference 
in the group with autism's ability to use an eye gaze directional cue. While the normal 
control group were able to supplement their relatively automatic responses to seen gaze at 
the shorter SOA's of 50 and 150 ms, with an endogenous shift of attention at both the 
longer SOA's of 600 and 1000ms, the group with autism displayed a much reduced cueing 
effect. This difficulty in using information voluntarily derived from the eyes was further 
supported by the results of Experiment 6. When task demands required subjects to 
direct 
their attention in the opposite direction of the eye gaze cue, the individuals with autism 
were less able to do so with group differences apparent at a SOA of 600ms. Overall, the 
pattern of results reported in this paper would suggest that of the two `social' cues 
investigated, information from a head directional cue was processed and used effectively 
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by the group with autism. While both groups showed evidence of relatively automatic 
processing of eye gaze direction, the individuals with autism were however, less able to 
make voluntary use eye gaze information. 
It should also be noted that there was a SOA by Group interaction across 
experiments 1-5. This pattern of results indicated that the group with autism were showing 
significantly faster detection latencies at a SOA of 150ms. In the design of this study, cue 
duration was confounded with target onset at this SOA. Therefore two additional 
experiments (Experiments 7 and 8) were conducted to investigate whether cue offset 
coinciding with target onset provided an additional warning cue to shift attention, thus 
facilitating RT. These two experiments were similar to Experiments 1 and 2 except the cue 
duration coincided with variations in SOA. This manipulation removed the significant 
interaction, with optimal performance seen at 150ms in both groups. Thus it seems that 
given the range of SOAs in this series of experiments, 150ms was the optimal time 
difference between cue and target for processing. 
The cueing effect seen in Experiment 1 bears some of the hallmarks of automatic 
or reflexive processes found in spatial cueing studies within the mainstream attention 
literature and as such could be taken as evidence for the idea that the brain has some innate 
mechanisms specific to gaze perception (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Specifically, Baron-Cohen 
(1995) has suggested that two modular mechanisms are involved in gaze following. One 
mechanism (the eye direction detector or EDD) is responsible for the perception of 
another's gaze direction. The second element (the shared attention mechanism or SAM) is 
responsible for executing shifts of the observer's own attention in the corresponding 
direction. The EDD is presumed to be intact in individuals with autism based on evidence 
that they are not impaired in the ability to make geometric judgements about the direction 
of perceived gaze (Leekam et al., 1997), whereas a malfunctioning SAM is said to be 
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responsible for their impaired ability to shift their own attention where others look (Baron- 
Cohen, 1995). On this account, individuals with autism are not impaired on the more 
mechanical aspects of perceiving where others are looking. However they are impaired on 
the more mentalistic aspects of interpreting the direction of seen gaze as reflecting the 
internal mental state of another person with unawareness of people as goal-directed beings 
capable of attending to objects. 
While it is uncertain whether a digitised photograph could be interpreted in a 
mentalistic fashion, this account would still predict that the reflexive or automatic 
orienting response to seen gaze should be absent in individuals with autism. Clearly, this 
prediction was not supported by the results of this study. It could be argued that the cueing 
effect reported in this paper in response to the eye gaze direction of others might provide 
evidence for some aspect of the SAM to be intact. 
However, mainstream attention studies have recently been criticised for not 
considering whether learned processes, operating over the lifespan could be involved in 
some of the spatial orienting effects that they have uncovered (Driver et al., 1999). These 
authors suggest that the well known effects following uninformative peripheral cues 
(Posner, 1980) might plausibly arise as a result of long-term learning that abrupt visual 
transients are often followed by important events at the same location in the real world. 
Recent research has provided some evidence of associative learning between cue attributes 
and target events (Lambert & Sumich, 1996). In this experiment, word cues were presented 
to the left and right of fixation. The semantic category of these words was predictive of the 
likely location of a subsequent target, however participants were unaware of the 
contingency between cue and target. Nevertheless, participants were faster to detect targets 
appearing in the cued compared to the uncued locations. It was suggested by Lambert and 
Sumich (1996) that the spatial orienting producing this effect was due to an implicit or 
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unconscious learning of the association between particulars of the cue and target events. 
Therefore the pattern of results obtained from the spatial cueing arising from seen gaze 
(Experiment 1) might operate as the result of extensive experience within social settings 
where seen gaze direction can often predict the location of important events. The inability 
to override this association might therefore arise because the tendency to orient in the 
direction of seen gaze is so heavily over-learned that it cannot easily be suppressed at will 
nor unlearned within the timeframe of the experiment. This may be a convincing 
explanation for the results of the normal adults who have had extensive experience within 
social settings, however it is a less attractive explanation for the individuals with autism 
whose social experiences have been more limited. 
If the learning hypothesis is indeed correct, then individuals with autism might 
acquire the ability to orient to social cues, but with a slower time course than for typically 
developing individuals. The present results might be compatible with this delay hypothesis. 
The adult subjects with autism in the present study all attend a special residential provision 
for individuals with autism where extensive tuition on socialisation and communication is 
conducted with particular reference to the significance of eyes and eye gaze in the 
interpretation of social interactions. Coupled with the results of Experiment 4 and 6 where 
the individuals with autism were less able to use eye gaze voluntarily may suggest that an 
earlier deficit in reflexively orienting to the direction of seen gaze leaves one with a 
reduced ability to direct ones attention to the social signals of others at will. However, 
whether the fast relatively automatic orienting effects that we have observed in response to 
the eye gaze direction of others are the result of a learning process, or some kind of innate 
mechanism, as implied by Baron-Cohen (1994,1995), is a difficult issue to resolve. 
The results of Experiment 3 also point to abnormal processing of eye gaze in the 
group with autism. While use of inverted stimuli eliminated the cueing effect among the 
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control subjects, it did not among the individuals with autism. Two explanations were 
suggested. The result could be related to a lack of central coherence during face processing 
among the individuals with autism or alternatively their possible recruitment of object 
perception processes because of a lack of specialised face processing abilities (Schultz et 
al., 2000). On either account, one might expect that individuals with autism would show 
impairments in tasks requiring the processing of faces. While some studies have shown 
face recognition deficits in individuals with autism (Klin et al., 1999; Boucher & Lewis, 
1992), others have failed to demonstrate any impairment (Davies, Bishop, Manstead & 
Tantan, 1994; Celani, Battacchi & Arcidiacono, 1999). However, one study has provided 
evidence for peculiarities in face processing that are not immediately apparent when only 
overall performance results are analysed (e. g., the lack of performance decrement when 
processing inverted faces and the preferential attention to the lower regions of the face 
rather than the eyes (Langdell, 1978)). While the conflicting results are difficult to 
reconcile it is possible that where results show no particular deficits in face recognition, 
older individuals with autism may supplement a possible lack of specialised areas 
dedicated to the perception of faces and compensate these with an intact object perception 
system. This may reveal no difficulties on a given experimental task, where stimuli are 
presented for long periods, however this strategy may be less effective in a naturalistic 
setting where face processing involves stimuli that appear for very short periods, that shift 
at a very fast pace and that need to be intuitively and quickly integrated with other social 
information such as voice intonation and posture. 
The results of Experiment 2 using head orientation as the directional cue, showed 
no cueing effect in either group. These results are not concordant with those of Langton et 
al. (1999). However another study (Hietanen, 1999) has also failed to report cueing effects 
as the consequence of a head directional cue. This author reported that a profile head cue 
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with a compatible gaze did not affect response times, indicating no specific automatic 
response to the direction of the head. In contrast a frontal face with an averted gaze did 
produce cueing effects. He further implies that psychologically a frontal view of a face 
could provide a more powerful social signal. The fact that both groups showed comparable 
results in Experiment 2 and 5 where subjects had to ignore and attend to the profile head 
cue respectively would suggest that the individuals with autism were only having difficulty 
in using information derived from the eyes. 
While it is difficult to ignore the significance of eye gaze (Kleinke, 1986), the 
relative importance of eye gaze and head direction in the analysis of social attention has 
recently been raised. Perrett and Emery (1994) have suggested that an eye-direction 
detector (Baron-Cohen, 1995) forms only part of a system designed to compute the 
direction of social attention. Perrett and his colleagues have proposed the existence of a 
direction of attention detector (DAD), which combines information from separate 
detectors analysing the direction of the eyes, head and body. These are arranged in a 
hierarchical fashion so that information from the eyes will override any information 
provided by the head, which in turn can override directional signals from the body. 
However, recent evidence suggests that information from the orientation of the head is not 
completely suppressed when it conflicts with the line of regard of the eyes (Langton, in 
press) and that while acknowledging the priority of the eyes as an indication to the 
direction of another person's attention, other cues such as head orientation and pointing 
gestures make significant contributions as well (Langton, Watt & Bruce, 2000). Given that 
the results reported in this chapter would suggest that the individuals with autism have 
difficulty with eye gaze use, it may be interesting to investigate the relative importance 
that they devote to eyes, head or body orientation and perhaps pointing gestures in the 
analysis of social attention. 
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In conclusion, the results of the experiments reported here would suggest that 
individuals with autism are not globally impaired in responding to social cues. While there 
was no evidence of a relatively automatic orienting response to head orientation in either 
group, the individuals with autism were able, when instructed, to use these cues as 
effectively as the comparison group. In contrast, both groups displayed a similar relatively 
automatic orienting response to eye gaze direction, however the effect was more short 
lived in the group with autism suggesting that this group were impaired in using 
information derived from the eye voluntarily. It was suggested that perhaps this 
impairment stems from a delay in acquiring a reflexive response to eye gaze during 
development. This is, of course, speculative and will remain so until tasks of this type are 
conducted with much younger individuals with autism. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The effect of eye gaze versus head orientation in 
the analysis of social attention 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous research has emphasised the importance of the eyes in the analysis of social 
attention. For example, Perrett et al. 's (1992) direction-of-attention detector (DAD) is a 
mechanism that analyses the direction of the eyes, head and body to determine where 
another individual is directing their attention. This is achieved by a network of inhibitory 
connections, however the eyes hold primary importance. Baron-Cohen (1994; 1995) also 
places particular emphasis on the eyes in his `mind-reading system' to account for the 
processes involved in social cognition. Conversely, other evidence would suggest that the 
perception of another's attention relies more on the head than eye gaze (Maruyama & 
Endo, 1983; Anstis et al., 1969). More recently, Langton (submitted) has proposed that 
both head and eyes have an equally mutual influence on decisions concerning the direction 
of social attention. 
The results of the previous chapter reported that individuals with autism showed 
some evidence of difficulties using information derived from the eyes. Coupled with the 
fact that numerous studies have suggested that gaze processing is impaired at many 
different levels in individuals with autism, such as eye contact (Kanner, 1943), gaze 
following (Leekam, Hunniset & Moore, 1998), joint attention (Charman, Swettenham, 
Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird & Drew, 1997) and understanding gaze within a mentalistic 
framework (Leekam et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995; 
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Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & Jolliffe, 1997), it was deemed of interest to investigate the 
relative importance of eye gaze versus head orientation in the analysis of social attention 
among individuals with autism. 
This chapter reports on the results of an interference paradigm adapted from 
Langton (submitted). The rationale behind using an interference paradigm as in the 
McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976) or the Stroop colour-word task (Stroop, 
1935) is that by placing different dimensions into conflict it is possible to examine any 
possible interactions between them. In the experiment reported in this chapter, participants 
were presented with a photograph of a female whose head was oriented to the left or the 
right. However, the gaze direction of the stimulus was either in a congruent or an 
incongruent line of regard to her head. Participants were asked to make a speeded response 
to each of these signals in separate blocks of trials. For example, in one block of trials a 
subject might be asked to respond to the orientation of the head and ignore the direction of 
the eyes and in the other block of trials, responses to the eye gaze direction were required 
while ignoring the direction of the head. 
It was predicted that the individuals with autism would show a preference in 
processing the head orientation thereby eye gaze and head orientation were expected to 
produce asymmetric interference effects. That is, the processing of the eye direction would 
be influenced by the direction of the head orientation, but classification of the head 
orientation would be unaffected by the direction of the accompanying gaze. 
In contrast, for the normal individuals several predictions were possible. 
Predictions based on Perrett et al. 's (1992) direction of attention detector would suggest 
that eye gaze direction will always inhibit head orientation but not vice-versa. Therefore, 
the opposite pattern of results to the individuals with autism would be predicted, with 
processing of the head orientation influenced by the direction of the accompanying gaze, 
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but classification of eye-gaze direction would be unaffected by the orientation of the head. 
If, on the other hand, head orientation plays a more significant role in the analysis of social 
attention direction as Langton (submitted) would suggest, a more symmetrical pattern of 
effects might be predicted. 
Conversely, results based on the findings of Maruyama and Endo (1983) might 
suggest that processing of gaze direction will be influenced by head orientation but 
processing of head orientation will not be influenced by the eye gaze direction, which 
would produce asymmetrical results again, but in the opposite direction as those based on 
Perrett et al's (1992) model. 
These predictions would be the same as those made for the individuals with autism. 
If this were the case, one might still expect that the individuals with autism would have 
difficulty using the eye gaze direction thereby displaying more errors and longer reaction 
times than the comparison subjects on the block of trials where one is required to respond 
to the eye gaze direction and ignore the head direction, whereas no differences in either 
errors or reaction times would be predicted on the respond to the head orientation and 
ignore the eye gaze direction block. Given all these possibilities, no definite predictions 
were made regarding the results of the comparison group. 
7.2 METHOD - Study 4 
Participants 
16 participants from each group who took part in the social cueing experiments described 
in the previous chapter were available for re-testing approximately 4 months later. 
Participants' characteristics are shown in Table 7.1. Independent sample t-tests revealed 
that the chronological ages, VIQ, PIQ and IQ of the two groups were not significantly 
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different ([t (30)=-0.80, p<0.43], [t (30)=-0.67, p<0.51], [t (30)=0.10, p<0.93] and [t (30)=- 
0.19, p<O. 85]) respectively. 
Table 7.1. Participant characteristics 
Group N AGE(y: m) VIQ PIQ Overall IQ 
Autism 16 Mean 20.56 88.25 91.50 89.31 
SD 2.47 14.88 19.46 15.96 
Range 16.9-23.9 73-112 72-123 72-118 
Normal 16 Mean 21.06 90.94 90.93 90.19 
SD 1.66 6.25 13.64 8.71 
Range 16.9-26.0 75-110 75-120 75-114 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The apparatus was the same as in the previous experiment. The visual stimuli for this task 
consisted of four digitised images of a female face. These images were 9 cm in height and 
7 cm in width and were viewed by participants seated approximately 57cm from the 
monitor. In each of these images the head was oriented approximately 30 degrees to the 
left or to the right of centre with the direction of eye gaze oriented approximately a further 
15 degrees in the same or opposite direction of the head. In half of the trials, the eye gaze 
was directed in the same direction as the head orientation (congruent trials), the other half 
of the trials the eyes were gazing in the opposite direction to that of the head (incongruent 
trials). In accordance with Langton (submitted), the amount of visible sclera in the 
congruent and incongruent images was roughly equated. The left and right gaze cues were 
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produced by a mirror reflection to ensure symmetry between stimuli. Figure 7.1 shows an rIy 
example of the experimental stimuli. 
1234 
Figure 7.1. Examples of the experimental stimuli. Picture 1 and 2 show an incongruent 
eye gaze and head direction. Picture 3 and 4 show congruent eye gaze and head 
direction. 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design, with one between subjects factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and within subject factors of Response dimension (head or eye) and 
Congruity (congruent/incongruent). An experimental session consisted of 2 blocks of 160 
trials with a short rest break after 80 trials. The direction of the image was equally divided 
between looking to the right and left and randomly distributed within each block. In one 
block of trials participants responded to the orientation of the head and were asked to 
ignore the gaze, and in the second block of trials they responded to the gaze direction and 
were asked to ignore the orientation of the head. The order in which these blocks were 
presented was alternated between successive participants. The image remained on the 
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screen until the participant responded and was then followed by a 500msec inter-trial 
interval. 
Procedure 
Testing of individuals took place in an interview room at the participant's institution. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to either the gaze 
or head direction of the visual stimulus, which would appear in the centre of the screen. 
Participants executed their responses by depressing one of two buttons on a button box, the 
right button signalling a right decision and the left button signalling a left decision. 
Depression of either key terminated the presentation of the visual stimulus and stopped the 
timer. Following the response, the screen remained blank for 500msec before the start of 
the next trial. Participants received 16 practice trials, comprising four repetitions of each 
of the four experiment stimuli before the start of the experiment. Reaction times (RTs) and 
the number of errors were recorded. 
7.3 RESULTS 
All reaction times greater than 2000ms and less than 100ms were removed. Figure 7.2 
shows the mean correct reaction time for both groups of subjects on congruent and 
incongruent trials when participants were told to respond to the direction of the eyes and 
ignore the head direction. This shows that participants from both groups were faster to 
respond on congruent compared to incongruent trials. 
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Figure 7.2. Mean (SEM) reaction times for both groups on congruent and incongruent 
trials in response to gaze. 
Figure 7.3 shows the reaction time for both groups of subjects on congruent and 
incongruent trials when participants were told to respond to the direction of the head and 
ignore the eye direction. This figure shows that there were no differences in responses to 
either congruent or incongruent trials. Both groups showed this pattern of results. 
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Figure 7.3. Mean (SEM) reaction times for both groups on congruent and incon(4ruent 
trials in response to head direction. 
There are clear effects of congruity for responses to eye gaze direction but no effect of 
congruity in response to the direction of the head. These observations were confirmed by 
an ANOVA examining Congruency and Response dimension as factors affecting reaction 
time in both groups. This analysis revealed a main effect of Response dimension 
[F(1,30)=54.02, p<0.001 ], indicating faster response times to head direction, a main effect 
of Congruency [F (1,30)= 9.57, p<0.004] indicating faster reaction times on congruent 
trials and a main effect of Group [F (1,30)=5.37, p< 0.03] with the comparison group 
significantly faster to respond. There was a significant interaction between Response 
Dimension and Group [F(l, 30)=4.83, p<0.04] suggesting that the group with autism were 
additionally slower to respond to the eye gaze direction than to the direction of the head. 
Simple effects analyses confirmed this observation. There was a more significant effect of 
Response dimension for the group with autism [(F 1,30)=45.57, p<0.0 I] than the 
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comparison group [(F1,30)=13.29, p<0.05]. The main effect of Congruity was further 
qualified by a significant interaction with Response Dimension. Simple effects analyses 
revealed a significant effect of Congruity in response to eye gaze direction [(F1,30)= 
16.09, p<0.01] but not in response to the direction of the head [F(1,30) < 1, ns] and a larger 
effect of Response Dimension for incongruent trials [F(1,30)=31.64, p<0.01] than 
congruent trials [(F1,30)= 22.75, p<O. 01]. All other interaction terms were not significant 
(Congruity x Group [F(1,30) < 1, ns] and Response dimension x Congruity x Group 
[F(1,30)= 1.32, p>0.05]). 
Error data 
For both groups, rates of errors were low in the respond to head direction condition, with 
more errors made in the respond to eye gaze direction. Table 7.2 shows the mean 
percentage of errors from both groups in both conditions. The mean percentage of error 
scores were analysed using ANOVA with a between subject factor of Group and within 
subject factors of Response dimension and Congruity. This revealed a main effect of 
Group [F(1,30)= 6.66, p<O. 01 ] and Congruity [F(1,30)=22.51, p<O. 001 ] which was further 
qualified by a significant interaction between Congruity and Group [F(1,30)=7.57, p<O. 0 1] 
and Response dimension and Congruity [F(1,30)=5.11, p<0.03]. Simple effects analyses 
revealed that the Congruity X Group interaction was attributed to a significant effect of 
Congruity for the group with autism [F(1,30)=32.99, p<0.01], but not the comparison 
group [F(1,30)=1.41, p>0.05]. The Response dimension x Congruity interaction was 
attributed to a significant effect of Congruity for the respond to gaze direction condition 
[F(1,30)=24.09, p<0.01] and not the respond to head direction condition [F(1,30)=3.26, 
p>0.05]. All other main effects and interaction terms were not significant (Response 
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dimension [F(1,30)= 2.73, P=0.11], Response dimension x Group {F(1,30)= 0.92, p=0.35], 
Response dimension x Congruity x Group [F(1,30)= 3.42, p=0.07]). 
Table 7.2. Mean RT (ms) and percentage of errors for each group in each condition. 
Response to gaze 
Reaction time (ms) % of errors 
Normal Autism Normal 
Congruent 500.53 658.56 0.82 
Incongruent 522.47 706.50 1.40 
Response to head 
Reaction time (ms) 
Congruent 373.41 431.09 0.59 
Incongruent 378.69 432.13 0.98 
Autism 
1.56 
4.38 
of errors 
1.29 
2.15 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
The results of this experiment demonstrated that participants' responses to the orientation 
of another individual's head were not influenced by the direction in which this individual 
was gazing. Reaction times from both groups to the direction in which the head was 
oriented were comparable when the eyes were gazing in the opposite direction to the head 
with the condition in which the eyes and head were oriented in the same direction. In 
contrast, a congruity effect was noted when participants were asked to respond to the eye 
gaze direction and ignore the direction of the head. In other words responses to head 
orientation were not influenced by the to-be-ignored eye-gaze direction, however responses 
to gaze orientation were influenced by the irrelevant orientation of the head. This would 
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suggest that for both groups the head orientation held the greater role in the direction of 
attention detection. 
These results are in accordance with those reported by Maruyama and Endo (1983 ) 
who showed that subjects' perception of the direction of gaze in schematic faces was 
intermediate between the eyes' line of gaze and the orientation of the face. Their data also 
suggested that the processing of gaze direction was influenced by head orientation, but 
processing of head orientation was not influenced by the perception of gaze direction. 
These results are however, contrary to those predicted by either Baron-Cohen's (1994) 
EDD or Perrett et al. 's (1992) DAD models. These models emphasise the importance of 
the eyes in the analysis of social perception, therefore one would expect to see a greater 
congruity effect in response to head orientation while ignoring the eye gaze direction based 
on predictions derived from these models. The results reported in this study show the 
opposite effect. They are also not concordant with results reported by Langton (in press), 
who found congruity effects that were symmetrical in nature; responses to head orientation 
were influenced by the to-be-ignored gaze dimension to the same extent as classification of 
eye-gaze direction was influenced by the irrelevant orientation of the head, thus suggesting 
the mutual influence of head and gaze direction in social attention detection. 
While the debate over the relative importance of one cue over the other remains, 
the discrepancy between the results reported in this study and those reported by Langton 
(submitted) may be reconciled. Although the interference paradigm adopted in this study 
was adapted from that reported in the Langton study, there was one important difference. 
In the Langton study the photographic images of a head included both orientations in the 
horizontal and the vertical planes, thus both the congruent and incongruent `looking' 
downward photographs contained images where the eyes were occluded. This, according 
to Perrett et al. 's (1992) DAD model would suggest that head orientation would over-ride 
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eye gaze direction, therefore this influence may have confounded the reaction time data. In 
the study reported in this chapter, only responses in the horizontal plane were examined. 
While this may have eliminated one possible confound, it may have introduced another. By 
only using images with attention directed in the horizontal plane, subjects could be using 
the nose as a directional cue in the respond to head block of trials thereby excluding any 
need to process the eye direction at all. This then could account for the asymmetrical 
congruency effects found in response to gaze and head direction. It may also point to 
common sense predictions that eye-gaze and head orientation may have different 
influences on social attention direction detection based on differing task demands. For 
instance, if you are engrossed in conversation on a mutual topic of interest, or 
alternatively, if you suspect that the other person was trying to deceive, you might pay 
particular attention to another's eyes. On the other hand, when socialising in a group or 
with others from a distance, the realisation that someone has lost interest may be better 
determined from a change in head orientation. 
While this study failed to resolve the issue of the relative importance of eye-gaze 
and head direction in the analysis of social attention direction, there were important 
differences highlighted between the groups. As predicted the group with autism displayed 
significant difficulty in responding to the eye gaze direction while ignoring the head 
orientation. This was based on the significant interaction between Response dimension and 
Group. While both groups were faster to respond to the direction of the head, this 
interaction suggests that the group with autism were having additional difficulty in 
responding to the eye gaze direction. Analyses of the error data are also suggestive of 
difficulties in processing eye gaze among the individuals with autism. The pattern of 
results suggest that incongruent trials elicited the most errors and these were more likely in 
the respond to gaze direction, however the effect of congruity was most evident in the 
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individuals with autism. These results therefore support the suggestion from the previous 
chapter that the individuals with autism have difficulty in using information derived from 
the eyes. 
7.5 RATIONALE FOR FINAL EXPERIMENTAL CHAPTER 
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that an attention-shifting impairment could account for the 
behavioural manifestations found in autism (Courchesne et al., 1994). However, previous 
studies supporting an attention-shifting impairment hypothesis of autism were beset with 
methodological difficulties. The experiments in Chapter 3 and 4 were designed to address 
these problems. The results from the experiments reported in Chapter 3 would suggest that 
individuals with autism do not have difficulties in shifting attention covertly in either the 
voluntary or reflexive modes. Moreover, the pattern of results from the visual search tasks 
reported in Chapter 4 are not indicative of an attention shifting impairment in autism. It 
was suggested therefore that the lack of joint attention behaviours seen in younger 
individuals with autism could stem from difficulties in interpreting social signals as cues to 
objects or situations of interest, rather than to difficulties in the voluntary control of their 
attentional system. While this thesis does not directly address this issue, the results 
reported in this chapter and Chapter 6 using older individuals with autism indicated that, of 
the two social signals that were investigated, using information from the eyes was 
particularly difficult. There was something about the nature of the cue rather than an 
attention-shifting impairment that was contributing to the individuals with autism's 
performance. That this was not due to an attention-shifting impairment was further 
supported by the results that showed a comparable performance when reflexively shifting 
to an eye gaze cue and also their ability to shift attention voluntarily to the cued head 
direction of another. Thus it seems that in this sample of older individuals with autism, 
using eye gaze information was problematic. 
194 
While it is important to respond to the shift of another's eye gaze direction during 
social interactions, it is equally important to be sensitive to frontal eye gaze. Chapter 8 
investigates the ability of individuals with autism at perceiving frontal eye gaze using a 
forced choice detection task (Perrett et al., 1986). 
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CHAPTER 8 
Gaze Perception 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The evidence reviewed in chapter 5 suggests that it would be of significant adaptive 
advantage for animals and humans to be sensitive to changes in another's attention. 
However, it is equally important to be attentive to frontal eye gaze. For social animals, 
sensitivity to direct gaze may be used as a defence against predators, to display threat or 
dominance or to express attraction in the presence of a potential mate. While humans use 
and interpret direct gaze to affirm desire and intimacy and as a cue for turn taking in 
conversation, prolonged gaze from a stranger elicits the same feeling of threat or 
dominance as it does among animals (Kendon, 1967). 
Social and developmental psychologists have examined the functional significance 
of gaze in the control of social interactions (Kleinke, 1986), the development of gaze 
following (Hood et al., 1998) and its relationship to joint attention behaviours and mental 
state attribution (Baron-Cohen, 1995). In contrast, perceptual psychologists have looked at 
thresholds for gaze detection to try and determine the accuracy with which we can decide 
whether we are being looked at (Anstis et al., 1969; Cline, 1967; Wade & Jones, 1982). 
Anstis et al. (1969) have shown that the human perceptual system is highly sensitive to 
deviations from frontal view when photographs of faces are viewed. They estimate that at 
a viewing distance of 122cm, a horizontal displacement of the iris of just 0.18mm is 
noticeable to subjects. This suggests that good visual acuity makes a significant 
contribution in the ability to make fine discriminations between the contrast of the 
coloured iris and the white sclera in the perception of direct gaze. 
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In the previous two chapters, it has been suggested that individuals with autism 
have difficulty using information derived from the eyes. While the evidence from Chapter 
6 suggested that the individuals with autism showed a similar reflexive or relatively 
automatic orienting response to eye gaze direction as normal adults, they were impaired in 
using this information at will. Moreover, they were significantly slower in responding to an 
eye gaze direction cue and made more errors when these cues were in conflict with the 
orientation of the head as reported in Chapter 7. As mentioned earlier, while it is important 
to note and respond to changes in another's attention direction, it is also important to be 
able to detect direct gaze. This chapter reports a study to determine accuracy at perceiving 
frontal eye gaze by using a forced choice detection task on paired photographs of a single 
human face (Perrett et al., 1986). 
While an impaired ability at detecting mutual gaze may be adding to individuals 
with autisms' difficulties in social interaction and communication, it is important to 
determine that something like poor visual acuity or an inability to make fine 
discriminations does not contribute to this difficulty. To exclude the possibility of 
impairments in making fine discriminations contributing to possible impaired 
performance, or circular accusations such as less experience in social interactions resulting 
in an impaired ability to detect eye gaze direction, a control task was employed in 
Experiment 1. This test involves subjects viewing a series of photographs in which a 
person is looking at one of three possible rods. Subjects are asked to indicate which rod the 
person in the photograph is looking at. The task gets increasingly more difficult as the 
spacing between the rods diminishes. 
One study has previously used a variation of this control task. Leekam et al. (1997) 
tested children with autism's ability to discriminate degrees of change in the orientation of 
gaze and conclude that the children with autism were well within their developmental age 
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level on this task. Twenty relatively low-functioning children with autism (mean age 13.5 
years) and two groups of mental age matched control subjects were tested on half of the 
original test devised by Perrett and Milders (1992). Only the coarser separations of twenty 
and ten degrees were used in the Leekam et al. study as pilot work had revealed that 
participants were at chance level on the two finer discriminations of five and two degrees. 
The results showed no significant differences between the three groups and there was even 
a trend towards the children with autism showing a slight superiority in relation to the 
other two groups in their ability to compute what a person was looking at. 
Experiment 2 involved two tasks, one with upright faces and the other one with 
inverted faces. Subjects were required to choose which one of a pair of photographs 
presented simultaneously was looking directly at them. The reason for examining inverted 
faces was to test for differences between groups in the extent to which full face 
configuration, comprising features in their correct relative positions, is necessary for 
adequate performance on the task. Previous research with normal subjects has revealed 
that with deviations of 20,10 and 5 degrees, only discriminations at 5 degrees are less 
accurately perceived when stimuli are inverted. Thus, for normal subjects, inverting the 
face impairs accuracy of gaze detection only when small angular deviations from the 
centre need to be discriminated (Campbell et al., 1990). 
Based on the results from the previous two chapters and from other studies 
suggesting deviant patterns of eye gaze use, it could be predicted that individuals with 
autism would be impaired on the upright version of this task. However, evidence from 
other studies might indicate alternative predictions. For instance, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the eye direction detector (EDD) component of Baron-Cohen's (1995) ToMM 
is intact in individuals with autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Leekam et al., 1997). Baron- 
Cohen and colleagues devised a direction of gaze experiment using schematic faces. In this 
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experiment children with autism and two comparison groups of children matched for 
mental age were shown pictures of a cartoon face with eyes directed at one of four possible 
sweet bars. When normal or mentally retarded children were shown the picture and asked 
which sweet `Charlie' prefers, they typically point to the sweet that the cartoon's (gaze is 
directed towards. In contrast, the children with autism were significantly less likely to 
point to this particular sweet. They rule out the possibility that this deficit was due to an 
inability to perceive the direction of gaze based on the results of another task where the 
children with autism were able to select which of a pair of cartoon faces was looking at 
them. In other words, they were able to perceive the direction of gaze, but were unable to 
use such information to infer the mental state of another person. On this account, no 
differences between groups would be predicted on a task involving discriminations of eye 
gaze direction. 
Moreover, other studies have suggested that individuals with autism may have an 
enhanced ability in making fine discriminations (Plaisted, O'Riordan & Baron-Cohen, 
1998a; 1998b). Plaisted et al. (1998a) suggests that the superior performance shown among 
the high-functioning children with autism during a visual search task is consistent with the 
idea that unique item detection is enhanced in autism. They provide further evidence of 
enhanced discrimination of novel, highly similar stimuli in adults with autism during a 
perceptual learning task (Plaisted et al., 1998b). This raises the possibility that individuals 
with autism would show a superior performance to control subjects on this task, especially 
at the finer discriminations. Based on these conflicting studies, no a priori predictions were 
made about differences between the performance of individuals with autism and the 
comparison group. 
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8.2 METHOD - Study 5 
Experiment 1: Control Task 
Participants 
The same 16 participants from each group who took part in the previous 
congruent/incongruent gaze experiment were available for re-testing approximately one 
week later. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli were taken from a test devised by Perrett & Milders (1992), which comprised 
a set of photographs of a head looking at one of three coloured rods (red, yellow or blue). 
The participant is asked to identify which rod the person in the photo is looking at. The 
spacing between the three rods diminishes progressively as one works through the 
sequence from 20 degrees to 10 degrees to 5 degrees. The original set of photographs was 
prepared using a 35mm camera with 90mm lens. The rods were 4.5cm high. The yellow 
rod was always 20 degrees to the right of the stimulus head while the red and blue rods 
were always positioned at an angle respectively smaller and larger than 20 degrees. 
Degrees were measured from the stimulus head. The head was 53cm away from the rods 
and 280cm from the camera. In addition, both head orientation and eye direction were 
varied systematically at either 40 degrees, 30 degrees or 20 degrees and either matched or 
mismatched. This ensured that participants could not rely solely on either head orientation 
or the position of the iris within the sclera as the sole cue to identifying the task solution. 
The colour of the peg being looked at was also randomised so that three head orientations 
each with three possible eye orientations were tested. This yielded a total of 27 
photographs measuring 9.5cm in height and 14cm in width. These images were scanned 
200 
and displayed using a PowerPoint presentation on a Texas Instruments Travelmate 6040 
computer. Samples of the photographic stimuli are shown in Figure 8.1. 
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Design 
The experiment had a mixed design, with one between subject factor of group 
(Normal/Autism) and a within subject factor of Angular deviation (20,10 or 5 degrees). 
Procedure 
All participants completed this task prior to Experiment 2. Participants were told the 
following "a series of pictures of a man looking at one of three pegs will appear on the 
screen. You must (point to or) tell me the colour of the peg that you think he is looking at, 
red, blue or yellow". Participants were not given feedback nor allowed to review any of the 
images. Each participant was first asked a colour control question: "Can you show me the 
red/yellow/blue rod? None of the participants had any difficulty with this question. 
8.3 RESULTS 
The performance of the two groups is shown in Table. 8.1. 
Table 8.1. Mean percent correct (out of 27) by each group. 
Mean % score 
Normal M 73.15 
SD 6.56 
Autism M 66.90 
SD 9.32 
An Independent sample t-test revealed a significant difference between the two groups [t 
(30)=-2.19, p<0.04]. 
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Figure 8.2 shows the relationship between accuracy and angular deviation of the 
pegs for both the group with autism and the comparison group. An ANOVA examined 
angular deviation as a factor affecting accuracy in both groups. 
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Figure 8.2. Mean % correct scores from each group as a function of the angular deviation 
between pegs. 
This revealed a main effect of Angular deviation [F (2,60)=105.81, p<0.001] and a main 
effect of Group [F (1,30)=4.35, p<0.05]. There was no interaction between Group and 
Angular deviation [F (2,60)=0.72, p>0.05]. Although there was no interaction between 
Group and Angular deviation, for completeness, planned comparisons were conducted at 
each angular deviation. Independent sample t-tests at each degree revealed a significant 
difference at 20 degrees [t (30)=-2.42, p<0.021 but not at 10 degrees [t (30)=-1.59, p=0.12] 
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or 5 degrees [t (30)=-0.26, p=0.80]. Table 8.2 shows the mean (SD) percentage correct at 
each angular deviation for both groups. 
Table 8.2. Mean (SD) percentage correct at each angular deviation for both groups. 
Mean % at 20 
Normal M 97.22 
SD 4.97 
Autism M 88.89 
SD 12.83 
Mean % at 10 Mean % at 5 
73.61 47.22 
13.98 14.91 
65.97 45.83 
13.13 15.65 
8.4 DISCUSSION 
Experiment 1 was designed as a control task to avoid any criticism such as poor visual 
acuity, an inability to make fine discriminations or lack of social experience in making eye 
direction judgements contributing to any possible impairment in detecting direct gaze 
during Experiment 2. However, the results show that the individuals with autism were 
impaired on this task compared to control subjects. Planned comparisons showed that this 
difference was apparent at the easiest discrimination when the pegs were separated by 20 
degrees. This result seems somewhat paradoxical, as although it was predicted that the 
group with autism would show no difficulties on this task, any possible impairments would 
be more likely at the hardest discrimination when the object is separated by another, by an 
angle of 5 degrees. 
These results are also in marked contrast to those obtained by Leekam et al. (1997) 
Children with autism and two verbal mental age matched control groups performed a 
similar task where only two different degrees of separation were examined. The task 
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involved discriminations between coloured rods when they were separated by 20 and 10 
degrees. While these authors report a comparable performance among the children with 
autism and the comparison groups in discriminating which rod the person was looking at, 
they note that many of the children with autism used a very concrete strategy of physically 
tracing their index finger from the stimulus head's eyes to the rod, a strategy not observed 
in the other two groups. While this strategy was not seen among the subjects with autism in 
this present study, it is possible that the degree of ambiguity between head orientation and 
eye gaze direction is greatest when the rods are spaced furthest apart, perhaps resulting in a 
reliance on head orientation among the group with autism to disambiguate where the eyes 
were directed. 
8.5 METHOD 
Experiment 2: Upright and inverted choice task 
Participants 
All participants from Experiment 1 completed Experiment 2 in one session. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The stimuli were identical to those used in an earlier study with prosopagnosic subjects 
(Campbell et al., 1990). The set of colour photographs were digitised and displayed using a 
PowerPoint presentation on a Texas Instruments Travelmate 6030 computer. The face was 
photographed in one of three different head orientations, 20 to the left or right or face on. 
For each position of the head the eyes could be in eight possible positions 2,5,10 or 20 
degrees to the left or right. This resulted in a set of 24 stimuli. In addition, three identical 
sets of discriminanda were prepared where the head was in one of the three possible 
positions but the eyes looked directly at the observer. Each photograph was paired with the 
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appropriate direct gaze photograph and presented to subjects to `choose the face that is 
looking straight at you,. The scanned photograph measured 7cm in height and 10.5cm in 
width. Participants responded verbally left or right and their response was recorded on a 
score sheet by the experimenter. All participants performed the task twice; once with 
correctly oriented faces, the other time with inverted face pairs. The order in which 
participants were presented with each task was alternated between successive participants. 
Figure 8.3 shows an example of the experimental stimuli. 
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Figure 83 Sample pair of photographs used in the experiment. Subjects were required to choose the face on 
the right (eye -contact). 
Design 
The experiment had a mixed design, with one between subject factor of Group 
(Normal/Autism) and within subject factors of Orientation (upright/inverted) and Angular 
Deviation (20,10,5 and 2 degrees). 
Procedure 
Individuals were tested in an interview room at the participant's institution. The visual 
stimuli were presented on a computer monitor using a PowerPoint presentation, at a 
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viewing distance of 57cm and at a rate determined by the participants' response. 
Participants were told the following: "One of each pair of the pictures that you will see on 
the screen will be of a face looking directly at you. You must (point to or) tell me which 
face is looking directly at you, left or right". Participants were not given feedback and 
were not allowed to review the pictures. 
8.6 RESULTS 
Figure 8.4 shows the relationship between accuracy of forced choice detection of frontal 
eye gaze and angular deviation of the picture for both normal and individuals with autism 
viewing upright and inverted faces. 
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Figure 8.4. Mean % correct scores from both groups in both the upright and inverted 
choice task. 
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An ANOVA examined angular deviation and orientation as factors affecting accuracy in 
both groups of participants. An overall effect of Angular deviation was confirmed [F 
(3,90)=82.01, p<0.001], along with a main effect of Orientation [F (1,30)=40.48, p<0.001]. 
There was also an interaction between these factors [F (3,90)=7.60, p<O. 001]. Simple 
effect tests showed that while deviation of 20 and 10 degrees were discriminated from 
frontal view at ceiling levels of accuracy ([F (1,30)<1], [F (1,30)=2.91, p>0.05]), 
deviations of 5 and 2 degrees from ahead were significantly less accurately reported 
[F(1,30)=40.47, P<0.01], [F(1,30)=15.05, P<0.01]. Similarly, there was a more significant 
effect of angular deviation in the inverted faces [F (3,90)=61.56, p<O. 01 ] than the upright 
faces [F (3,90)=26.22, p<0.01]. There was no interaction between Orientation and Group 
[F (1,30)=1.18, p>0.05] or Angular deviation and Group [F (3,90) <1, ns] or main effect of 
Group [F (1,30)<1]. However there was a three way interaction between Orientation, 
Angular Deviation and Group [F(3,90)=6.26, p<O. 001]. Simple effect tests revealed that 
the Orientation by Angular Deviation interaction was more significant for the normal 
control group [F (3,90)=8.25, p<O. 01] than the group with autism [F (3,90)=5.62, p<O. 01]. 
These tests also revealed that the effect of Orientation was not significant for angular 
deviations of 20 degrees [F (1,30)<1, ns], 10 degrees [F (1,30)=3.90, p>0.05 or 2 degrees 
[F (1,30)<1, ns] but was significant for 5 degrees [F (1,30)=23.31, p<0.01] for the 
individuals with autism. In contrast the normal control group showed a significant effect of 
Orientation at both 5 degrees [F (1,30)=17.38, p<0.01] and 2 degrees [F (1,30)=30.10, 
p<0.01] but not at 20 [F (1,30) <1, ns] or 10 degrees [F (1,30)<1, ns]. This suggests that the 
individuals with autism did not show a significant drop off in performance when the 
stimuli were inverted in the most difficult discrimination at an angular deviation of 2 
degrees. Indeed, three individuals from the group with autism obtained 100% correct at 
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this discrimination, with 11 out of 16 of the participants performing at above chance 
levels. In contrast only 4 out of sixteen of the comparison group performed above the level 
of chance. 
8.7 DISCUSSION Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 2 using upright stimuli indicate that the group with autism have 
no difficulty in judging when a person is looking at them. Both groups were sensitive to 
the degree of angular deviation from the frontal gaze position, showing a decrement in 
performance as the angular deviation of the eyes decreased. These results are in contrast to 
those of Howard et al. (2000) who used a reduced set of stimuli at deviations of 5,10 and 
20 degrees to investigate the perception of eye gaze direction in a group of high- 
functioning individuals with autism with enlarged amygdala volumes. These authors 
suggest that developmental malformation of the amygdala may underlie the social- 
cognitive impairments characteristic of high-functioning autism. The results suggested that 
the high-functioning individuals with autism were impaired in the perception of eye-gaze 
direction. There is contradictory evidence relating amygdala damage with difficulties in 
eye-gaze direction detection (Broks et al., 1998), however the contrasting results could be 
due to age of onset of amygdala damage. It is difficult to make direct comparisons between 
the results of the experiments reported in this chapter and those of Howard et al. (2000) to 
account for this discrepancy as exact figures were not reported for each angular deviation, 
nor whether the comparison group were performing at ceiling. 
The results of the normal viewers in the inverted condition are concordant with 
those of Campbell et al. (1990) who showed that this task could be performed with upside- 
down faces, though with some loss of sensitivity for the smaller angular deviations of 5 
and 2 degrees. The results of the group with autism in detecting direct gaze from inverted 
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stimuli also showed a decrease in performance with discriminations of 5 degrees, however 
there was no decrement in performance at the most difficult 2 degree discrimination. This 
indicates that while the group with autism are showing a comparable performance to the 
control group in angular deviations up to 5 degrees, the most difficult discrimination poses 
less of a problem for the individuals with autism. These results may suggest that the group 
with autism are achieving small discriminations in detecting eye gaze by different 
processes than the normal control group. This may also be related to the findings in 
Chapter 5 where inversion of the stimuli did not disrupt the cueing effects and to other 
research indicating a diminished disadvantage in processing inverted faces among 
individuals with autism (Langdell, 1978; Hobson et al., 1988). 
It has been suggested that face perception is mediated by mechanisms that are 
different to those involved in the perception of objects (Farah, 1996). This dissociation is 
supported by evidence of the effects of face inversion in normal subjects (Valentine, 1988; 
Farah et al., 1998) and in patients with selective impairments of face and object 
recognition (Farah et al., 1995; Moscovitch, Winocur & Behrmann, 1997). In normal 
subjects, stimulus inversion is more detrimental to face recognition than to the recognition 
of other objects, suggesting that face recognition may be a specialised process that is more 
sensitive to stimulus orientation (Valentine, 1988). Moreover, in patients with 
prosopagnosia, the recognition of inverted faces can be relatively normal, indicating that 
upright faces may cause processing errors because of damaged face perception 
mechanisms which may interfere with processing by intact object perception processes. 
On the other hand, inverted faces do not evoke processing by the damaged face 
processing mechanisms, thereby allowing intact object perception processes to operate 
without interference (Farah et al., 1995). Moscovitch and colleagues report evidence from 
a patient with object agnosia, whose face perception was normal, however recognition of 
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inverted faces was severely impaired. This suggests that intact face perception mechanisms 
by themselves cannot process inverted faces effectively. Indeed, Haxby et al. (1999) have 
shown in a study investigating face inversion using fMRI, that activation of face sensitive 
areas by inverted faces may reflect direct engagement of these areas, but that activation is 
insufficient to form a distinct representation of the individual shown. Consequently, the 
brain has to recruit additional processing resources elsewhere, namely in object selective 
regions to augment the distinctiveness of the representation of an inverted face. These 
resources may be related to features of object shape that are not as typical of faces. 
Alternatively, the recruitment of these additional resources may reflect a different 
processing strategy, such as a change from a more holistic representation of a face to a 
representation based on a decomposition of the face into its individual parts (Farah et al., 
1998). 
It is therefore possible that individuals with autism do not have specialised brain 
areas devoted to the perception of faces, thereby causing no interference to object 
dedicated areas when the processing of inverted stimuli is required. Alternatively, as 
suggested by central coherence theory (Happe, 1994b), individuals with autism may prefer 
to adopt a local or relatively piecemeal processing style in deference to more holistic 
processing. They are therefore less likely to be disrupted by the inversion of faces as, 
although the processing of faces involves both featural (part) and configural (whole) 
processing (Tanaka & Farah, 1993), it appears that configural processing is interrupted by 
the inversion of faces. 
8.8 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In summary, the results of the experiments reported in this chapter would indicate that the 
detection of frontal gaze appears to be intact in individuals with autism, suggesting that an 
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impairment in the detection of mutual gaze is not contributing to their difficulties in social 
interaction. There was however, some indication of peculiarities in face processing among 
the group with autism, in that they displayed no decrement in performance at the most 
difficult discrimination when the stimuli were inverted. It was suggested that this might 
indicate that individuals with autism are processing faces and detecting mutual gaze by 
different mechanisms than typically developing individuals. Therefore, it is also possible 
that differences in detecting mutual gaze may not become apparent in an unnatural 
experimental task such as this one, where the face stimuli are presented for as long as 
necessary. In the real world, faces and eye direction change at a fast face and must be 
integrated with other information and it is under these circumstances that differences may 
become apparent. A possible limitation of this study was the neglect of recording reaction 
time data. Alternatively, future research could investigate the detection of mutual gaze in 
more naturalistic settings with dynamic stimuli. 
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CHAPTER 9 
General Discussion 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this final chapter is to relate the implications of the results reported in the 
experimental chapters to theoretical issues raised in the introductory chapters. The Chapter 
begins with a brief summary of the main findings. Section 9.3 explores some possible 
limitations of the studies reported in this thesis. Following on from this, attention 
dysfunction and its relation to cerebellar pathology in autism are discussed in Section 9.4, 
in light of the results of experimental Chapters 3 and 4. The next section (9.5) highlights 
the role of inhibitory mechanisms and their possible involvement in the executive 
dysfunction theory of autism based on the results of Experiment 1 in Chapter 3. The 
experimental chapters on social perception and attention have both implications for 
`Theory of mind' and `Central coherence theory' and are discussed in Section 9.6. This 
discussion leads to consideration of the implications for modular mechanisms involved in 
social analysis in autism. Further avenues for future research concludes the thesis. 
9.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The first two experimental chapters investigated the performance of individuals with 
autism on two low-level tasks of attention. Chapter 3 considered the ability of individuals 
with autism to shift their attention both reflexively and voluntarily and found no pervasive 
deficits. While the results of the first experiment in Chapter 3 revealed that the individuals 
with autism were having some difficulty in reflexively shifting their attention in space at 
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short cue to target delays, this pattern of results was not replicated in Experiment 2. 
Voluntary attention shifting ability was explored in Experiment 3. Analyses designed to 
explore efficiency of attention deployment did not reveal a selective deficit in the 
individuals with autism compared with the matched control group. The task design also 
allowed the mechanism `inhibition of return' to be explored. This mechanism, which is 
thought to be involved in the efficiency of visual search by producing a novelty bias, also 
appeared to be intact. Chapter 4 employed a standard visual search task. The results 
showed that while the group with autism were overall slower in responding, the pattern of 
results did not reveal any impairment in shifting attention. The remaining three 
experimental chapters investigated the response of individuals with autism to social 
stimuli. Chapter 6 investigated attention-shifting contingent upon social cues. No evidence 
of reflexive orienting in response to head orientation was found in either the individuals 
with autism or the control group. However, when instructed, both groups were able to use 
this type of social cue to direct their attention effectively. While both groups showed 
evidence of reflexive orienting to a change of eye gaze direction in another, the individuals 
with autism were less able to use this information voluntarily. This reflexive orienting was 
abolished by inversion of the stimuli in the comparison group, however this manipulation 
did not affect the results of the group with autism to the same degree. The experiments 
reported in Chapter 7 were designed to investigate the relative importance of eye gaze over 
head orientation in the analysis of social attention. While this issue remains unresolved, 
there were important differences highlighted between the two groups, with the group with 
autism again showing some difficulty in using eye gaze information. While this 
impairment may be contributing to their difficulties during social interaction, the 
experiments in Chapter 8 explored their ability to detect frontal eye gaze, which is also 
important during social interchanges. No significant differences were found between the 
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two groups in their ability to detect frontal gaze from upright stimuli. However the 
individuals with autism showed an enhanced ability at the most difficult discrimination 
when the face stimuli were inverted. 
9.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDIES REPORTED IN THE THESIS 
The experimental studies reported in this thesis sought to clarify some of the 
methodological issues highlighted in other research into attention shifting in autism and 
contribute to the understanding of the problems with the analysis of social attention in 
individuals with autism. Although these aims have been met with some success, certain 
limitations of the studies must be recognised. 
The first involves the choice of subjects. Only adolescents and young adults of 
relatively high ability participated in the experimental studies reported in this thesis. These 
results therefore, can say little about how learning-disabled individuals with autism would 
perform. Some attempt was made to recruit less able individuals, however it proved 
difficult to find subjects able to adhere to the experimental instructions across the large 
number of trials required to obtain an accurate reaction time. Furthermore, the age of 
subjects means that little can be said about how younger individuals might perform or 
about the developmental progression of abilities. This is a potentially interesting future 
line of enquiry. 
A second possible limitation was in the design of the experiments reported in 
Chapter 3. More specifically, that the exogenous and endogenous shifting tasks in Chapter 
3 were carried out in order rather than counterbalanced. This was mainly as a consequence 
of the results of one paradigm affecting the design of subsequent tasks. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that the order of experiments need not be counterbalanced as the 
inhibition effect and exogenous orienting occur quite automatically and without the need 
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for any deliberate strategy on the part of the subject (Posner & Cohen, 1984). On the other 
hand, the general finding that the group with autism are not impaired in their ability to 
orient attention either automatically or at will may be thrown into question due to possible 
carry-over effects. With hindsight, it would have been desirable to have counterbalanced 
the order of the three experiments reported in Chapter 3. 
A third possible limitation surrounds the design of the studies reported in Chapter 
6. Throughout the experimental studies there appeared to be a trend towards a general 
slowing of overall reaction time among the individuals with autism. However, with 
subsequent follow up experiments an amelioration in overall reaction time sometimes 
resulted in this group. Possible reasons for this phenomenon were explored, such as a 
general arousal and/or processing impairment (Ornitz & Ritvo, 1968). Alternatively, 
motivational and/or social factors such as a more general feeling at ease with the 
experimenter and the experimental procedure may have contributed to this effect. 
In implementing the task design of the social cueing studies in Chapter 6, the 
question of whether to counterbalance the order of each set of experiments was considered 
in view of this amelioration in reaction time with subsequent similar tasks. It was decided 
that while it was necessary to counterbalance the order between participants within a set of 
experiments, participants should all complete the `ignore' set with 50% probability first, 
followed by the `attend to' cue set. While this again resulted in an amelioration of overall 
reaction time among the individuals with autism the main result of interest was the 
differences between invalid and valid reaction times and not to overall reaction time 
differences. This choice of order was further justified in light of the results of the two post 
hoc experiments designed to explore the possible confounding influence of the cue 
duration and SOA coinciding at 150ms, as the results showed that once you had been told 
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to attend to the cue this tendency was difficult to overcome with subsequent experiments 
where one was required to ignore the cue again. 
A further possible limitation of the experimental studies reported in this thesis was 
the decision not to include a neutral cue in the social cueing studies reported in Chapter 6. 
As previously expressed in Chapter 3, efficiency of attentional deployment has often been 
examined by comparing the magnitude of the invalid-valid reaction time difference 
between each group, termed the validity effect. Alternatively, the cost-benefit analysis, 
originally developed by Posner and Snyder (1975) was designed to provide a more 
informative decomposition of reaction time with the consideration of a neutral cue. Both 
informative and neutral cues serve general warning functions. However, only the locational 
cue contains information that is relevant to the direction of attentional movements. Thus 
one should be able to attribute any difference in performance between neutral and 
informative cues to specific attentional processes. 
However, it is clear that this rationale depends on the assumption that neutral and 
informative cues must be identical with respect to all their effects except that of 
information specific to the target (Jonides & Mack, 1984). For this reason, neutral cues 
should be physically similar, be interspersed randomly with informative cues, and occur 
with the same frequency. Moreover, these authors argue that an informative cue provides 
subjects with more information than a neutral cue, therefore it may well take more time to 
encode and extract this information, which may in turn influence reaction time to a target 
stimulus. In consideration of these warnings, the careful selection of neutral cues is 
required to avoid improper conclusions about the underling mechanisms that produce costs 
and benefits. 
While the choice of neutral cues was not difficult in the cueing studies reported in 
Chapter 3 (two types of neutral cues were considered), choosing an appropriate neutral cue 
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for the social orienting studies was more problematic. During the design stage of the social 
cueing studies a photograph of a face with direct gaze was tried as a potential neutral cue. 
Traditionally, reaction times to neutral cues lie somewhere in the middle between a valid 
and invalid cue. However, this pilot work revealed that reaction time subsequent to a direct 
gaze was sometimes slower than an invalid gaze cue. There seemed to be something about 
a photograph of someone gazing directly at you that considerably slowed participant's 
reaction time to targets. Moreover, it was not clear whether this would have been an 
equivalent neutral cue for the head orientation studies. For these reasons, the inclusion of 
this neutral cue was abandoned in the final experimental studies. However, with hindsight, 
it is possible that a photograph of a person with their eyes closed could have usefully 
served as a neutral cue. 
It was also mentioned in Chapter 8 that a possible limitation of the gaze perception 
task was the neglect of recording reaction time. No differences between the two groups 
were found in the detection of mutual gaze with upright stimuli. It was postulated that as 
participants were given no time limitations for decision-making, group differences in 
relative efficiency at completing the task might have gone unnoticed. In the real world 
gaze shifts happen rapidly and unpredictably and it is possible that under time constraints, 
the group with autism may have shown impairments. While anecdotally there was no 
indication that the group with autism were taking an excessive amount of time in reaching 
a decision, an interpretation of any possible overall reaction time differences between the 
two groups would be problematic in light of the previous studies showing an overall 
slowing. 
It is difficult to resolve the general finding that the group with autism took longer 
to respond in some of the reaction time tasks or the amelioration in reaction time with 
subsequent similar tasks given that all subjects did not participate in each experiment. 
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Moreover, a consideration of reaction time in both groups of subjects across experimental 
studies is problematic due to differing task demands in each study. While greater practice 
effects, social and/or motivational factors could account for the amelioration of reaction 
time with subsequent similar tasks found in the group with autism, other possibilities 
remain. For example, as considered in Chapter 3, theories that individuals with autism 
suffer from a deficit in their arousal regulation could account for these differences (Hutt et 
al., 1964, Dawson & Lewy, 1989). 
Differing tasks demands to account for possible reaction time differences between 
groups was probed in Chapter 4 with a consideration of the performance on a binary versus 
a single choice paradigm. While these results suggested that an impaired ability to make 
and execute the appropriate response was contributing to the individuals with autism's 
visual search performance, a response selection impairment could only be part of the 
problem as the overall reaction time differences remained. Difficulties with perceptual 
grouping and strategy use were proposed as possible contenders. While it is conceivable 
that problems with perceptual grouping could account for impaired face processing during 
the social cueing studies, it is unclear how an impairment in strategy use would impair 
performance on simple cueing tasks 
A more parsimonious explanation for overall reaction time differences may be to 
suggest that the individuals with autism have a more general processing impairment. This 
explanation also suffers from difficulties. Firstly, the subjects in the studies reported in this 
thesis were carefully matched with the control group on both verbal and non-verbal IQ. 
Moreover, while speed of processing and IQ are often linked (Sternberg, 1985) there was 
no correlation between reaction time and ability in the visual search tasks in either group. 
A further possible limitation was the neglect to undertake a simple reaction time task prior 
220 
to each experimental study to rule out or confirm a possible processing impairment 
explanation to account for any subsequent reaction time differences. 
While these differences in overall reaction time seen between the two groups are 
interesting, the important findings in this thesis are the pattern of results and the 
differences between valid, invalid and neutral conditions. The implications of this pattern 
of results for psychological theories of autism and where future research might proceed 
will be discussed in the final sections of this Chapter. 
9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ATTENTION DYSFUNCTION THEORY OF AUTISM 
It was suggested in Chapter 1 that because attention plays an important role in the 
development of complex cognitive functions, an attentional deficit could produce severe 
developmental abnormality, perhaps resulting in the particular socio-cognitive functioning 
typical of autism. For example, in the individual with autism, attentional dysfunction may 
interfere with the ability to continuously follow the rapid changing events that compose 
reciprocal social interactions. An inability to selectively and rapidly shift attention 
contingent upon social signals may result in knowledge of the social world made up of 
disconnected fragments that lack context or temporal continuity. This would seriously 
hinder the individual with autism's ability to engage in joint social exchanges, which in 
turn could lead to deficiencies in social knowledge and communication. In addition to 
helping explain the principal social communication deficits in autism, an impairment in 
the control of attention may also be at the source of the other commonly observed 
abnormalities in autism, including stimulus overselectivity, uneven memory, insistence on 
sameness, perseveration, repetitive and ritualistic behaviours, narrowed interests and poor 
performance on executive function tasks requiring shifting of mental sets. The failure to 
attentively and completely explore in a timely fashion all elements of a complex stimulus 
array would result in an incomplete memory for events. What would be retained would not 
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necessarily be stimulus elements that had causal relationships with each other or spatial or 
temporal contiguity. Therefore the normal coherence of various elements of social and 
non-social events would be lost, as would the predictive correlations between them. 
Instead, unrelated fragments would be registered, possibly resulting in unusual associations 
and predictions about relationships. This could provoke disjointed and unexpected 
behavioural and emotional reactions by the individual with autism during interactions with 
the non-social and social environment. It is not difficult to understand why individuals 
with autism may prefer repetitive, predictable, invariant events over novelty, exploration 
and social exchanges. 
The first aim of this thesis was to investigate the hypothesis that individuals with 
autism have difficulties in shifting attention (Courchesne et al., 1994). The results of 
Chapter 3 revealed no pervasive deficits among the high-functioning individuals with 
autism in either their voluntary or automatic allocation of attention. While the results of 
Chapter 4 revealed that the individuals with autism were slower to respond in a visual 
search task, the pattern of results was not suggestive of any attention shifting impairment. 
Furthermore, one question that has been raised during the last three or four decades 
of research into autism is the role played by disturbances in the cerebellum in the 
symptomatology of this behavioural syndrome (Minshew, 1992). The current cerebellar 
model of autism hypothesises that a structural abnormality of cerebellar vermal lobules VI 
and VII is expressed functionally as a deficit in the capacity for shifting attention and is a 
primary cause of the behavioural abnormalities that define this syndrome (Courchesne et 
al., 1994). The results reported in this thesis provide no additional support for an attention 
shifting impairment hypothesis of autism. 
However, it would be unwise to dismiss the idea of cerebellar abnormalities being 
involved in the symptoms found in autism because of this finding. To participate fully in 
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the real world requires the ability not only to shift attention through space but also through 
time. Ivry (1993) has proposed that the cerebellum operates as an internal timing system, 
invoked in both motor and non-motor tasks that require precise timing. Moreover, although 
the cerebellum has traditionally been viewed as essential for the control and integration of 
motor activity (Holmes, 1939: Hallett, Shahani & Young, 1975), recent years have seen 
claims that the cerebellum contributes to higher mental function (Leiner, Leiner & Dow, 
1986,1993; Bracke-Tolkmitt et al., 1989; Schmahmann, 1991; Canavan Akshoomoff & 
Courchesne, 1992; Kim, Ugurbil & Strick, 1994; Middleton & Strick, 1994, 
Sprengelmeyer, Deiner & Homberg, 1994; Gao et al., 1996). 
Potentially fruitful lines of investigation could examine the performance of 
individuals with autism on tasks sensitive to cerebellar dysfunction. Indeed, a recent 
unpublished study (Neely, Turner & Findlay 2000) has made initial investigations into this 
area. The perceptual tasks employed in this study were adapted from a study by Ivry and 
Keele (1989) who investigated possible timing impairments in patients with cerebellar 
deficits. The first task measured subjects' ability to discriminate between small differences 
in the duration of two intervals. A control task was also used to test for generalised deficits 
in auditory perception. The subjects again heard two pairs of tones. However, the interval 
between both pairs was always 400ms, whereas the loudness of the second pair of tones 
was manipulated. No significant differences were observed between the group with autism 
and the matched comparison group on the loudness judgements. Although there was no 
significant difference in terms of sensitivity on the duration task, there were however, 
significant differences on a threshold measure, in that; the group with autism's point of 
subjective equality over-estimated the standard 400ms interval. At present it is difficult to 
interpret the behavioural ramifications of this result and there is certainly scope for further 
research into this area. 
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While several independent research groups have identified abnormalities of 
specific areas in the cerebellum (Courchesne, 1995; El-Badri & Lewis, 1993; McKelvey, 
Lambert, Monson & Shevell, 1995), this may not be the primary underlying cause of 
autism. One problem in determining developmental brain damage is that it is difficult to 
ascertain which abnormalities are the primary root cause and which are subsequent 
consequences of earlier abnormal development. It is possible that the abnormalities 
sometimes observed in the cerebellum in autism are the consequence of a primary deficit 
elsewhere. Indeed these abnormalities may not be involved in any of the triad of 
impairments seen in autism. As the cerebellum has long been recognised as vitally 
important in regulating muscle tone, limb movements, timing of movement, speech, 
posture, balance and sensory modulation, perhaps the clinical observations of motor 
clumsiness especially among those who fulfil the criteria for Asperger's Syndrome may be 
explained (Attwood, 1998). 
9.5 INHIBITORY MECHANISMS- IMPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION IN 
AUTISM 
Frontal system models, developed during the last ten years have proposed deficits in 
executive function as the cognitive and neural basis of autism (Ozonoff et al., 1991). One 
aspect of executive function believed to be relatively spared in individuals with autism is 
inhibitory control of action. The first experiment in Chapter 3 was designed to investigate 
an additional low-level inhibitory mechanism, not previously explored, namely `inhibition 
of return'. This basic inhibitory mechanism is thought to exert its effect by producing a 
novelty bias thus preventing perseverative types of errors. From the results reported in 
Chapter 3, it would appear that this mechanism is intact in individuals with autism, 
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providing further support for the notion that inhibition is not contributing to the deficits 
observed among individuals with autism on executive function tasks. 
9.6 SOCIAL ATTENTION IN AUTISM 
An alternative line of investigation, and the one pursued in the remaining chapters of this 
thesis was to examine attention-shifting contingent upon social cues. This line of 
investigation arose because of some of the questions raised in Chapter 5. Firstly, recent 
evidence from the joint attention literature in autism has proposed that orienting attention 
is only problematic when responding to social cues. Secondly, research from the visual 
attention literature has proposed that visuospatial orienting can arise in response to a 
`social' cue in a reflexive manner in typically developing adults. Given the evidence that 
gaze processing is impaired at many different levels in autism, such as eye contact 
(Kanner, 1943), gaze following (Leekam et al., 1998) and joint attention (Charman et al., 
1997), it was deemed important to investigate `social orienting' in individuals with autism. 
Social attention- implications for theory of mind in autism 
The results of Chapter 6 revealed that individuals with autism displayed the same 
relatively automatic orienting response to the gaze direction of another as has been 
reported in typically developing adults. They were however, less able to use this `social' 
information as effectively as the control subjects. It was postulated that there might be a 
developmental delay in acquiring this reflexive orienting response in individuals with 
autism resulting in a reduced ability to use eye gaze information effectively to guide their 
actions. This has some implications for Baron-Cohen's theory of an innate social module 
being specifically damaged in autism, as these results would suggest that some aspect of 
the SAM is intact or can be acquired at a later date. 
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An alternative view to the notion of a predetermined social module in the brain, 
advanced by Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues (1995), is that some degree of 
modularisation is the result of postnatal development, and not a precursor to it. 
Specifically, domain-specific biases in the newborn ensure that cortical circuits are 
preferentially exposed to socially relevant stimuli like language and faces. With prolonged 
exposure to such stimuli, brain circuits develop representations appropriate for processing 
these inputs, eventually giving rise to a super-ordinate system for the pragmatics of social 
interaction in general. In support of this account, there is evidence for a developmental 
progression in the ability to respond to social cues. Research with typically developing 
infants, has shown that in the second half of the first year infants begin to show the ability 
to look in the same direction as an adult's gaze and head turn. However, it is not until the 
age of twelve months that infants reliably look to where someone else is looking, 
regardless of whether a shift in gaze is accompanied by a head turn (Corkum & Moore, 
1995). There is however, some recent evidence to suggest that infants as young as ten 
weeks old orient to gaze shifts alone (Hood, Willen & Driver, 1998). 
In autism, perhaps the initial bias to attend to socially relevant stimuli such as faces 
and language is absent, resulting in less experience of complex interactions with other 
people which in turn affects the basic architecture of the cortex and relevant subcortical 
structures. On this account, individuals with autism may eventually develop an orienting 
response but with a slower time course than typically developing individuals, perhaps 
resulting in a reduced ability to use eye gaze information effectively. 
Recent data may provide some support for the assumption of a developmental trend 
in responding to social cues and for the hypothesis that there may be a delay in autism. 
Swettenham, Milne, Plaisted, Campbell and Coleman (2000) have conducted a series of 
experiments investigating visual orienting in response to social stimuli in children with 
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autism. Children with autism (mean age 10.3 years) and typically developing children were 
assessed using a profile static and dynamic head cue. Typically developing children 
showed a significant cueing effect in both the static and dynamic cueing conditions, 
suggesting that they were reflexively cued by the head orientation. In contrast, the children 
with autism showed no validity effect in either the static or dynamic head cueing 
conditions, suggesting that they were not reflexively orienting to this social cue. 
These results are not convergent with those reported in Chapter 5 where both the 
individuals with autism and the normal comparison group failed to show a reflexive 
orienting response to head orientation. However, it is possible that an early reflexive 
orienting response to the direction of another's head is replaced by an automatic tendency 
to respond to the gaze direction of another during development as one learns that in the 
analysis of social attention, the eyes are often more important. 
However, there may be problems with the interpretation of the results obtained by 
Swettenham et al. (2000) as evidence for reflexive orienting. These authors report a cueing 
effect at both a SOA of 100 and 800ms in the comparison group. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, one of the criteria for reflexive or relatively automatic processing is that it should 
develop quickly and be short lived. Therefore, one might expect the cueing effect to be 
present at the shorter SOA of 100ms and not at the longer SOA of 800ms. An alternative 
explanation for the results reported by Swettenham et al. (2000) might be to suggest that 
the children with autism were complying to the experimental instructions, whereas the 
typically developing children were not. This could be clarified by adopting slightly longer 
SOAs or a different range of SOAs. 
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Implications for central coherence theory 
The difference in performance between the individuals with autism and the comparison 
group in the studies involving inverted stimuli was another significant result of interest. In 
Chapter 6 the orienting response to eye gaze was disrupted by inversion of the stimuli in 
the comparison group, however the group with autism were less affected by this 
manipulation. Furthermore, in Chapter 8, the group with autism showed no decrement in 
performance for inversion of the face stimuli at the hardest discrimination. It was 
suggested that this could provide additional support for the `central coherence theory' of 
autism. It is possible that the individuals with autism adopted a more piecemeal style of 
processing in the analysis of the facial stimuli whereby they were less disrupted by 
inversion. Conversely, the typically developing comparison group adopted a more holistic 
processing style, which is more likely to be disrupted by this manipulation. 
Implications for modular mechanisms involved in social analysis. 
An alternative explanation proffered for the results was the possibility that individuals with 
autism may not have an intact face processing system, relying on object recognition 
systems instead. This may be related to the suggestion made above that lack of a pre- 
disposition to attend to social stimuli, alongside a dearth of experience in social 
interactions may affect the organisation of the cortex. Therefore, in individuals with 
autism, the processing of facial stimuli may be accomplished by a slower or more 
cumbersome object recognition system as opposed to one dedicated to the processing of 
faces. 
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9.7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The study of social attention in autism is a relatively new line of enquiry and there are a 
number of areas where future research could proceed. As discussed in section 9.6, a 
potentially fruitful line of investigation would be to examine the developmental 
progression of `social orienting'. It was suggested that there may be a developmental 
sequence whereby an early appearing automatic or reflexive orienting response to the head 
direction of another is replaced by this same response to the eye gaze direction of another. 
It has yet to be established at what age might this occur in typically developing children 
and whether there is a delay in acquiring this response in individuals with autism. At 
present, there is tentative evidence that typically developing children orient their attention 
in a reflexive manner to the head direction of another at age 10, whereas this response is 
absent in children with autism at this age (Swettenham et al., 2000). To the best of my 
knowledge, no studies of orienting to the eye gaze direction of another have been 
conducted on children. Clarification of this issue could be gained by adopting the social 
cueing studies reported in Chapter 6 in either a longitudinal or cross sectional design. 
Further investigation into the context effects of this orienting response may provide 
useful insight into the enigmatic results reported among the individuals with autism when 
processing inverted stimuli. For example, while it has been shown that typically 
developing individuals orient their attention in an automatic fashion to the gaze direction 
of a schematic face, it is not clear whether presentation of the eyes within the context of 
the whole face is necessary to elicit this response or whether subjects would respond in a 
similar manner to just a picture of the eyes. The results of Chapter 6 and 8 suggested that 
the individuals with autism were less disrupted by inversion of the stimuli. Proposals based 
on `central coherence theory' argued that the individuals with autism were less impaired 
by this manipulation because they adopted a more piecemeal style of processing in 
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deference to processing in a more holistic fashion. Predictions based on this account would 
suggest that the context of a whole face would not be necessary to elicit an automatic 
orienting response in the individuals with autism, and just an isolated picture of the eyes 
would suffice. It could be however, that the eyes, seen in the whole context of a face 
would be necessary to produce an automatic orienting response in typically developing 
individuals. 
While it was shown that individuals with autism were less able to use an eye gaze 
cue when instructed to do so, another line of investigation might be to examine the ability 
of individuals with autism to develop an expectancy from a social cue. Much of our 
perceptual effort is expended for good reason - so that we can operate on the world 
effectively. `We perceive in order to act and we act to perceive' (Pick, 1992). If we 
consider inanimate objects as incapable of independent action, so that what they can do is 
influenced by what we can do to them, their characteristics can be predicted. It could be 
that because people are complex, novel and unpredictable, individuals with autism have 
difficulty in processing information of this nature. The child with autism's need for 
predictability has been noted in both clinical observations and anecdotal accounts and has 
also been demonstrated in experimental studies (Schopler, Brehm, Kinsbourne & Reichler, 
1971; Clark & Rutter, 1981). This need for a highly structured routine and predictable 
environment persists for individuals with autism of all ages and functioning levels in 
contrast to many symptoms, which may attenuate with development (Turner, 1997). This 
may reflect a natural desire to anticipate regular events and therefore exert some sense of 
control over their environment. 
Investigation into whether individuals with autism can develop an expectancy from 
a social cue could be achieved by manipulating the predictability of the cue without 
informing subjects of the probability contingencies and by comparing the invalid-valid 
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reaction time difference under the predictable and unpredictable conditions. If subjects can 
supplement exogenous orienting under the predictable condition with endogenous 
orienting, they should have larger validity effects or larger benefits and/or larger costs 
under the predictable condition than under the unpredictable condition. Studying this 
across development may also be interesting as a previous developmental study of covert 
orienting to peripheral visual cues has revealed that participants aged 6 and 8 were unable 
to take advantage of the predictability of the cue whereas adults aged 20 years were able to 
develop an expectancy in response to probability manipulations (Enns & Brodeur, 1989). 
While the studies reported in this thesis examined two types of `social' cue, social 
interactions are also accompanied by a myriad of gestures. Indeed, another way of 
directing someone's attention aside from a change in eye gaze direction or head orientation 
is to point. Furthermore, this so called `protodeclarative' pointing is largely absent in 
young children with autism (Loveland & Landry, 1986; Landry & Loveland, 1988; Mundy 
et al., 1986; Sigman et al., 1986). One avenue of future investigation might be to examine 
whether pointing gestures also elicit an automatic orienting response in both typically 
developing individuals and among individuals with autism. 
In all the cueing studies reported in this thesis, covert attention was examined. 
However, in the real world we usually move our eyes to the object of our attention. 
Relatively few studies have examined eye movements in individuals with autism and it 
may be of interest to investigate what aspects of scenes they pay attention to. One study 
has reported an abnormality in saccadic eye movements in terms of frequency in 
individuals with autism compared to typically developing and ADHD children (Kemner, 
Verbaten, Cuperus, Camfferman & Van Engeland, 1998). Another recent study by 
Minshew, Luna and Sweeney (1999) report oculomotor evidence for neocortical systems 
but not cerebellar dysfunction in autism. In this study eye movements were recorded 
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during three separate tasks, a visually guided saccade task, an antisaccade response 
suppression task and an occulomotor delayed-response task. No differences were reported 
for peak velocity, duration, latency or accuracy between the high-functioning adolescents 
and young adults with autism and a matched control group in the visually guided saccade 
task. However, the individuals with autism made more response suppression errors in the 
anti-saccade and the delayed response task. In addition the subjects with autism made 
more errors in their initial saccades and in the final resting position of their eyes to 
remembered target locations. These results suggest that it is volitional and not reflexive 
saccades that are impaired in individuals with autism. To provide a more ecologically valid 
regime, future research could investigate the scanning pattern of eye movements in 
individuals with autism when viewing everyday scenes and social situations to determine 
what aspects capture their attention and where they look for information. 
9.8 CONCLUSIONS 
It has been argued that an attention dysfunction is the primary cause of the 
symptomatology in autism (Courchesne et al., 1994). The experimental studies reported in 
this thesis provide no additional support for an attention shifting impairment hypothesis of 
autism. While a behavioural inhibition hypothesis has been proposed to account for 
repetitive behaviour in autism (Turner, 1997) and inhibitory mechanisms have been 
implicated as components involved in executive function tasks where individuals with 
autism perform poorly compared to matched controls, impairments have not 
been found on 
tasks designed to isolate low-level inhibitory mechanisms (Ozonoff et al., 1994; 1997). An 
additional inhibitory mechanism, not previously explored, namely `inhibition of return' 
was investigated in this thesis. From the present results it would appear that this 
mechanism is intact in individuals with autism. The remaining experimental studies 
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investigated social attention and perception in autism. The results of these studies revealed 
that individuals with autism were able to use the larger and more salient head orientation 
cue to direct their attention. They did however, have difficulty in using information 
derived from the eyes, providing further support for the possibility that this impairment 
contributes to their difficulties during social interactions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; 1997). 
Research into the analysis of social attention is a relatively new line of 
investigation, pursuit of which should contribute to the understanding of the difficulties 
experienced by individuals with autism in this area. While of obvious academic interest, 
the results of such research should also be informative to clinicians, carers and teachers, 
which could assist in the treatment and understanding of children and adults with autism. 
An increased understanding of the disorder is critical and should allow treatment to 
become increasingly specified and therefore, more effective. 
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